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This thesis uses a socio-legal methodology to investigate how mental capacity law 
balances protection and empowerment of vulnerable adults in cases concerning 
capacity to: consent to sex, marry and decide on contact. The thesis questions 
answered are: 1) Who is understood to be vulnerable in mental capacity law and why? 
2) To what extent do vulnerable adults participate in mental capacity law proceedings? 
3) What forms of knowledge are valued in mental capacity law? 4) How do mental 
capacity law interventions balance protection and empowerment in relation to adults 
vulnerable to abuse? These questions are answered by analysing empirical data 
collected through Court of Protection observations, case file reviews and social worker 
interviews. 
I argue that mental capacity law views its subjects as inherently vulnerable, 
usually because of their disability, in contrast to viewing adults as being vulnerable for 
situational reasons. Contributing to vulnerability theory, I argue that vulnerability needs 
to be understood in situational, embodied and relational terms, rather than as caused 
by features inherent to the individual, such as their mental disability. Viewing adults as 
vulnerable in situational ways can lead to more nuanced interventions to protect them 
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In this thesis I explore how mental capacity law operates in practice by reference to the 
views of social workers and cases at the Court of Protection (COP). The main focus is 
on cases concerning capacity to consent to sex, capacity to marry and capacity to 
decide on contact. Mental capacity law is often seen through the wording of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and its associated jurisprudence. Understanding mental 
capacity law in this way represents a doctrinal analysis of the law. However, in this 
socio-legal thesis I investigate how the MCA, and associated legal frameworks, 
operate in practice – that is, both in legal proceedings and in social work practice. 
I argue that mental capacity law in practice understands its subjects (commonly 
referred to as ‘P’) to be inherently vulnerable, usually because of their disability. 
Understanding adults as inherently vulnerable leads to a failure to account for the 
situational causes of the adult’s vulnerable position. I explore the implications of 
viewing adults in this way and argue that it results in a paradox of under-protection and 
over-protection, a failure to value the experiential knowledge of P and those close to 
her, and the use of interventions in the name of protection that control rather than 
empower P. Furthermore, I suggest that, in the context of my research at least, mental 
capacity law has become a tool for dealing with abusive behaviour where other legal 
frameworks (such as criminal justice and adult safeguarding) have failed.  
In this chapter I introduce the key themes that permeate this thesis (mental 
disability, abuse of vulnerable adults, protection versus empowerment) and set out the 
legal frameworks that form the background to the discussion. I also provide an 
overview of the research context, including the role of the COP and adult social work. I 
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highlight the gaps in legal research in this area, particularly at the intersection of mental 
capacity and adult safeguarding, and explain how my research helps to address those 
gaps. I finally outline the four research questions that guide my thesis and provide a 
brief overview of each chapter. 
 
2. Key Themes  
 
2.1. Mental disability 
 
In this thesis I refer to adults with ‘mental disabilities’. This term is used to refer to 
adults who may or may not fall within the jurisdiction of the MCA but are deemed to 
have a mental impairment. The range of disabilities covered under this term includes, 
but is not limited to: dementia, learning disability, autism, personality disorder, Down’s 
Syndrome, cerebral atrophy and schizophrenia. Whilst I accept there is a range of 
terminology that could be used, for example cognitive or psychosocial disabilities, I  
adopt this term throughout for clarity and breadth. Firstly, using different terminology in 
different places could be confusing. Secondly, I use the term ‘mental disability’ to 
enable sufficient breadth of analysis. For example, in also using the term mental 
disability Benedet and Grant explain,  “we sought an umbrella term that could describe, 
in a shorthand way, women whose disabilities affect cognition, perception, intellectual 
ability or decision-making, but who are otherwise a heterogeneous group” (Benedet 
and Grant, 2014, p. 133). Therefore the term allows a wide range of individuals who 
may share experiences to be discussed together without suggesting that they are one 
homogenous group. Similarly, the term ‘mental disability’ is regularly used in legal 
literature and therefore assists in bringing different branches of law together (Bartlett, 
2012; Herring, 2012; Benedet and Grant, 2014; Craigie, 2015). Whilst the context of 
this thesis is mental capacity law, my arguments have wider implications for mental 
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health law, criminal law and beyond and therefore this term is used to ensure that my 
arguments are understood in their broadest terms.  
In using the term mental disability I take into account the social model of 
disability which criticises the situating of disability within the biological features of the 
person. Disability theorists challenge this medicalised model of disability and argue that 
the social structures and environment cause a person to experience disability, rather 
than their individualised, biological and inevitable impairment (Oliver, 1990). This is in 
contrast to the medical model which views disabilities as stemming from an individual 
dysfunction to be dealt with primarily through medical treatment. 1 As Clough rightly 
explains, the prevalence of a medical model may have acted as a barrier to those who 
experience mental disabilities asserting their human rights (Clough, 2015, p. 55).  
The social model of disability has achieved a great deal in trying to improve the 
lives of individuals with disabilities and reduce the stigma they experience. However, 
Shakespeare criticises the social model for its impact on disability research; as the 
medical model is rejected, people become sceptical and suspicious of medical 
solutions to impairments (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 30). Similarly, the social model of 
disability has failed to sufficiently account for mental disability and appears to primarily 
serve as a model for considering the negative experiences of the physically disabled 
resulting from environmental structures. Furthermore, in arguing that disability can be 
entirely removed by changing the environment, the social model fails to appreciate that 
for many individuals with severe cognitive impairments changing their environment 
cannot remove the disabling experiences their condition presents. Even in optimum 
environmental conditions they may experience their impairment negatively and not be 
able to function fully (Scully, 2014, p. 207). Whilst this is true, Scully also explains that 
the proportion of vulnerabilities that are purely inherent to the individual are likely to be 
                                                      
1 Albeit that more recent authors are critical of this dichotomy and suggest that it is not only 
those who subscribe to the social model who can or should be seen as working to protect or 
promote the rights of those with disabilities, see Shakespeare (2006). 
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much lower than traditional approaches to disability suggest (Scully, 2014, pp. 207-
208). Therefore a combination of medical and social understandings of disability is 
likely to be useful. 
The biopsychosocial model (Hull, 2006; Clough, 2015) is a bridge between the 
social and medical models of disability. This model emphasises the distinction between 
impairment and disability whilst acknowledging that there is a link between the two. 
According to the World Health Organization, an impairment is a problem in body 
function or structure (World Health Organization, 2018). Impairment is therefore seen 
as more biological in nature, although it still might include reference to a variation in 
bodily functioning from the biological ‘norm’. Disability on the other hand is described 
as “a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of a person’s 
body and features of the society in which he or she lives” (World Health Organization, 
2018). Therefore the biopsychosocial understanding of disability recognises the 
relationship between various biological, psychological and social factors (Shakespeare, 
2006) to bridge the gap between the medical and social approaches.  
‘Mental disability’ could be viewed as either impairment or disability. It could be 
caused by something biological and inherent (an impairment) or by environmental and 
situational factors (a disability). More likely is that the distinction between biological and 
environmental features is not so clear cut. The problem, as I explain in Chapter Two, is 
that an inherent impairment, such as a mental disability, is too often categorised as 
making that person especially or disproportionately vulnerable. The social model, and 
subsequent critiques, helps to draw this out even if it does not fully account for the 
experiences of all of those with mental disabilities.  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UNCRPD) articulates the social model of disability. It contains a number of provisions 
which try to ensure non-discrimination on the grounds of disability, most of which I do 
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not have the space to explore in this thesis.2 This international human rights instrument 
entered into force on 3 May 2008 and was ratified by the United Kingdom on 8 June 
2009, although legally it only has the status of an international treaty and therefore 
primary legislation, including the MCA, prevails. The UNCRPD’s importance lies in its 
disability neutral approach. As Bartlett explains: 
 
Disability is articulated not in terms of limitations or impairments of 
disabled people, but as flowing from inadequate social responses to the 
particular needs of individuals in society. (Bartlett, 2012, p. 753). 
 
There are two main provisions of the UNCRPD which I refer to in this thesis. Firstly, 
Article 12 UNCRPD requires state parties to “… recognize that persons with disabilities 
enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life” as well as to “… 
take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support 
they may require in exercising their legal capacity”. Respecting legal capacity requires 
the state to ensure the individual is able to make their own decisions about their lives 
and take part in legal processes, irrespective of their mental capacity. This issue of 
legal capacity is important for this thesis and arises in Chapters Five and Six where I 
discuss participation and the role of evidence in mental capacity law proceedings. A 
second important provision of the UNCRPD is Article 16, which requires state parties 
to: 
 
... take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, educational and 
other measures to protect persons with disabilities, both within and 
outside the home, from all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse, 
                                                      
2 For a further analysis of issues relating to the UNCRPD see in particular Bartlett (2012) and 
Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (2014). 
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including their gender-based aspects. 
 
This provision is relevant to this thesis because, as I explain in the following section, 
the cases explored primarily concerned abuse. However, precisely what the UNCRPD 
requires in this regard is unclear. Bartlett and Schulze describe it as more than a 
simplistic libertarian document that simply requires the right to be left alone (Bartlett 
and Schulze, 2017, p. 3). Instead they suggest that Article 16 can be interpreted 
alongside the other provisions to ensure the proper realisation of the rights contained 
within the convention. Therefore the UNCRPD, whilst taking a social approach to 
understanding disability, also requires that adults with disabilities are protected from 
abuse through positive steps. An important question is how states respond to abuse 
against people with mental disabilities. Bartlett and Schulze argue that the UNCRPD 
does not only require an equality of approach between disabled people and others, but 
that it requires giving more protection to people with disabilities who suffer abuse 
(Bartlett and Schulze, 2017, p.9). Therefore it is a possible interpretation of the 
UNCRPD that even when the general population has no comparable protections from 
abuse, people with disabilities should be provided with protection. Whilst I do not 
question the need for protection from abuse for people with mental disabilities, and that 
is a theme that permeates this thesis, the form that that protection should take requires 
deeper scrutiny. If, as I argue, mental capacity law is more likely to apply to adults who 
have experienced abuse and, furthermore, the use of mental capacity law to protect is 
controlling rather than empowering, then it is unlikely to be UNCRPD compliant. 
 
2.2. Adults vulnerable to abuse 
 
As noted above, many of the cases that arose in this research concerned abuse. In 
some cases this was abuse by intimate partners or family members and in others it 
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was abuse by acquaintances or those unknown to P. The primary reason for this 
recurring theme was because I focused on cases concerning capacity to consent to 
sex, capacity to marry and capacity to decide on contact. The subject matter of those 
cases almost always centred on allegations of abuse, something I explore further in 
Chapters Four and Seven (also see Table A1, Appendix one, for a summary of the 
subject matter of the cases reviewed at the COP). 
Whilst the arguments in this thesis apply to men and women, intimate abuse is 
a gendered phenomenon (Benedet and Grant, 2014). Females are more likely to be 
victims of intimate abuse in nearly all of its forms (Office for National Statistics, 2017).3 
Furthermore, women with mental disabilities are additionally more vulnerable to sexual 
abuse in particular (Martin et al., 2006; Benedet and Grant, 2012). This is for a number 
of reasons including that abuse is perpetrated by those in positions of trust, the role of 
institutionalisation and segregation (Hollomotz, 2011, pp. 36, 72-73; Plummer and 
Findley, 2012, p. 23) and the targeting of groups less likely to resist or report violence 
(Martin et al., 2006, p. 824). Women with mental disabilities are also vulnerable in the 
way that all women are; as a result of society’s failures to address violence against 
women (Benedet and Grant, 2014).  
Benedet and Grant consider “prevention of and redress for sexual violence to 
be a precondition to meaningful sexual self-determination…” (Benedet and Grant, 
2014, p. 136). By allowing sexual (and other forms of) violence against women to 
continue unchallenged we further undermine women’s ability to develop the capacities 
required for autonomy (Benedet and Grant, 2014). This is the case for women 
generally as well as women with mental disabilities. The relevance of this discussion 
for this thesis is, as I outline in Chapter Four, too often women with mental disabilities 
                                                      
3 The Office for National Statistics confirm this is the case for all forms of intimate violence 
except for non-sexual family abuse where the difference between men and women was not 
significant. They also define intimate violence by reference to a number of different forms of 
physical and non-physical abuse including partner abuse, family abuse, sexual assault and 
stalking (Office for National Statistics, 2017). 
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who are subjected to sexual abuse are left under-protected. The reasons for this 
include attitudes of those working in law and social care, as well as persistent failures 
of the criminal justice system to recognise and give value to the experiences of those 
who have suffered sexual violence (Benedet and Grant, 2014). For example, there are 
a number of reported cases where the police appear not to have taken action against 
perpetrators.4 Therefore whilst I am mindful of the potential for over-protection, I also 
urge caution about the failures to protect vulnerable adults, particularly women with 
mental disabilities who suffer intimate abuse.  
 
2.3. Empowerment versus protection 
 
A final theme that permeates this thesis is the balance between empowerment and 
protection. This is a theme which is present throughout mental capacity law but is 
intensified in the context of abuse because there is a greater protection imperative. I 
use the term empowerment to mean encouraging and facilitating the adult to: develop 
the skills and abilities needed to live a fulfilling life, to make decisions for herself, and to 
have her decisions respected. In other words therefore, being empowered involves 
having a sense of control over one’s life. As has been identified elsewhere, adults with 
mental disabilities have long lacked this sense of empowerment and control 
(Hollomotz, 2011). Others argue that the imperative to intervene in the name of adult 
protection could lead to those individuals being disempowered (Dunn, Clare and 
Holland, 2008). This argument is particularly prevalent in the context of vulnerability 
discourse as there are concerns about the over-protection of adults who are 
categorised as vulnerable (Dunn, Clare and Holland, 2008; Hollomotz, 2011). 
However, as I outline in Chapter Two, much of this turns on how we view vulnerability 
                                                      
4 Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38, The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v 
TB and SA [2014] EWCOP 53, Birmingham City Council v Riaz and others [2014] EWHC 4247.  
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and I advocate a nuanced, situational and embodied understanding throughout this 
thesis. 
Empowerment is an important concept in this area, at the very least as a 
mechanism to ensure that adults with mental disabilities are given the same respect as 
other adults in society. In the absence of empowerment discourse there is a risk of 
reverting back to the protection imperative, which may result in controlling 
interventions, something I explore in Chapter Seven, and a failure to value the 
experiences of the adult in question as explored in Chapter Five. In some cases the 
adult requires protection for a reason unrelated to their disability. In other cases their 
vulnerability might be exacerbated by their disability, for example where they are 
specifically targeted by an abuser. Therefore, and particularly in light of Article 16 
UNCRPD, in many cases the subjects of mental capacity law are vulnerable and do 
need protection. How the balance between empowerment and protection is resolved 
requires further analysis. 
In advocating solutions to the problems identified throughout this thesis, I have 
tried to strike a balance between empowerment and protection because the two 
concepts do not necessarily conflict. As Keeling explains, “increased involvement of 
the individual in their own safeguarding investigation is increasing empowerment and 
resulting in better, more stable outcomes” (Keeling, 2017, p. 83) and this is supported 
by evidence from practice (Cooper et al., 2015). Therefore by endeavouring to balance 
protection and empowerment, I advocate original solutions based both on empowering 
the adult to participate in decision-making whilst also suggesting innovative 




3. Research Context: Adult Social Care and the COP 
 
In this section I provide an overview of the research context, focusing on resource 
allocation in adult social care and the COP. This background context requires setting 
out because it inevitably shapes the practice of law in this area. Concerns about 
resource allocation permeate any area of public law because the challenges involved 
in public authorities carrying out their statutory duties are inevitably impacted by the 
availability of resources. Therefore one of the central material factors that shapes the 
findings in this thesis is adult social care provision in England.5 In recent years there 
has been a reduction in public spending which has meant local authorities are less able 
to meet the needs of service users (Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 
2015). Evidence shows that despite demand increasing in 2013-14 (up four per 
cent from 2012-13 and up six per cent from 2008-09), the provision of services in the 
same period went down four per cent from 2012-13 and down 29 per cent from 2008-
09 (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2014).  Correspondingly, the time that 
social workers have to spend with each service user has also fallen. Insufficient 
budgets alongside increased workloads mean that social workers simply do not have 
the time to spend with service users to sufficiently seek their views or to give weight to 
their input into the decision-making process, thereby risking disempowering them 
further.  
Adult social care has historically been underfunded and difficult to access, in 
contrast to NHS services which, although have had their share of funding challenges, 
have generally been free at the point of need (Humphries, 2013, p. 3). Structurally, 
adult health and social care spending has been focused on acute needs at times of 
                                                      
5 There is insufficient space here to consider all of the contributing causes to this complex issue. 
However, one other important material cause is the fact that the disability movement has only 
recently developed a significant voice within the legal sphere, in contrast for example to the 
criminal justice system where the lobbying and advocacy system for defendants and prisoners 
has resulted in increased rights for those involved in the criminal justice process. 
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crisis rather than long term, supportive engagement (Humphries, 2013). Furthermore, 
levels of funding were facing downward pressures precisely at a time when demands 
for P’s voice to be heard were beginning to increase, particularly in light of the 
UNCRPD’s ‘paradigm shift’ in thinking about mental disability (Clough, 2015). 
Therefore the material pressures faced by adult social care over many years have, in 
part, contributed to the failure to listen to service users. This is exacerbated by funding 
constraints which do not allow for social workers to spend sufficient time with service 
users to ascertain and give weight to their views. Whilst this is the result of material 
causes, it is reinforced as the service user is excluded from decision-making 
processes. It becomes normal to make decisions on behalf of instead of with the 
person as they are treated as “‘objects’ with limited agency and control, rather than 
‘subjects’ of the law” (Keeling, 2017, p. 80). 
Unsurprisingly, being able to maintain a continuing relationship with the same 
social worker and allowing sufficient time for service users to express their needs and 
wishes are central to effective social work practise (Meakin and Matthews, 2015, p. 
19). However, attitudinal problems in social work, such as not valuing the service 
user’s experience, may also be partially attributable to funding issues as time 
pressures are a factor in obtaining and attributing value to such experiences (Meakin 
and Matthews, 2015, p. 33). Furthermore, evidence shows that of those who sought 
access to social services, the majority were signposted to other services (31%) or did 
not receive a service at all (28%) (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015). 
Of those who were permitted access, the ever-increasing demand alongside cuts to 
adult social care budgets will inevitably present a challenge for levels of support.  
Similarly, bringing a case to the COP, the court that deals with disputes under 
the MCA, can be extremely costly. For example, research suggests that it costs an 
estimated £13,000 for a local authority to take a welfare case to the COP (Series et al., 
2017b). Furthermore, during 2013-14 81% of local authorities in England reported 
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being involved in at least one COP welfare case, the average number was three and 
4% had been involved in more than ten (Series et al., 2015b). The decisions that reach 
the COP are only a small fraction of the cases that involve capacity issues in health 
and social care and the high cost of proceedings may be one factor which deters local 
authorities from bringing cases to court. If fewer cases were taken to court that may 
help to divert resources away from the legal process back to front line services, which 
in turn may improve the situation for service users on the ground. There may therefore 
be pressure to seek an out of court resolution in light of current resource constraints, 
albeit cases do still reach the COP and part of the aim of this thesis is to understand 
why. 
In this thesis I acknowledge that focusing on legal proceedings may ignore the 
reality of how mental capacity law applies in everyday settings. In those cases which 
do not reach court, individual social workers or other professionals may instead rely on 
the ‘general defence’ contained within s 5 MCA, which provides protection for those 
who act in a person’s best interests in relation to care or treatment where they 
reasonably believe that the person lacks the capacity to make that decision. Therefore 
the practice of mental capacity law by local authorities may be overshadowed by the 
presence of funding constraints and restrictions on time, resources and training, as well 
as the ability to fall back on s 5 MCA. In proposing solutions in this thesis I am 
therefore mindful of these constraints and take them into account in any proposals for 
reform. 
 
4. The Legal Frameworks 
 
In this section I introduce the legal frameworks referred to throughout this thesis. The 
primary legislation is the MCA. However, this area of law is complex and often 
intersects with other frameworks. Therefore I also provide an introduction to the Care 
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Act 2014, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act 2007 (FMCPA) and consider how they relate to this thesis. The criminal 
law and the Mental Health Act 1983 are also two further potentially relevant legal 
frameworks. However, these latter two areas are not considered in any detail in this 
thesis as they did not arise as a theme from the empirical data.  
 
4.1. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the concept of autonomy  
 
The MCA is the legal framework at the core of this thesis and sets out an entire 
legislative structure on mental capacity. The MCA allows for interventions in the lives of 
adults who lack the capacity to make decisions in various domains,6 thus denying legal 
capacity to those who lack the mental capacity to make decisions for themselves 
(Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, 2014). The MCA includes clear principles at its outset 
which include that “[a] person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is 
established that he lacks capacity”7 and that “[a] person is not to be treated as unable 
to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision”.8 This presumption 
of capacity, even for unwise decisions, is important in the context of sex, marriage and 
contact cases because there is often a strong imperative to protect an adult from 
exploitative relationships. Allegations of abuse dominate the sex, marriage and contact 
cases in mental capacity law and where an adult is in an abusive situation, this may 
shift the delicate balance from empowerment towards protection. 
Recent literature acknowledges the challenges posed when borderline 
capacitous adults make seemingly unwise decisions (Herring, 2012; Clough, 2014; 
Herring and Wall, 2014; Series, 2014). The capacity/incapacity binary in the MCA 
means that any adult with capacity can make decisions for themselves, even if those 
                                                      
6 s 1 (5) MCA. 
7 s 1 (2) MCA. 
8 s 1 (4) MCA. 
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decisions are deemed unwise. Whereas once a person crosses the threshold of 
incapacity, decisions can be made by the court on their behalf in their best interests.9 
This binary obviously lacks nuance in considering the reasons why capacity might be 
impaired in particular instances and the ways in which it could be facilitated in others. 
The primary concern of scholars who criticise the direction of the current law is that 
findings of capacity can leave vulnerable adults without protection. For example, 
Herring explains this gap in protection as one between “having capacity under the MCA 
and being genuinely autonomous” (Herring, 2016, p. 64). This implies that individuals 
who make decisions to stay in abusive relationships may, legally, have the capacity to 
make those choices, but he argues those choices cannot properly be characterised as 
autonomous. Herring focuses on the concept of autonomy to highlight the problem of 
the capacity binary in hard cases. 
The MCA has been described as the “gatekeeper for autonomy” (Donnelly, 
2010) and the concept of autonomy is at the heart of debates about the MCA. Whilst 
the meaning of autonomy and the different interpretations of it are vast and worthy of 
their own detailed analysis which I do not have the space to explore here, 10  it is 
important to acknowledge the role of autonomy in mental capacity law because it 
shapes much of the literature. The principle of autonomy is engaged to protect an 
individual’s right to choose how to live their life – to protect their self-determination. 
However, precisely what this requires varies depending on the particular conception of 
autonomy adopted. Liberal accounts of autonomy have asserted that autonomous 
choices are independent, self-interested and rational (Kant, 1998).11 Liberal theorists 
similarly argue that autonomous choices should not be interfered with, albeit Coggon 
                                                      
9 s 1 (5) MCA. 
10 See section 2.2 of Chapter Two for further analysis of the meaning of autonomy. 
11 Notwithstanding the differences between different liberal understandings of autonomy. For 
example, Donnelly sets out the difference between Kantian interpretations of autonomy and 




and Miola argue that, strictly speaking, non-interference protects liberty rather than 
autonomy (Coggon and Miola, 2011). In this liberal understanding of autonomous 
decision-making, the content of the decision is not what matters, but the ability of the 
person to self-govern and make their own choices about how to live their lives. 
Preserving this right for autonomous adults to make their own decisions and 
empowering them through law to do so is certainly an important liberal principle worth 
defending.  
Some take the concept of autonomy beyond this liberal account to argue for a 
relational approach. Relational autonomy takes into account the personal relationships 
and other environmental and contextual factors that impact upon an individual’s 
decision-making (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Mackenzie, 2014b; Herring, 2016). In 
this respect, relational autonomy requires considering the constraints on individual 
choices that arise from particular, harmful relationships (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; 
Mackenzie, 2014b). Therefore a decision may not fulfil the liberal criteria for rationality 
because it appears to go against the individual’s interests, but relational theorists argue 
that might be because of the relational context within which that person is living. For 
example, staying in an abusive relationship might appear irrational to outsiders on an 
abstract analysis. However, perhaps that choice appears more rational in light of well-
established evidence that the point of leaving an abusive relationship is the time when 
women are at highest risk of the most serious abuse (Humphreys and Thiara, 2003, p. 
200). 
Whilst liberal and relational accounts of autonomy have a different focus, both 
can be engaged to argue that certain decisions (or people) are not autonomous, 
therefore justifying interference with those decisions (Coggon and Miola, 2011; Herring, 
2016; Kong, 2017). This approach can emerge from liberal accounts of autonomy on 
the basis that only autonomous decision-making should be protected by law. Therefore 
if a person lacks the rational capabilities to self-govern, the law need not protect her 
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decisions. Similarly, but for different reasons, on a relational account of autonomy, 
decisions may be overridden. It could be argued that the social conditions a person is 
in undermine her decision-making abilities such that it is not reflective of her true 
desires or values. The example often given is of a person who accepts her own 
oppression by, for example, agreeing to be enslaved. On both liberal and relational 
accounts, a person’s lack of, or reduced, autonomy can lead to law interfering with her 
decisions. Thus a lack of autonomy also impacts on liberty. The liberal account of 
autonomy is reflected in the test for capacity in the MCA in that if a person does not 
meet a certain threshold of understanding then decisions can be made on their behalf 
in their best interests.12 Conversely, the inherent jurisdiction, which I discuss in section 
4.2 below, arguably reflects a more relational understanding of autonomy as it looks at 
the vulnerability of the adult to undue influence by others and justifies interference on 
that basis.  
Whilst the MCA most reflects a liberal conception of autonomy, concerns about 
interference with the liberty of adults and the difficulties in identifying what constitutes 
non-autonomous decision-making may partly explain why the law has adopted a low, 
‘act-specific’ threshold for capacity to consent to sex and marriage. The test for 
capacity to consent to sex was originally set out in obiter comments by Munby J (as he 
then was) in a pre MCA decision, X City Council v MB.13 The information deemed 
relevant to a decision to consent to sex includes understanding:14 
 
(a) the mechanics of the sexual act; 
(b) that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of 
sexually transmitted and sexually transmissible infections; and  
                                                      
12 s 1 (5) MCA. 
13 [2006] 2 F.L.R. 968. 
14 Local Authority X v MM [2007] EWHC 2003, D Borough Council v AB [2011] EWHC 101, The 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB and SA [2014] EWCOP 53, IM v (1) LM (2) AB (3) 
Liverpool City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 37. 
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(c) that sex between a man and a woman may result in the woman 
becoming pregnant. 
 
The mechanics of the sexual act covers the functional and physical aspects of sex. 
Understanding the health risks most often requires an understanding that sexual 
activity can result in sexually transmitted infections (STIs).  The third aspect of the 
relevant information is that P must understand the possibility that sex can result in 
pregnancy, but does not require knowledge of childbirth or the bringing up of a child. 
These three aspects are at the core of the test for capacity to consent to sex and set a 
relatively low threshold for understanding. There is some debate as to whether the test 
also includes whether the person understands that they can say no to sex, with the 
judges coming to different conclusions in Derbyshire County Council v AC15 and The 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB and SA.16 Despite the uncertainty in relation to 
this additional aspect, the test currently requires at least an understanding of the 
mechanics, health risks and possibility of pregnancy. Similarly, the legal test for 
capacity to marry is also act-specific. The following principles inform the legal test for 
capacity to marry: 17 
 
a) Marriage is status specific not person specific. 
b) The wisdom of the marriage is irrelevant. 
c) P must understand the broad nature of the marriage contract. 
d) P must understand the duties and responsibilities that normally attach to 
marriage, including that there may be financial consequences and that spouses 
have a particular status and connection with regard to each other. 
                                                      
15 [2014] EWCOP 38, where it was held that the whether or not a person understands they can 
say no to sex was not a required part of the relevant information.  
16 [2014] EWCOP 53, where it was held that for a person to have capacity to consent to sex part 
of the relevant information would be whether or not they have a choice and can refuse. 
17 The London Borough of Southwark v KA [2016] EWCOP 20 para 76. 
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e) The essence of marriage is for two people to live together and to love one 
another. 
f) P must not lack capacity to enter into sexual relations. 
 
Whilst the test for marriage is arguably more complex than for sexual activity, it is still a 
low threshold and does not allow for a consideration of the features of a particular 
marriage with a particular individual. 18  For both sex and marriage, the act-specific 
approach means that decisions can only be considered in the abstract – whether or not 
a person understands the relevant information in a general, rather than specific, 
sense.19 There is limited recourse to the circumstances in which the decision is made 
or the environmental, social or economic factors that might influence the decision. 
Some argue that this can leave vulnerable adults unprotected (Clough, 2014; Herring 
and Wall, 2014). In contrast, a person-specific test considers whether or not a person 
understands the nature and character of the particular activity with a particular person 
in particular circumstances. It can therefore lead to findings of incapacity which can 
protect the person from that particular relationship whilst still facilitating their sexual 
autonomy in relation to other, non-exploitative relationships.  
In this thesis I also explore cases concerning capacity to decide on contact. 
This was partly because case law shows that incapacity for contact is sometimes used 
as a way of regulating intimate relationships. For example, in a number of reported 
cases, the courts have reached a different conclusion in regards to a person’s capacity 
to consent to contact compared to their capacity to consent to sexual activity –20 that is, 
the courts have found that under the act-specific approach P has been deemed to have 
the capacity to consent to sex but under the person-specific approach P has been 
                                                      
18 York City Council v C and another [2013] EWCA Civ 478. 
19 This position was affirmed in IM v (1) LM (2) AB (3) Liverpool City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 
37. 
20 Local Authority X v MM [2007] EWHC 2003, Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 
38 and A Local Authority v TZ (No. 2) [2014] EWHC 973. 
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found to lack the capacity to decide with whom she should have (sexual) contact. 
Unlike sex and marriage, capacity to decide on contact can be a person-specific test, 
as explained by MacFarlane LJ in York City Council v C and another:21 
 
The determination of capacity under MCA 2005… is decision specific. 
Some decisions, for example agreeing to marry or consenting to 
divorce, are status or act specific. Some other decisions, for example 
whether P should have contact with a particular individual, may be 
person specific. 
 
Furthermore, according to Cobb J in WBC v Z and others22 the relevant information 
that needs to be understood, retained and weighed or used for a decision about 
contact to be capacitous includes:23 
 
… an understanding of the positives and negatives of having contact, or 
a relationship, with another individual, and an ability to assess the risks 
posed by another individual or situations from which to extricate herself 
if she were vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
It is arguable that having an act-specific approach to sex and marriage, but a person-
specific approach to contact, facilitates a liberal account of sexual autonomy and 
promotes liberty in that it maximises the numbers of people who are able to enjoy 
intimate relationships without interference (Clough 2014; Series, 2014). Individuals are 
able to have intimate relationships but it provides the state with some ability to 
supervise their contact with abusive others, an issue I explore in Chapter Seven. Whilst 
                                                      
21 [2013] EWCA Civ 478 para 35.  
22 [2016] EWCOP 4. 
23 para 38. 
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this distinction is criticised by those who see it as unprincipled and illogical (Ruck 
Keene et al., 2014), it is a potentially useful way of protecting vulnerable adults from 
abusive relationships within the confines of mental capacity law. It means that social 
workers or court appointed deputies24 could monitor and decide who a person is safe to 
have intimate contact with, without the need for a wide-ranging finding of incapacity in 
relation to all intimate relationships. 
The low threshold for capacity to marry and consent to sex reflects concerns 
about interfering in the decisions of adults. For example, the operation of s 27 MCA 
means that a court cannot decide that it is in a person’s best interests to engage in 
sexual activity or get married.25 This means that any finding of incapacity in respect of 
sex and marriage has potentially highly restrictive consequences for the adult in 
question. It could mean that they are prevented from engaging in any intimate contact 
whatsoever and may therefore be accompanied by highly restrictive supervisory 
arrangements, an issue I consider further in Chapter Seven. Whilst having a relatively 
low threshold for capacity protects the widest conception of sexual autonomy, it can 
mean that the balance between empowerment and protection is not always achieved in 
individual cases. 
As this discussion has shown, the concept of autonomy pervades mental 
capacity law. It has influenced the direction of the jurisprudence to primarily protect a 
liberal conception of autonomy and, more specifically, non-interference (Donnelly, 
2010). However, in this thesis I move away from this focus on autonomy. This is partly 
because focusing on autonomy does not further our normative understanding of the 
appropriate balance between protection and empowerment in mental capacity law. 
Apart from the fact that it problematically relies on having an agreed definition of 
autonomy, which can detract from providing real solutions for people, it also has the 
                                                      
24 s 16 MCA. 
25 s 27 (1) MCA. 
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potential to justify highly restrictive and disempowering interventions in peoples’ lives in 
the name of their own protection. Similarly, viewing people as acting ‘non-
autonomously’ can impact on how we view and empower them as participants in 
society more broadly. Furthermore, in cases where there are allegations of abuse, it 
may not actually be a question of a lack of autonomy, rather, an overpowering of 
autonomy or a failure by the state to protect autonomy by not taking action against the 
abuser. As Clough persuasively states in this respect “[i]t [the mental capacity 
framework] does not engage with the crux of the problem” (Clough, 2014, p. 381) and I 
consider this partly to be because of the emphasis on the concept of autonomy in the 
literature. 
There has also been extensive debate about the appropriate balance between 
empowerment and protection in sex and marriage cases, but again much of this has 
focused on whether the act-specific or person-specific test would better protect 
autonomy. Some argue that a person-specific approach would better protect vulnerable 
adults who might have capacity but are not necessarily autonomous (Herring, 2012; 
Clough 2014) whereas others have raised concerns about interference in the lives of 
adults with disabilities (Hollomotz, 2011; Dunn, Clare and Holland, 2008) as well as 
their limited participation in decision-making (Hollomotz, 2011; Keeling 2017). 
However, where cases concern allegations of abuse, I question whether the distinction 
between autonomous and non-autonomous decision-making should be the focus. 
Many welfare cases are not brought to court under the MCA because of concerns 
about autonomy. They are brought because of concerns the individual is vulnerable, 
whether that be to abuse, exploitation or self-neglect.26 Whilst much of the literature 
centres on the legal test for mental capacity, and its underpinning principle of 
autonomy, I instead use vulnerability theory to analyse this area. In doing this, I 
consider the types of cases that reach court and in relation to which vulnerable adults, 
                                                      
26 This thesis does not consider the issue of self-neglect.  
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the interventions that are applied and how they exacerbate or protect against 
vulnerability, and the overall balance between empowerment and protection in those 
cases. 
In shifting the focus from autonomy to vulnerability, as well as considering the 
relationship between the two concepts, the interaction between mental capacity and 
safeguarding adults law requires further analysis. In fact, one of the difficulties with this 
area of law is the overlap between a number of different legal frameworks, with many 
professionals and service users struggling to know where the boundaries lie. As 
Pritchard-Jones explains, “[u]nfortunately only when the courts begin to engage the 
[inherent] jurisdiction rather than forcing such cases under the Mental Capacity Act will 
these areas open up for discussion” (Pritchard-Jones 2016, p. 66). Therefore whilst I 
focus on mental capacity law in practice and consider ways in which it can better 
protect and empower vulnerable adults, I also consider the interlocking jurisdictions of 
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, Care Act 2014 and FMCPA 2007. As 
Keywood explains “mental health law and mental capacity law are ill-suited to 
addressing the array of safeguarding concerns that local authorities ought to be 
confronting” (Keywood, 2017, p. 91). Therefore I argue that, in many instances, these 
alternative frameworks provide better solutions for vulnerable adults than the MCA. 
 
4.2. The Care Act 2014 and adult safeguarding 
 
The Care Act 2014 placed adult safeguarding on a statutory footing. Safeguarding is 
concerned with the state’s obligation to protect the health, rights and welfare of 
persons who are unable to protect themselves from abuse. Whilst a number of 
agencies will be involved in adult safeguarding, the primary duty is on local authorities 
who are required to protect adults with care and support needs who are experiencing, 
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or are at risk of, abuse or neglect, and as a result are unable to protect themselves.27 
This represents a movement away from the internalising discourses of the MCA and 
previous No Secrets guidance (Department of Health, 2000) because there is no 
reference to internal features such as disability and it has been acknowledged at para 
5.2 of the Office of the Public Guardian’s Safeguarding Policy that “…the term 
‘vulnerable adult’ may wrongly imply that some of the fault for the abuse lies with the 
victim of abuse” (Office of the Public Guardian, 2017). The distinction is in the subtle 
wording of s 42; whether or not an adult with care needs is able to protect themselves 
is an important way of encompassing those who might suffer a mental disability without 
defining them as vulnerable solely on that basis. Vulnerable adults may find it more 
difficult to protect themselves due to their disability, but also as a result of their life 
experiences, or lack thereof. 
The Care Act 2014 does not have any additional enforcement mechanisms 
despite a power of entry being considered (Department of Health, 2017), but it does 
require local authorities to set up Safeguarding Adults Boards, 28  multi-agency 
cooperation29 and provide an annual report.30 Once a safeguarding enquiry has been 
undertaken, there are no mechanisms to guide how local authorities should respond to 
abuse. On reviewing statutory guidance (Department of Health, 2017) and evidence 
from Hansard debates, for example in questions from Paul Burstow MP (2014), it was 
clearly not Parliament’s intention for local authorities to do nothing where abuse was 
identified. A better interpretation for the lack of a power or duty to intervene is resource 
related; in difficult financial times Parliament did not want to interfere with the discretion 
that local authorities have in deciding how best to allocate resources (Herring, 2016, p. 
178). 
                                                      
27 s 42 (1) Care Act 2014. 
28 s 43 Care Act 2014. 
29 s 6 (7) Care Act 2014. 
30 schedule 2 para 4 Care Act 2014. 
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The limited effectiveness of the Care Act 2014 (and previous safeguarding 
frameworks) is arguably one of the reasons why abuse cases dominate mental 
capacity law. Given that the inherent jurisdiction is the way civil interventions under the 
s 42 safeguarding provisions of the Care Act have any legal bite, I argue that the Care 
Act renews the inherent jurisdiction’s authority (Lindsey, 2016a). The inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court explicitly allows High Court judges to intervene where 
they are faced with a ‘vulnerable adult’. Historically, the inherent jurisdiction pre-dates 
the MCA and its background was as a parens patriae jurisdiction (Herring, 2016, pp. 
72-76). Today the inherent jurisdiction can be invoked to allow judges to intervene to 
protect a vulnerable adult even where the person has capacity to make a decision 
under the MCA. 31  The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction can be invoked where a 
vulnerable adult is “reasonably believed to be, (i) under constraint, (ii) subject to 
coercion or undue influence, or (iii) for some other reason deprived of the capacity to 
make the relevant decision, or disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or 
disabled from giving or expressing a real and genuine consent”. 32 This conception 
reflects a more relational understanding of autonomy than the MCA. In situations 
where the MCA does not apply, for example where the threshold for incapacity is not 
reached, the inherent jurisdiction provides professionals with an alternative route to 
safeguarding (Department of Health, 2016). As Herring explains, “the inherent 
jurisdiction challenges the binary divide between those who have capacity and those 
who do not… by offering the potential for legal intervention when a person has 
capacity, but only just” (Herring, 2016, p. 71).  
The inherent jurisdiction has undoubtedly survived the enactment of the MCA,33 
despite the legislative authority of the MCA and the intention that it was to replace the 
inherent jurisdiction (Law Commission, 1995, p. 16). Perhaps this is because 
                                                      
31 A Local Authority v DL and others [2012] EWCA Civ 253. 
32 A Local Authority v SA [2005] EWHC 2942 para 77. 
33 A Local Authority v DL and others [2012] EWCA Civ 253. 
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“vulnerability casts a much wider gaze than the mental capacity approach” (Clough, 
2014, p. 372) and therefore allows for exposure of the situational conditions that make 
people at risk of abuse. The implementation of the Care Act has arguably addressed 
some of the constitutional concerns about the post-MCA use of the inherent 
jurisdiction, for example there were concerns about the use of the common law 
alongside a statutory framework (Miles, 2011; Hewson, 2013). The inherent jurisdiction 
can arguably be used as a way of responding to abuse identified as a result of a 
safeguarding enquiry under s 42 Care Act 2014. I have written elsewhere about the 
value of the inherent jurisdiction and Care Act being used together to safeguard 
vulnerable adults (Lindsey, 2016a), particularly given the weaknesses in enforcement 
within the Care Act. 
Therefore the use of the inherent jurisdiction and Care Act together in 
safeguarding cases may also better enable UNCRPD compliance (Herring, 2016, p. 
96) in relation to Articles 12 and 16 as the inherent jurisdiction is, on the face of it at 
least, disability neutral. However, as I explain in Chapter Four, who is considered to be 
vulnerable, and in what ways, influences who is subject to the law. Whilst the inherent 
jurisdiction is not the focus of the research, it provides an insight into how a 
vulnerability analysis might operate as a legal tool. 
 
4.3. The Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
 
The final legal framework I introduce here is the FMCPA. This legislation was enacted 
to help address the problem of forced marriage through the civil law. Given the subject 
matter of this thesis, the research inevitably touched on forced marriage cases, despite 
this not being the primary focus, again highlighting the complexity of mental capacity 
welfare cases. The boundaries of what constitutes a ‘forced marriage’ are arguably not 
easy to define and links with the practice of arranged marriage need to be carefully 
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drawn (Enright, 2009). However, under s 63A Family Law Act 1996 (as amended by 
the FMCPA) the court can make an order to prevent a person from being forced into a 
marriage. A person is deemed to be forced into a marriage if another person forces 
them to do so without their free and full consent.34 'Force' includes coercion by threats 
or other psychological means. 35  Therefore force in this context includes a lack of 
consent, which may be achieved through violence or threats or through other forms of 
psychological pressure.  
The reason that many forced marriage cases appear before the COP is that a 
person who lacks capacity to enter into a marriage is deemed to be forced into that 
marriage because there is an absence of consent. The operation of s 27 MCA means 
that no other person, including the COP, can consent to the marriage on P’s behalf. 
Urgent proceedings may be brought under the FMCPA if an agency, such as the local 
authority, is concerned that a person who they suspect lacks capacity is going to 
marry. A Forced Marriage Protection Order (FMPO) can then be obtained which can 
contain prohibitions, restrictions or requirements, or any other terms which are 
considered appropriate. 36  The legislation has the benefits of being pre-emptive in 
dealing with and responding to concerns about a vulnerable adult at risk of being 
forced into marriage above and beyond the MCA. Furthermore it provides an 
“innovative approach to culturally-specific difficulties in facilitating exit from forced 
marriage” (Enright, 2009, p. 343). 
One of the key cases that helps elucidate this area is XCC v AA and others.37 
The case concerned DD, a woman with a significant learning disability and described 
as having “little language, very little comprehension of anything other than simple 
matters, and needs assistance with almost all aspects of her daily life”. In 2003 DD 
                                                      
34 s 63A (4) FMCPA. 
35 s 63A (6) FMCPA. 
36 s 63B (1) FMCPA. 
37 [2012] EWCOP 2183. 
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entered into a marriage in Bangladesh with her cousin, AA. Concerns arose about the 
marriage and the police obtained a FMPO. Parker J watched the wedding video and 
described that during the ceremony DD “was slumped in a chair almost comatose and 
only just able with considerable prompting to repeat the words of consent to 
marriage”.38 It was also said that the marriage would not have taken place were it not 
for the fact that AA came to the UK for the express purpose of working.39 Parker J 
stated:40 
 
In my view a marriage with an incapacitated person who is unable to 
consent is a forced marriage within the meaning of the Forced Marriage 
Act 2007. In my earlier judgment I said: 
 … 
"[186] "Force" in the context of a person who lacks capacity must 
include inducing or arranging for a person who lacks capacity to 
undergo a ceremony of marriage, even if no compulsion or coercion is 
required as it would be with a person with capacity." 
 
Ultimately Parker J found that DD lacked the capacity to marry and declared, using the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction, that the marriage was not a valid marriage in England and 
that it was in DD's best interests for the marriage to be annulled.  
 Statistics from the Forced Marriage Unit confirm that in 2016 they assisted in 
140 cases, 10% of their total number, which involved victims who had a learning 
disability (Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016). This does not 
inevitably mean those adults lacked the capacity to marry, as it is possible that they 
had capacity but were otherwise forced. However, it is the best evidence available as 
                                                      
38 para 26. 
39 para 10 
40 para 30. 
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to the prevalence of the problem of adults with mental disabilities being forced into 
marriage. This thesis explores further some of those cases that reached the COP, 
many of which also involved issues around capacity to consent to sex. As will be 
shown throughout this thesis, the boundaries between mental capacity and other areas 
of law, such as adult safeguarding and forced marriage, are often difficult to define.  
 
5. Overview of Thesis 
 
In light of this background, it is evident that a number of gaps exist in understanding 
how adults vulnerable to abuse are protected and empowered through mental capacity 
law. These gaps include understanding: the reason why mental capacity law is used in  
relation to particular vulnerable adults in particular cases; how mental capacity law 
empowers and protects in practice; and, how mental capacity law intersects with adult 
safeguarding, the inherent jurisdiction and the forced marriage legal frameworks. 
In this thesis I ask: 1) Who is understood to be vulnerable in mental capacity 
law and why? 2) To what extent do vulnerable adults participate in mental capacity law 
proceedings? 3) What forms of knowledge are valued in mental capacity law? 4) How 
do mental capacity law interventions balance protection and empowerment in relation 
to adults vulnerable to abuse? I answer these four questions starting with Chapter Two 
where I set out the theoretical framework that I use. I provide an original contribution to 
the understanding of vulnerability, as a situational, relational and embodied concept, 
and explain how vulnerability could be harnessed as a useful legal tool. Drawing on 
feminist approaches to vulnerability (Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010; Clough, 2014; 
Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b), I argue for a focus on the situational factors 
which make adults with mental disabilities vulnerable, rather than the current focus on 
inherent causes of vulnerability such as disability. I also place emphasis on the 
concepts of relationality and embodiment in helping us to understand vulnerability. This 
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is because in developing vulnerability as a legal tool there is a need to consider the 
impact of decisions and interventions on vulnerable bodies. I further show, by 
reference to the intersection of mental capacity and adult safeguarding case law, that 
the law has not taken a situational approach to understanding vulnerability nor has it 
sufficiently taken into account the impact of interventions on the bodies of vulnerable 
adults. 
In Chapter Three I set out the methodological approach I take and the methods 
chosen for the research. I interrogate the strengths and weaknesses of the law as well 
as investigating how law operates in practice by using an empirical socio-legal 
methodology. In doing this I develop Karen Barad’s material-discursive approach to 
understanding phenomena (Barad, 1998; Barad, 2003; Barad, 2007) as a way of 
achieving a more informed understanding of the world. I also set out the empirical 
methods chosen, explaining why they are effective in uncovering partial truths about 
mental capacity law in practice. Finally, I explain the practicalities of carrying out the 
empirical research and address the ethical issues that arose during the project. 
Chapters Four to Seven are the chapters in which I analyse the empirical data 
obtained. Chapter Four informs the remaining chapters as to the way that ‘vulnerability’ 
was understood in the intersection of adult safeguarding and mental capacity law. In 
Chapter Four I apply the vulnerability theory set out in Chapter Two to show, using my 
empirical data, that inherent approaches to vulnerability dominate the practice of 
mental capacity law. That is in contrast to understanding vulnerability situationally. I 
particularly focus on the discourse of vulnerability by reference to both COP 
proceedings and the language used by social workers. I further argue that vulnerability 
discourse has led to a paradox of under-protection and over-protection of adults 
vulnerable to abuse. I conclude by arguing that viewing vulnerability more situationally 
will achieve a better balance between empowerment and protection, rather than 
rejecting the concept of vulnerability altogether.  
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Chapters Five and Six focus on evidence given in mental capacity law 
proceedings. Chapter Five concerns P’s limited participation in proceedings, which I 
frame as a form of testimonial injustice, that is, a failure to value a person in their 
capacity as a giver of knowledge (Fricker, 2007). The issue of competence to give 
evidence is considered but it is argued, based on the data obtained, that it is not the 
formal evidential rules that prohibit P from giving evidence. Instead, and linked to 
Chapters Two and Four, I argue that P’s limited participation is the result of a persistent 
assumption that she is inherently and situationally vulnerable. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion about the importance of participation and considers how participation 
might be facilitated. 
The focus of Chapter Six is on the evidence of professionals in mental capacity 
law, particularly psychiatrists and social workers. The chapter contributes to the debate 
over the objectivity of knowledge and argues that law categorises psychiatric 
knowledge about mental capacity as a form of objective expert evidence whereas 
knowledge of others such as social workers is seen as subjective, experiential 
evidence. Resulting from this characterisation I argue that mental capacity law treats 
psychiatric evidence as a superior knowledge claim over the evidence of social 
workers, despite it taking an inherent vulnerability approach.  Finally, I question this 
hierarchy and instead argue for greater weight to be placed on ‘experiential’ forms of 
knowledge, such as that possessed by those who have an existing relationship with P, 
including social workers. Experiential knowledge not only represents a more reliable 
claim to truth about mental capacity, but experiential knowledge is more likely to 
facilitate situational responses to vulnerability and therefore a achieve a better balance 
between empowerment and protection. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven I argue that the limited legitimacy of social work, and 
the process of legal legitimation in high-risk cases, contributes to the use of controlling 
rather than empowering interventions in this area. I instead suggest that the law needs 
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to focus on the material, situational conditions that the individual is in and understand 
how law can be used to empower and protect individuals in vulnerable circumstances. I 
advocate solutions which focus on the situational causes of vulnerability or impaired 
decision-making, which I view as a more empowering response than further restricting 
the choices of vulnerable adults. I particularly argue that social workers need greater 
legitimacy to intervene in supportive ways and suggest that one way this could be 
achieved in abuse cases is through strengthening the safeguarding adults legal 
framework. 
Finally, in Chapter Eight I bring all of these different themes and findings 
together to conclude the thesis. I do so to provide suggestions as to possible legal 
reforms and to set out what I have identified as possible areas for future research, 




In this chapter I have set out the key themes this thesis addresses, the legal 
frameworks that apply and provided an overview of the research context. In doing so I 
have identified the gaps in knowledge in this area of law, which I respond to in the 
remainder of the thesis. I have also provided an overview of the thesis, including the 
content of each chapter and the research questions that are answered by the thesis. In 
the next chapter I outline my theoretical approach in detail, drawing on vulnerability 










In this chapter I set out the theoretical framework of vulnerability that I develop in this 
thesis.41 I focus on how vulnerability could be a useful legal tool in mental capacity, an 
area where vulnerability discourse is increasingly applied,42 and adult safeguarding, 
which focuses on “protecting certain people who may be in vulnerable circumstances” 
(Office of the Public Guardian, 2017). Drawing on feminist approaches to vulnerability 
(Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b), I argue that 
the increased vulnerability to sexual violence of women with mental disabilities 43 
provides an example of how and why a situational account of vulnerability should be 
advanced.  
In the first section of this chapter I explore the meaning of vulnerability, 
conceptualising it as “both universal and particular” (Fineman, 2008, p. 31). I argue that 
the concept of inherent and situational vulnerability developed by Mackenzie, Rogers 
and Dodds is the most compelling (Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b) as it allows 
us to identify vulnerability in negative and positive ways rather than as a neutral 
inevitability of human life. I build on their analysis to argue for the link between mental 
                                                      
41 This chapter is based on an article I published, see Lindsey (2016a). 
42 It is present in much of the case law in this area: D County Council v LS [2010] EWHC 1544 
paras 9, 13, 33, A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49 paras 8-9, York City Council v C and 
another [2013] EWCA Civ 478 paras 50-51, Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38 
paras 13, 16, 43. 
43 Whilst the arguments in this thesis are intended to apply to all adults, my focus in this chapter 
is explicitly on women. This is partly as a result of the focus on sexual and domestic abuse 
which is a distinctly gendered phenomenon, see Benedet and Grant (2014, p. 133). 
Furthermore, any legal response developed using vulnerability theory needs to be attentive to 
the embodied interplay between mental disability, sexual violence and gender.  However, that 
does not detract from the vulnerability that men also experience and the arguments made are 
intended to apply to all in vulnerable circumstances irrespective of their gender or disability.   
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disability and vulnerability to be removed, because it focuses on the inherent rather 
than situational causes of vulnerability.  
I then move on to explore the relationship between vulnerability and autonomy, 
understood in a relational sense, and consider how this relationship is operationalised 
in the context of abuse. I argue that the most pressing problem for women with mental 
disabilities has been the failure to protect them from abuse, with high rates of sexual 
violence amongst this group (McCarthy and Thompson, 1997, p. 107; Martin et al., 
2006, p. 829). I further consider the role that embodiment can play in working through 
some of the concerns about the use of the concept of vulnerability whilst also allowing 
vulnerable adults to be protected. I suggest that an embodied, situational 
understanding of vulnerability can help to develop legal responses which both protect 
and empower vulnerable adults, in line with the aims of this thesis.  
I finally consider the extent to which my embodied, situational approach to 
vulnerability has been realised in case law at the intersection between adult 
safeguarding and the MCA. By reference to three cases, I show that the law focuses 
disproportionately on the inherent features of vulnerability rather than exploring the 
situational reasons for the adult’s vulnerable position. Whilst there are some instances 
of a situational and embodied approach to vulnerability in the case law, it will be shown 
throughout this thesis that this is the exception rather than the norm. 
 
2. Vulnerability Theory 
 
Vulnerability typically connotes a person’s susceptibility to harm. The concept has been 
recognised most explicitly in the bioethics context, for example, scholars such as Aday 
and Rogers use vulnerability to highlight the frailty of human existence, which can lead 
to poor health outcomes when certain vulnerabilities are present (Aday, 1994; Rogers, 
2006). Similarly, debates about vulnerability arise in the context of research ethics, for 
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example the Nuffield Council on Bioethics highlight that (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
2015, p. 124): 
 
… in many (though not all) cases, the factors that may potentially make 
children feel, or be, vulnerable in the context of clinical research do not 
arise inevitably because of the nature of childhood; and nor are they 
necessary features of research. Rather, they arise in the context of the 
developmental nature of childhood – experienced, for example, in a 
young child’s need for practical and emotional support in understanding 
what is proposed; or an older child’s anxiety about the impact of 
research participation on their school life.  
 
Therefore even within bioethics, vulnerability is recognised to be a nuanced concept, 
varying with and dependent on a range of factors. Understanding what vulnerability 
means for law, and how it could be developed as a legal tool, is a difficult task as the 
concept is not easily defined. Martha Fineman, the leading vulnerability theorist in the 
legal context, describes being vulnerable as being in “a state of constant possibility of 
harm” (Fineman, 2008, p. 11). Fineman uses the idea of human dependency, created 
by our biological and material existence, to critique the pervasive notion of the rational, 
self-reliant man. She argues that whether at birth, during childhood or old age, there is 
always a certain level of inter-dependency needed for human existence to flourish 
because vulnerability is biological and unavoidable (Fineman, 2008, p. 2). A material, 
biological analysis of vulnerability is therefore persuasive to the extent that the 




2.1. Universal, inherent and situational vulnerability 
 
Understanding vulnerability also requires understanding how law views its subjects. 
Fineman has theorised the concept of vulnerability to develop a broader critique of 
mainstream Anglo-American liberal legal theory. She questions how traditional theories 
of law all but ignore “our bodily fragility, material needs, and the possibility of messy 
dependency” (Fineman, 2008, p. 21). This is achieved through the dominance of the 
rational, individualised autonomous subject. Fineman instead argues that the 
“vulnerable subject” should be the centre of moral, legal and political concern as it 
better accounts for the embodied experiences of human existence (Fineman, 2008, p. 
9). The way that different people experience their diverse lives is dependent upon their 
environments and a legal approach that considers humans in the abstract, without their 
messy relationships and complexities, fails to appreciate those nuances. As I 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, mental capacity law uses the language of 
vulnerability but has failed to adopt an appropriately nuanced, situational account of it.  
Fineman’s analysis is a powerful reminder of why vulnerability theory is relevant 
to law – it is an essential feature of human existence (Fineman, 2012). Similarly Kittay 
argues that dependency is the paradigmatic view of moral relations; any theory of 
justice which fails to account for the dependent, vulnerable nature of human beings is 
flawed (Kittay, 1999, pp. 71-76). Kittay more strongly emphasises that vulnerability is 
not equally shared across different individuals and groups (Kittay, 1999), a claim which 
I take forward. In doing so, I focus on understanding vulnerability as inherent and 
situational (Mackenzie, 2014b; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a; Mackenzie, 
Rogers and Dodds, 2014b). Inherent vulnerability relates to features intrinsic to the 
human condition, typically biological factors such as health or hunger (Aday, 1994). 
However, it also encompasses vulnerabilities such as biological sex which, although 
related to other vulnerabilities, come with inherent vulnerabilities of their own, such as 
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pregnancy. Historically, certain groups have been recognised as having vulnerabilities 
because of their particular status, typically women and children or people with 
disabilities have been viewed as weaker, more vulnerable members of society. The 
core of this type of vulnerability is that the individual is vulnerable to something 
because of features they possess which make them distinguishable from the rational, 
autonomous agent. 
 In contrast, situational vulnerability covers the circumstance-specific aspects of 
vulnerability. Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds discuss social, political, economic, 
personal and environmental situations as examples of situational contexts which can 
cause or contribute to vulnerability (Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a, p. 8). This 
is important in the intersection between gender and disability because vulnerability has 
often been seen as inherent to both. In contrast, situational approaches to vulnerability 
allow us to question that assumed link and consider other reasons why women with 
mental disabilities may be more vulnerable without essentializing them as inevitably so.  
As a starting point in arguing for a situational approach, vulnerability must be 
decoupled from any assumed linked to mental disability. Whilst a person may be more 
susceptible to abuse because of inherent features, that is not necessarily so and is not 
caused by her disability. It is the person abusing her, or her past experience of abuse, 
which is responsible for her vulnerability. As the social model of disability reinforces 
(see p. 3), individuals are often ‘disabled’ as a result of social and environmental 
factors. For example, women with mental disabilities are more vulnerable to sexual 
abuse for situational reasons; because of abuse perpetrated by those in positions of 
care and trust, the role of institutionalisation and segregation (Hollomotz, 2011, pp. 36, 
72-73; Plummer and Findley, 2012, p. 23) and the targeting of groups less likely to 
resist or report violence (Martin et al., 2006, p. 824). They are also vulnerable in the 
way that all women are - as a result of society’s gendered responses to, and failures to 
address, sexual (and other forms of) violence (Benedet and Grant, 2014).  
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The assumed link between mental disability and vulnerability has led to claims 
that being labelled vulnerable is regressive and stigmatising. This is at the root of 
concerns around vulnerability discourse and, as I highlight from my data in Chapters 
Four and Seven, the term has been used to, for example, place restrictions on the 
movement of women with disabilities.44 However, feminist approaches to vulnerability 
(Kittay, 1999; Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010) can help to allay these concerns. 
Fineman’s assertion of universal vulnerability is powerful as it reinforces that we are all 
materially vulnerable (Fineman, 2012, p. 84). It helps to remind external observers, 
including social care professionals, lawyers and judges, that a vulnerable/invulnerable 
dichotomy is not only stigmatising but also false because we are all vulnerable to 
varying degrees throughout our lives.  
Yet under Fineman’s approach we acknowledge the universality of vulnerability 
but are drawn away from focusing on the specificity of it. Fineman does explain that 
vulnerability requires an analysis of the particular (Fineman, 2013, p. 21). Yet her 
motivation appears to be to point out there is no position of invulnerability (Fineman, 
2013, p. 22). The observation that humans are constantly and inevitably vulnerable is 
essential, but in going beyond that claim, I argue that law must focus on why embodied 
experiences of vulnerability vary. Research shows that 61% of women with learning 
disabilities had suffered sexual abuse in their lives (McCarthy and Thompson, 1997, p. 
107). This vulnerability is not inevitable or constant, yet the description is central to 
Fineman’s characterisation (Fineman, 2008, p. 8). I agree with Mackenzie that 
Fineman’s “claim that vulnerability is a constant feature of the human condition 
obscures important distinctions between different sources and states of vulnerability” 
(Mackenzie, 2014b, p. 38). Instead, I argue for removing the assumed link between 
vulnerability and disability, so that we can focus legal responses on situational causes 
                                                      
44  A Local Authority v SA [2005] EWHC 2942, A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49, 
Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38. 
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in mental capacity law in practice.  
 
2.2. Vulnerability and relational autonomy 
 
Whilst I have identified that the focus in mental capacity law has been on autonomy, 
the relationship between vulnerability and autonomy has been under-developed. This 
is partly because there is a perceived tension between the two (Fineman, 2008; 
Fineman, 2010; Mackenzie, 2014b). Anderson asks, “what does justice demand, 
especially where there are trade-offs between promoting autonomy and diminishing 
vulnerability?” (Anderson, 2014, p. 151). In exploring this, I argue that autonomy and 
vulnerability should not be seen as oppositional concepts (Anderson, 2014). In fact, it 
must be acknowledged that it may be worthwhile, even necessary, to risk vulnerability 
in the pursuit of autonomy and, therefore, empowerment. In the name of protection the 
learning disabled are often subjected to restrictions for fear of harm (Hollomotz, 2011, 
133). In doing so, their ability to experience how to lead an empowered, autonomous 
life is undermined. For example, learning disabled adults who seek protection within 
their care home do not gain the benefits of social experiences (Arstein-Kerslake and 
Flynn, 2016), and adults who are socially isolated have a higher likelihood of suffering 
abuse (Plummer and Findley, 2012, p. 23). Therefore, instead of understanding 
vulnerability and autonomy as conflicting, we need to consider the relationship between 
the two more carefully. This will help to guide legal responses that better empower and 
protect vulnerable adults. 
Liberal approaches to autonomy assert that adults make rational, independent 
and self-interested choices (Kant, 1998). They focus on the isolated nature of choices, 
made in the interests of the self. It is said that these decisions are to be respected and 
others have no place in interfering with choices made by autonomous agents. The 
importance of respecting agency must not be forgotten in any feminist critique; the 
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assertion of a woman’s equal right to self-determination has also protected women 
from unwanted interference, particularly through law. 45  However, non-interference 
founded upon freedom-based conceptions of autonomy can often only mean 
respecting agency; that we must refrain from interfering with choices made by 
individuals, irrespective of the capabilities or circumstances within which that choice 
was made. Whilst agency is important because even individuals who have limited 
options should still in many cases have their choices respected, it is not conceptually 
equivalent to autonomy. Exercising agency by making or resisting a choice does not 
make it autonomous (Sherwin, 1998, pp. 32-33); autonomy requires something 
stronger than simply action, typically some degree of reflection and value/preference.46 
Autonomy may also be affected by the person’s capacities or oppressive 
circumstances in the way that agency is not because it relates to a more fundamental 
ability. In fact, using agency as akin to autonomy is precisely how oppressive social 
relations are best maintained; when the subordinated person uses their agency to 
seemingly ‘accept’ their position (Warriner, 2015, p. 37). Therefore in considering the 
relationship between autonomy and vulnerability, I consider autonomy beyond 
individual freedom to make choices.  
As discussed at section 4.1 of Chapter One, relational approaches to autonomy 
emphasise the impact of relationships and environment on a person’s ability to act 
autonomously (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Christman, 2004; Oshana, 2006). 
Explicitly relational approaches argue that whether or not a choice is autonomous can 
only be understood by seeing the person in context and taking account of the situation 
they are in. It is the antithesis of seeing the world as made up of distinct actors 
behaving as individuals without connections – people are individually autonomous, but 
                                                      
45 For the seminal case see St George’s NHS Healthcare Trust v S [1998] 3 W.L.R. 
46 For example see Frankfurt’s discussion of first and second order desires (1988). Whether 
such values or desires should be judged by reference to internal or external conditions has 
been the subject of further debate (Oshana, 2006; Westlund, 2009). 
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within their relationships, as they are also vulnerable to those relationships (Nedelsky, 
2011). This approach does not entail a complete rejection of liberal approaches to 
autonomy that focus on the rational self-interested actor. This is because the liberal 
conception could still be in accordance with certain relational conceptions by 
expanding the scope of the ‘self’. For example, if a vulnerable adult understood their 
sense of self as encompassing others, perhaps their child, then it would be highly 
rational to act in a way that also takes into account the child’s interests as well as the 
individual’s, even where they conflict. Similarly, often women have developed ways of 
navigating and developing their own autonomy within a context of vulnerability to 
abuse. The fact that the moment at which a woman is most at risk from a violent 
partner is at the point of leaving (or shortly after) suggests that, in many ways, 
remaining within an abusive relationship is, at least to some extent, an autonomous 
choice based on a risk analysis (Humphreys and Thiara, 2003, p. 200).  
A relational approach is important when considering the human relationships 
that permeate this thesis. Sex, marriage and contact inevitably involve another person 
and therefore the relational dimension of these capacity domains is explicitly drawn. By 
relational I do not simply mean intimate relationships, albeit those are the primary focus 
of sex and marriage cases. However, the way that people interact with each other, and 
with the world around them, is central to understanding who they are. Nedelsky refers 
to “nested relations” as an approach to relationality (Nedelsky, 2011), a description 
which captures the core of relational theory as it is clear that relations are complex, 
interconnected and interdependent. This idea of nesting draws out the fact that, so 
often, relationships are often built on and within different relational and social 
conditions and it can be difficult to delineate between the various factors. Again, this is 
particularly relevant for sexual activity and marriage because a person’s intimate 
relationships are often negotiated along complex social, gender and familial lines, such 
that a choice to engage in sexual activity is often complex, negotiated and constrained.  
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Relationships are not always positive and taking a relational approach does not 
mean that all relationships must be accounted for. Relations can be a confusing mix of 
benefit and harm and this may also vary temporally as relationships develop and 
change over time. Mackenzie and Stoljar’s (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000) approach to 
relationality focuses on this harmful aspect of relations. They consider that 
relationships could be harmful to a greater or lesser extent and in different contexts, for 
example, a particularly pushy parent may push their child academically which may 
have benefits for that child’s economic success but which may also have a harmful 
impact on their own relationship with that parent in the long term. The harmful nature of 
relationships is at the core of my analysis: the subject matter of this thesis is 
fundamentally about abusive relationships and how the law, social work and medicine 
responds to such relationships.  
Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds’ taxonomy of vulnerability similarly draws on 
relational autonomy to highlight examples of pathogenic vulnerability. This is defined as 
a harmful form of situational vulnerability which should be removed because it is so 
undermining of (relational) autonomy or exacerbates other vulnerabilities to such an 
extent it is always undesirable (Mackenzie, 2014b, p. 39; Mackenzie, Rogers and 
Dodds, 2014a, p. 9). In contrast, not all inherent or situational vulnerabilities are 
undesirable, particularly if connected to features inherent to embodiment, for example 
age. Therefore the concept allows us to distinguish between the positive and negative 
aspects of vulnerability. Anderson discusses the related problem of surplus 
vulnerability, which refers to an excess of vulnerability otherwise needed to maximise 
autonomy (Anderson, 2014, p. 154) and enable a person to pursue their conception of 
the good life. For me this ties in with pathogenic vulnerability which is also surplus – it 
is harmful and should be removed typically because it impacts on autonomy. In 
contrast, surplus vulnerability may not always be pathogenic. For example, if we could 
develop technology that extended the period for which humans could survive without 
 
 42 
food this would reduce inherent vulnerability to hunger but in an industrialised country 
might have little impact on a person’s autonomy. Similarly certain mental disabilities 
may fall within the category of surplus vulnerability as they may increase a person’s 
vulnerability to no benefit to their autonomy. However, they wouldn’t necessarily be 
pathogenic, for example bipolar disorder has been shown to have positive effects 
(Galvez, Thommi and Ghaemi, 2011).  
The presence of surplus pathogenic vulnerability in a person’s life increases 
their situational vulnerability, has a destabilising effect on their autonomy and has little 
or no other benefit to them. That is not to say that law should always intervene where 
surplus pathogenic vulnerability is present. Instead, the concept provides a way of 
understanding the circumstances in which law could usefully identify and respond to 
harmful forms of situational vulnerability. For example, in entering any relationship we 
risk the possibility of being hurt. This is a form of vulnerability, but it is not necessarily 
harmful because it is the only way to assert autonomy; we risk our emotional stability to 
make friendships that enhance our lives. Yet we do so knowing that if those 
relationships become abusive, we can end them and move on. In contrast, when a 
woman is unable to leave, whether because a learning disability means she cannot 
identify the abusive behaviour, or financial dependence on the other person, at that 
point that relationship becomes a harmful, surplus pathogenic vulnerability. As Scully 
puts it “if autonomy is the capacity to make what you want happen, then vulnerability, 
as the inability to protect oneself against unwanted things happening, is a specific kind 
of autonomy deficit” (Scully, 2014, p. 212). However, in this scenario law should not 
intervene on the basis that the decision to remain in the relationship is not 
autonomous, but because the abusive partner represents a surplus pathogenic 
vulnerability in the woman’s life. Whilst this form of vulnerability impacts on her 
autonomy, intervention is not justified on the basis that the decision is non-
autonomous. Instead, the emphasis is on responding to the surplus pathogenic 
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vulnerability and its situational cause.  
To help understand how vulnerability can work as a legal tool I use the concept 
of situational vulnerability, specifically highlighting surplus and pathogenic vulnerability 
in cases of abuse. Sexual violence and other forms of abuse can be seen as surplus 
pathogenic vulnerabilities because they stem from harmful and oppressive social 
structures that should be eliminated (making them pathogenic). 47  Furthermore, the 
current level of vulnerability to violence is not necessary to enhance autonomy (making 
it surplus). In fact the opposite is required; sexual and domestic abuse is so prevalent 
and linked to inequality that a reduction in female sexual vulnerability would result in an 
enhancement of female autonomy generally (Benedet and Grant, 2014, pp. 136-137). 
Benedet and Grant consider “prevention of and redress for sexual violence to be a 
precondition to meaningful sexual self-determination…” (Benedet and Grant, 2014, pp. 
136). Viewing abuse as a surplus pathogenic vulnerability can help to achieve such 
redress, without focusing on the victim of abuse as a non-autonomous decision-maker, 
which can be disempowering.  
The type of redress that is usually advocated where abuse is present is gained 
through the criminal justice process. However, persistent failures of the criminal justice 
system to value the experiences of those who have experienced abuse undermines 
autonomy and increases vulnerability (Benedet and Grant, 2014), as discussed further 
at section 4.2 of Chapter Four.48 Therefore I argue that the state’s obligation to protect 
cannot end with criminal justice processes, as there are a number of reported civil 
                                                      
47 For example being within an abusive relationship or experiencing failures of criminal justice. 
Around 90% of victims of the most serious sexual abuse knew the perpetrator. Only 15% of 
victims of the most serious sexual offences reported them to police and their reasons for not 
doing so included they “didn’t think the police could do much to help” and that it was 
“embarrassing”. In 2011 the 2,900 defendants prosecuted for rape were prosecuted, on 
average, for 2.3 rape offences each, suggesting that failures to apprehend and punish means 
they are able to continue committing sexual violence (Ministry of Justice, Home Office and the 
Office for National Statistics, 2013). 
48  The point at which perpetrators should be held accountable through the criminal law is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and my arguments are not intended to detract from the 
importance of criminal law reform to achieve justice. 
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cases where the police appear not to have taken action.49 Alongside, or in the absence 
of, the criminal law, it remains the responsibility of the state to minimise vulnerability 
through the civil law where abuse is proven on the balance of probabilities. The civil 
law regularly challenges violence in other contexts, for example in tort claims for 
battery.50 Yet the way in which the civil law responds is through civil law remedies such 
as injunctions. 
 For example, Birmingham City Council v Riaz and others51 concerned a 17 
year old woman without any recognised mental disability, AB, who was a victim of 
sexual exploitation by at least ten older men.52 The police came to the conclusion that 
there was insufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, highlighting an all too common 
problem. In Riaz, initially AB was subjected to a secure accommodation order which 
would have restricted her liberty rather than those abusing her. However, the local 
authority sought an injunction against the perpetrators – meaning they could not 
contact or associate with AB nor any other female under 18 years, previously unknown 
to them, in a public place.53 The order was granted under the inherent jurisdiction and 
this case highlights the situational approach to minimising vulnerability that I explore 
throughout this thesis. The use of a civil law injunction in this case is similar to the use 
of a non-molestation order under s 42 Family Law Act 1996. However, non-molestation 
orders require initiation from the victim and there is no duty on the state to consider 
such action. 54  Therefore the use of the inherent jurisdiction gave the state more 
flexibility to respond to abuse where other areas of law, such as criminal justice, had 
failed. 
                                                      
49 Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38, The London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
v TB and SA [2014] EWCOP 53, Birmingham City Council v Riaz and others [2014] EWHC 
4247, The Hospital Trust v V and others [2017] EWCOP 20. 
50 Ashley v CC Sussex Police [2006] EWCA Civ 1085. 
51 [2014] EWHC 4247. 
52 para 1. 
53 para 7. 
54  One way around this would be to enact a power for local authorities to apply for non-
molestation orders. For a further discussion see Miles (2011). 
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Justifying interventions based on the inherent vulnerability of an individual 
(Mackenzie, 2014b; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b) focuses the gaze of the 
law in the wrong direction. Instead, in Riaz the court focused on the situational causes 
of AB’s vulnerability – that she was at risk of abuse from perpetrators of sexual 
violence. In that case AB was legally a child and, therefore, it may have been easier to 
justify intervention using the inherent jurisdiction, but it would better if the court focused 
on perpetrators of abuse in cases concerning vulnerable adults too. AB was not 
especially vulnerable because she was 17 years old, nor will she cease to be 
vulnerable once 18. AB, like many others, was situationally and pathogenically 
vulnerable because of the conditions within which she had developed and as a result of 
the continual threat and past experience of sexual violence. This is the case for a 
young woman such as AB as much as for an older woman with or without disabilities.55  
Therefore in mental capacity law, the focus must similarly shift from the inherent 
to the situational causes of vulnerability to enable vulnerability to be a useful legal 
device. Using a vulnerability analysis helps law to move away from a focus on the 
autonomy of the vulnerable adult, which can be disempowering, towards an emphasis 
on their vulnerable position. That is not to say that redefining vulnerability as caused by 
situational conditions will solve the problem of abuse (Williams, 2002, p. 312). 
However, it should lead to the use of more nuanced legal tools to address the 
situational causes of vulnerability, rather than attributing the adult’s vulnerable position 
to inherent features. 
 
                                                      
55 Riaz is not the only reported case that concerns people without mental disabilities, albeit they 
are much less common, see also In Re L (Vulnerable Adults with Capacity: Court’s Jurisdiction) 




2.3. Vulnerability and embodiment 
 
In this thesis I understand vulnerability as embodied. Embodiment is founded upon an 
understanding that humans live and navigate the social world through their bodies 
(Fletcher, Fox and McCandless, 2008; Mackenzie, 2014a, pp. 157-158). Fineman 
explains that it is our embodied nature that makes us “constantly vulnerable to events 
that might render us dependent” (Fineman, 2012, p. 86). Therefore it is predominantly 
our embodiment which contributes to our vulnerability. As such, embodiment is not 
something that should be ignored when considering how to frame legal responses. 
Taking account of embodiment requires understanding the different ways that bodies 
are vulnerable and can be affected by legal responses, and how certain bodies are 
excluded from analysis. For example, it must be remembered that female bodies might 
become pregnant; disabled females might have their bodies restricted or denigrated; 
and mentally disabled females may never have known what it means to have their 
body respected. 
Yet, as discussed, the traditional account of autonomy has focused on 
rationality (Kant, 1998) at the expense of an analysis of the body (Eisenstein, 1988; 
Naffine and Owens, 1997; Fletcher, Fox and McCandless, 2008). Feminists have long 
criticised this with women being viewed as constrained by their bodies but men being 
able to step outside bodily restrictions (Nedelsky, 1990; Naffine and Owens, 1997). 
This is not only based on the idea that capacities for rationality are superior to other, 
more ‘animalistic’ capacities associated with the female but that these capacities stem 
from somewhere other than the body. Such a claim is now widely believed to be false 
as the mind is situated within the physical realm (Nemeroff, Kilts and Berns, 1999, p. 
672).   
In contrast, it is often (wrongly) argued that when men force their sexual desires 
on others their behaviour should be understood because of their strong biological 
 
 47 
underpinnings (Hale, 1736; Sandland, 2013b).56 This once common understanding is in 
stark contrast to theorisation of the body in other contexts, such as reproduction, where 
women are perceived to be unable to overcome the trappings of their own biology 
(Eisenstein, 1988; Jackson, 2008). Similarly, the female with mental disabilities is 
characterised as doubly biologically determined since she is seen as being driven by 
instinct and a dangerously insatiable appetite to engage in sex; it is seen to be an 
inevitability of her mental state. This characterisation is more similar to descriptions of 
men’s sexuality than non-mentally disabled women (Sandland, 2013b, p. 984) and 
helps to obscure the vulnerability these women often experience.  
The difficulty with mentally disabled women’s sexual embodiment is the 
tendency to dichotomise; they are seen as either sexually risky and uncontrollable or 
asexual and in need of protection (Doyle, 2010; Sandland, 2013b). Furthermore, their 
bodies are either controlled through the use of secure accommodation from which they 
cannot leave,57 or given absolute liberty to engage in dangerous and abusive sexual 
behaviour (Doyle, 2010). This dichotomy is achieved by reference to sexual instinct, 
pointing towards an inherent vulnerability within all mentally disabled women; from 
which they are also perceived to seek out risky sexual encounters (Sandland, 2013b, 
p. 1002). Their reduction through the law to an instinct driven, non-rational body can be 
seen in the way that their vulnerability is constructed as inherent and inevitable, rather 
than situational and preventable.  
Partly as a result of these concerns, vulnerability theory has attracted criticism. 
For example, Munro and Scoular raise concerns about the term’s increased use and 
potential for supporting regressive practices (Munro and Scoular, 2012, p. 197). They 
are critical of legal responses focused on maintaining security and labeling based on 
the perceived vulnerability of victims despite their varying experiences of vulnerability. 
                                                      
56 Or when husbands were deemed to have a right to sex with their wives, see R v R [1991] 3 
W.L.R. 767. 
57 A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49. 
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Similarly, in the disability context it is the impairment that is perceived to make that 
person (disproportionately and inevitably) vulnerable. Disability theorists also take 
contrasting perspectives on the usefulness of vulnerability theory; for some it provides 
an opportunity for a disability neutral justification for legal interventions in line with the 
UNCRPD (Bartlett, 2012; Clough, 2014; Series, 2015b). Conversely, the practice and 
interpretation of vulnerability could be linked to internalising and stigmatising 
discourses of disability which might be difficult to move away from (Fawcett, 2009; 
Hollomotz, 2011). Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter One in discussing the social 
model of disability, the proportion of vulnerabilities that are inherent are much lower 
than traditional approaches to disability suggest (Scully, 2014, pp. 207-208) as many 
stem from social and institutional responses to disability. The prevalence of 
vulnerability being tangled up with stigmatising labels and inherent notions of disability 
has contributed to concerns around its use.  
Yet in being wary of the negative connotations of vulnerability (Brown, 2011; 
Munro and Scoular, 2012), there is a danger of shifting the balance too far in the 
opposite direction. For example, fears around state intervention can lead to non-
interference, which, in turn, allows the causes of vulnerability to continue. As Herring 
explains: 
 
such comments are in danger of underplaying the extent to which the 
state is already meeting people’s needs and intervening in people’s lives 
in a way which is uncontroversial. Whether it be the provision of 
sewerage, electricity, transportation or security… (Herring, 2016, p. 25).  
 
In my view the problem is not state intervention per se; but how the state responds in a 
way which empowers whilst also protecting vulnerable adults. Taking an embodied, 
situational approach is central to achieving this as the focus should be on achieving a 
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better balance between empowerment and protection for the vulnerable adult. As 
highlighted in the previous section, I consider this can partly be achieved by framing 
legal responses which target situational causes rather than the vulnerable adult herself, 
something explored in more detail at section 4 of Chapter Four and section 3 of 
Chapter Seven. For example, the law could focus on providing a vulnerable adult with 
a safe space to consider and communicate her own wishes away from the vulnerability 
inducing circumstances. This means minimising the surplus pathogenic vulnerability 
factors present in the adult’s environment to enable her to make a decision, for 
example by targeting the abusive individuals in the person’s life, typically husbands 
and partners (Martin et al., 2006, p. 834; Plummer and Findley, 2012, p. 23). This is in 
strict contrast to forcing an intervention on the vulnerable adult. For example, by 
removing her against her will into what is perceived to be a safe environment through 
the use of the deprivation of liberty (DOL) provisions under the MCA. A focus on 
embodiment emphasises that it is not the vulnerable adult who should be coerced by 
any legal intervention. The role of the court must be “facilitative, rather than 
dictatorial”58 towards the vulnerable party as there are legitimate concerns about the 
role of the law in interfering with her liberty (Hewson, 2013, p. 457).   
As I do not argue for interventions which coerce the vulnerable adult directly, 
her objection cannot be a barrier to intervention. However, interventions should still 
take account of her wishes. This is important because historically women and people 
with disabilities have been subjected to pathogenic legal responses which control 
them, often ignoring the embodied consequences. Similarly, I argue in my following 
discussion of the case law that derivative vulnerability may be created by law’s 
response if the adult’s views are ignored (Fineman, 2010, p. 24; Fineman, 2013, p. 18). 
Derivative vulnerability is not universal in the way Fineman describes other forms of 
vulnerability but is constructed as a result of other inequalities (Fineman, 2010, p. 24).  
                                                      
58 A Local Authority v DL and others [2012] EWCA Civ 253 para 67. 
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In this sense, legal interventions which place an adult in secure accommodation for her 
own protection, for example, may exacerbate her vulnerable position rather than 
reduce it. Only an embodied analysis of vulnerability ensures such consequences are 
considered.  
 
3. Vulnerability Contextualised 
 
In this section I consider the extent to which my embodied, situational approach to 
vulnerability is reflected in the law. The intersection between mental capacity and adult 
safeguarding law provides an interesting point of analysis because of the 
pervasiveness of vulnerability in both contexts. Yet both areas have taken an inherent 
approach to vulnerability. For example, Department of Health guidance, No Secrets 
(Department of Health, 2000), defined a vulnerable adult in relation to their mental (or 
other) disability, age or illness. The meaning of vulnerability in safeguarding, pre-Care 
Act at least, was therefore focused on the inherent features of persons (Clough, 2014, 
p. 372). The focus in the MCA on internal features also points towards an inherent 
vulnerability approach, stating that “a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at 
the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself…because of an 
impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain”.59 The language 
of inherent vulnerability is equally present throughout judicial discourse in this area.60 
Law’s focus on inherent causes of vulnerability will be highlighted in the 
following two sections, as well as being a theme to which I return throughout this 
thesis. Despite this inherent focus, I also show that there are limited examples from the 
case law which point towards the possibility that an embodied, situational approach to 
                                                      
59 s 2 (1) MCA. 
60 D County Council v LS [2010] EWHC 1544 paras 9, 13, 33, A Local Authority v H [2012] 
EWHC 49 paras 8-9, York City Council v C and another [2013] EWCA Civ 478 paras 50-51, 
Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38 paras 13, 16, 43. 
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vulnerability could be operationalised that better protects and empowers adults 
vulnerable to abuse. 
 
3.1. An inherent vulnerability approach: The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB and 
SA 
 
I now discuss one case which I suggest is typical of the approach taken in this area of 
law. It is a case that provides a useful example to contrast the position of two women in 
similar situations, one of whom was ‘protected’ as a result of her inherent vulnerability 
(her mental disability) whilst the other was left to remain situationally vulnerable within 
an abusive relationship. I argue that there was a failure to apply an embodied, 
situational vulnerability approach in relation to either woman in this case.  
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB and SA61 concerned TB, a 41 year 
old woman with a moderate learning disability believed to be genetic in aetiology and 
who was described as having the cognitive abilities of a “child between the age of 4 to 
8 years”.62 TB, who was found to lack capacity to consent to sexual activity and decide 
on residence and contact, was married to a man, SA, who was also her first cousin and 
had four children with him. All four children were the subject of care proceedings and 
placed for adoption. In the course of care proceedings, findings were made, supported 
by witness evidence, that SA had committed acts of violence against TB.63 Following 
this course of events, and whilst TB and SA were still married, SA married SSB, also 
his first cousin, under the laws of Islam, albeit this marriage was not valid in English 
law. SA and SSB had also had two children together at the time of the proceedings. 
Mr Justice Mostyn noted in his judgment “[SA] has regular sex with SSB. He 
told me that this had occurred the previous week, and happened about every two 
                                                      
61 [2014] EWCOP 53. 
62 para 2. 
63 para 5. 
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weeks. He regards it as his right to have sex with her and her duty to submit to it. This 
is a tenet of his culture and religion”.64 In relation to TB it is also noted “that according 
to his religion and culture he regards himself as entitled to do this [have sex with TB] 
and he regards it as her duty to submit”.65 Mostyn J further explained that following 
removal of their child at birth:66 
 
within three months SA had impregnated TB again. Inevitably when SHT 
was born he was immediately removed also. It was a very heartless 
thing for SA to impregnate TB when he must have known that the baby 
would be removed instantly on birth. 
 
Therefore TB’s relationship with SA was evidently abusive and of understandable 
concern to all involved with the family. However, the contrast between the law’s 
treatment of the two women, TB and SSB, both in abusive relationships, highlights the 
effect of attributing ‘vulnerable’ status on the basis of an inherent vulnerability, in this 
case TB’s mental disabilities. Both women had similar situational and pathogenic 
vulnerabilities; they had a comparable home life in that each had regular contact with 
an abusive partner who regarded it as his right to have sex with them. Culturally they 
were from similar backgrounds and there appeared to be pressure on both women to 
remain in the relationship.67 In many ways SSB’s vulnerability to harm may actually 
have been greater than TB’s as an earlier decision found that TB lacked capacity to 
decide on residence and that it was not in her best interests to live with SA. 68  
Therefore SSB’s sexual contact with SA likely continued while TB was protected. 
Furthermore, the finding that TB should only have limited contact with SA, fortnightly 
                                                      
64 para 10. 
65 para 12. 
66 para 15. 
67 para 5. 
68 para 4. 
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for one hour,69 also likely reduced her surplus pathogenic vulnerability as SA would 
have been unable to have the level of influence over her that he would have had if she 
lived with him. Therefore whilst the court rightly identified the cause of vulnerability as 
SA, they only intervened to protect TB because she had a mental disability. The MCA 
appears not to have been used in relation to SSB, with the seemingly preferred 
approach being the use of immigration law to address SSB’s vulnerable situation.70 The 
contrast here is clear; TB was protected because of her inherent vulnerability, whereas 
SSB appears to have been left unprotected because she was not sufficiently inherently 
vulnerable. 
Whilst I agree that TB needed protecting from SA, in being found to lack 
capacity in relation to sex and residence, it is not clear that the embodied 
consequences for TB were fully considered. For example, TB had been living in a self-
contained flat with 24 hour care but Mostyn J ordered that a supported living placement 
was in her best interests. The risks with moving TB into an institutionalised setting 
appear not to have been fully considered. The primary concern was to remove TB from 
SA, but an embodied approach would also require taking into account the derivative 
and pathogenic vulnerabilities that can be created by legal interventions. Furthermore, 
a finding of incapacity in relation to sexual activity may have led to TB being prevented 
from having contact with any other males because of the risk of sexual activity. Having 
the freedom to interact with others undoubtedly risks vulnerability but it is done so in 
the pursuit of autonomy and may have led to TB living a more fulfilled life. 
In this case, the fact that TB had a mental disability meant the MCA was an 
available tool to help address the abuse against her. If TB’s vulnerability had been 
viewed in situational terms then the focus would have been on restricting SA, which 
would also have had benefits for SSB. However, the court viewed TB and SSB’s 
                                                      
69 para 26. 




vulnerability in a way that focused on the inherent rather than situational causes, 
without taking full account of the embodied consequences of such an approach for 
either woman. 
 
3.2. An embodied, situational approach: In Re A (Capacity: Refusal of Contraception) and 
Local Authority X v MM 
 
Despite my analysis above, embodied, situational responses to vulnerability have, at 
times, been achieved under mental capacity law. In particular this has most clearly 
occurred where the court has taken the lead from the inherent jurisdiction and has 
sought to intervene to allow unencumbered decision making by the adult herself.71 In In 
Re A (Capacity: Refusal of Contraception)72 the High Court held that A, a married adult 
woman, lacked the capacity to make decisions about contraception, primarily because 
of the coercive, and therefore pathogenic, pressure to refuse contraception under 
which her husband had placed her. Despite being a Court of Protection decision, the 
court drew heavily on the inherent jurisdiction and described A as a vulnerable woman 
and saw it as their duty to intervene where a person “coerces or unduly influences a 
vulnerable party from making free decisions”. 73 As in most cases in this area, the 
inherent conception of vulnerability described by the court has wide-reaching 
implications as it turns on who they consider to be vulnerable. In this case the 
implication was that Mrs A was vulnerable because of her IQ of 5374 and this highlights 
the court’s problematic focus on inherent rather than situational vulnerability. A had 
learning difficulties but, more importantly, she had had two children removed from her 
at birth and was now in a relationship with a man who was abusive and trying to restrict 
                                                      
71 A Local Authority v DL and others [2012] EWCA Civ 253. 
72 [2010] EWHC 1549. 
73 para 79. 
74 para 4. 
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her reproductive choices.75 Not only was she subject to coercion by her partner but had 
he succeeded in his efforts, the embodied vulnerability which she would have 
experienced, namely pregnancy and the resulting likelihood of having her child 
removed, would most likely have had harmful consequences. If vulnerability means 
being at greater risk of harm then A was undoubtedly vulnerable, but situationally 
rather than in any inherent sense. By this I mean that had A been in a supportive 
intimate relationship, where her partner had encouraged her to make decisions for 
herself, then perhaps A would not have been viewed as especially vulnerable at all. 
Despite this focus on inherent vulnerability, the court also explained the 
purpose of the inherent jurisdiction as “to create a situation where he or she can 
receive outside help free of coercion, to enable him or her to weigh things up and 
decide freely what he or she wishes to do.”76 This unusual approach looks as if the 
court’s intention was to enable Mrs A to make the decision free from Mr A’s influence. 
Her susceptibility to his pressure was in excess of any vulnerability needed to 
maximise autonomy, highlighting how a surplus pathogenic vulnerability analysis might 
develop. However, the court did not issue an injunction against Mr A. A more 
conciliatory approach was preferred, on the basis that Mr A gave assurances that he 
would allow Mrs A to access support. Perhaps if his behaviour had not changed the 
court may have taken a more interventionist approach. Yet the fact the court was able 
to recognise that this adult was vulnerable because of her partner’s oppressive 
influence, and that he may need to be removed to allow her to develop, is an important 
step forward in identifying situational causes of vulnerability and responding in ways 
that are sensitive to embodiment.  
The importance of this case for my situational, embodied approach is also in the 
court’s finding that it was in Mrs A’s best interests to receive contraception only if she 
                                                      
75 paras 4, 17. 
76 para 79. 
 
 56 
consented to it.77 This was because it was held to be unacceptable to physically force 
contraception on her. The court in this case therefore tacitly recognised its ability to 
create derivative and surplus vulnerability. Therefore using an embodied vulnerability 
analysis not only highlighted Mrs A’s vulnerability but led to the court recognising the 
material impact of its decision on her. Had Mrs A been forced to receive contraception 
against her will, this would have involved physical restraint and possibly even secure 
accommodation. This outcome may appropriately have been described as pathogenic 
and would have done very little to enhance Mrs A’s autonomy. The best outcome for 
Mrs A was surely to allow her the space to make the decision herself; for her to 
recognise the impact on her physical and mental health of becoming pregnant again 
and consider this in the absence of Mr A’s pathogenic influence.  
In recognising embodiment in mental capacity law, courts must also think of 
ways to facilitate decision-making by vulnerable adults. Removing surplus pathogenic 
vulnerability through the creation of spaces for decision-making is one way the courts 
can empower whilst protecting vulnerable adults. For example, this arguably occurred 
in Local Authority X v MM,78 a decision handed down shortly before the MCA came into 
force, where it was accepted by all parties that MM had the capacity to consent to sex. 
MM was described as having an IQ of 56, a moderate learning disability, poor cognitive 
functioning and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. 79  MM’s partner, KM, had a 
history of violence against her and encouraged her to disengage from support. The 
local authority initially submitted that MM should be prevented from contact with KM 
entirely. The extent to which a complete ban would exacerbate rather than reduce 
MM’s vulnerability is difficult to determine. If MM was prevented from contacting KM but 
expressed a wish to do so, physical restraint would presumably have to be used. The 
extent of physical restraint would depend on MM’s reaction. However, enforcing such 
                                                      
77 para 77. 
78 [2007] EWHC 2003. 
79 para 2. 
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restrictions would likely have exacerbated MM’s embodied vulnerability.  
Munby J, as he then was, found that whilst it was in MM’s best interests to be 
placed in supported living arrangements, that should not involve a ban on contact with 
her partner. A reasonable set of restrictions on KM’s behaviour were proposed, 
including that KM should not be under the influence of alcohol or be verbally or 
physically threatening towards MM or staff at her supported accommodation. This 
represents a focus on the situational cause of vulnerability and the embodied harms 
that can result from such vulnerability. In this respect MM’s expressed wishes to retain 
contact with KM were respected, but the nuanced approach in restricting KM’s 
behaviour may have reduced the surplus pathogenic vulnerabilities she experienced as 
she was given the space to develop free from an abusive environment.  This approach 
also better represents an embodied analysis of MM’s vulnerability as it minimises the 
likelihood of future disengagement from support which may have occurred had she 
been subject to restraint or a complete prohibition on contact with KM. Whilst the case 
still highlights a preference for the use of supported accommodation and therefore 
surveillance of the vulnerable adult, it was, at least, carried out in a manner that was 
sensitive to her embodiment and situational vulnerability.80 
In cases where surplus pathogenic vulnerability has been implicitly recognised 
the courts have tread a fine line between protecting the adult and creating further 
derivative pathogenic vulnerability. Rather than resorting to surveillance and control, 
the court was reminded of the situational reasons for Mrs A’s vulnerability, allowing it to 
respond in non-pathogenic ways. However, as I show throughout this thesis, in practice 
in the sex/marriage/contact cases that I analysed, such an approach was rare. 
Furthermore, even in the limited examples provided here where the court arguably took 
a more embodied, situational approach to vulnerability, they still remain resolute in 
                                                      
80 For example, it is also distinguishable from TB’s case discussed above because in this case 
the local authority accepted that MM had capacity to consent to sex and therefore the 
restrictions placed on her were likely much less onerous, para 20. 
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adopting an inherent vulnerability approach by applying the law primarily to adults with 
mental disabilities. Traditionally, in engaging a concept of vulnerability, the courts have 
failed to distinguish between inherent and situational vulnerability, nor have they 
sufficiently considered the embodied consequences of their decisions to intervene in 
particular ways in particular cases. Targeted interventions against abusive partners, as 
occurred in In Re A and Local Authority X v MM, are rare cases, but they highlight the 
possibility of an embodied, situational understanding of vulnerability being adopted 




In this chapter I have set out the theoretical approach that I use in this thesis, drawing 
on theories of vulnerability, relational autonomy and embodiment. In doing so I have 
contributed to the emerging debate around the meaning of vulnerability and considered 
how it might be developed as a useful legal tool. Whilst I have aimed to move away 
from the categorisation of the mentally disabled as especially and inherently 
vulnerable, in reality in the intersection between mental capacity and adult 
safeguarding law, mental disability is used disproportionately as a justification for 
intervention, something that my empirical data confirms (see Chapters Four and Seven 
in particular). I have argued that the law in this area needs to move away from this 
focus on inherent vulnerability and instead view vulnerability in more nuanced and 
situational ways. If this is achieved then interventions targeted against situational 
causes of vulnerability, sensitive to embodiment, can be developed which help to better 
protect the vulnerable adult whilst also empowering her to make her own decisions. 
In the following chapter I build on my situational understanding of vulnerability 
to outline the material-discursive methodology that I use for this thesis. I also explain 
the methods I used and how I collected the data. My methodological approach and the 
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data obtained informs the remaining chapters of the thesis, including my understanding 




CHAPTER THREE: A MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE METHODOLOGICAL 




In this thesis I draw on empirical socio-legal methods because the need to cross 
boundaries in research is essential; the world is complex, messy and inseparable into 
discrete areas of expertise. It further enables more accurate and informed knowledge 
production (Harris, 1989).  This is also the value of socio-legal research; I am not only 
interrogating the strengths and weaknesses of specific laws, but how they operate in 
everyday life and interact with social work and courtroom practices.  
In this methodology chapter I firstly explain the material-discursive approach 
that I take to understanding phenomena, arguing that it allows for a more reliable and 
informed understanding of the reality of mental capacity law in practice. I then set out 
the empirical methods used, explain why I chose them and apply my material-
discursive methodology to those methods. Finally, I provide an outline of the empirical 
research I carried out and highlight some of the opportunities and challenges, ethical 
and practical, that arose during this project. 
 
2. Theories of Knowledge: A Material-Discursive Approach 
 
I have used two empirical methods for this project; courtroom observation (including a 
review of court files) and interviews with social workers. These methods were chosen 
to gain knowledge of the discourse and material reality of mental capacity law. In the 
literature there is a stark contrast between epistemological positions underpinning the 
production of knowledge. Positivist approaches to knowledge consider the possibility of 
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an objective, discoverable truth or reality, which can be measured and tested (Banakar 
and Travers, 2005, pp. 14-16; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 57-58). Under 
positivism, the subjective experiences of individuals are not necessary or relevant to 
understand the truth of phenomena (Durkheim, 1966). Knowledge can be gained 
through the testing of hypotheses, independent of the views of those who have 
experienced the thing in question. This latter approach is more akin to scientific 
approaches to research and is more commonly associated with quantitative than 
qualitative methods, albeit not exclusively so. Traditionally, legal analysis has been 
heavily dominated by positivist theory. The doctrinal meaning of the law was seen as 
authoritative of how law is and ought to be. Under positivism, it is assumed that the 
observer’s own thoughts or preconceptions are excluded in favour of an objective 
analysis of the phenomena under observation. Similarly, the judge has been treated as 
an objective, neutral arbiter of disputes. However, many critiques have been made of 
such an analysis because of the inevitable interaction between observer and observed. 
Not only is there evidence that things behave differently under observation, but 
questions have been raised about whether it is possible for an observer, human or 
otherwise, to have no effect on the phenomena being observed (Barad, 2003, p. 816).  
In contrast, those who take a social constructionist approach consider that 
knowledge is subjective, that it is based on a person’s thoughts, ideas, experience and 
language (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 52-53; May, 2011, p. 164). In this sense, 
knowledge of phenomena cannot be gained independently of understanding it in 
context. In anthropology this aligns with ideas as the guiding aspect of human culture 
(Geertz, 1973). Similarly, social constructionist approaches draw heavily on the 
concept of discourse as the representation of how things are, rather than there being 
any singular, discoverable reality. It is argued that reality is socially constructed through 




I find the extremes and confines of the above positions unhelpful and instead 
make claims about the truth and reliability of my particular research without 
disregarding the importance of context (Giddens, 1984; Knauft, 2006; Jacob, 2012, p. 
21). In many ways, experiencing a phenomena or culture can be the most scientific 
way of analysing it; it is only once you understand the phenomena in its context, with 
the subtleties of meaning that are so often hidden to outsiders that you can give an 
accurate picture of the whole (May, 2011, p. 164). Therefore I emphasise the 
importance of real world experience and, as such, draw on materialist approaches to 
phenomena and knowledge production.  
 
2.1. A material analysis   
 
Materialism, as a form of realism, is often seen as more akin to positivism than 
constructionism as it is underpinned by a commitment to science and the explanation 
of things, albeit beyond that it is quite different from positivism. Materialism means 
recognising that the world is made up of matter; that physicality and cause and effect 
apply to human behaviour as much as to any other phenomena (Murphy and Margolis, 
1995). As Karen Barad, a leading advocate of material-discursive approaches, explains 
“matter refers to the materiality/materialization of phenomena, not to an inherent fixed 
property of abstract independently existing objects of Newtonian physics…” (Barad, 
2003, p. 822). Therefore matter is an active agent in the process of phenomena, rather 
than a neutral result of discursive or other practices. This approach is also reflected in 
my focus on embodiment, as discussed in Chapter Two, because the traditional 
understanding of matter as fixed, inherent and atomistic feeds in to the problematic 
mind-body dualism which is so harmful, particularly for women (Barad, 2003).  
As matter is not a neutral phenomenon, materialist approaches contend that the 
environment, or what is often referred to as infrastructure, constrains and provides 
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possibilities for an explanation of observed phenomena. Materialist approaches 
consider that there is a reality to be discovered, but recognises that objectivity is not 
always possible and that subjectivity can also be part of one shared reality. It makes a 
claim for the likelihood of truths or partial truths (Harris, 1995, p. 67), rather than the 
absolute claims to truth of positivism. Not everything about the physical world is yet 
fully known to humans. However, materialist approaches contend that it is at least 
possible that physical causes (albeit not justifications) could be located for all 
phenomena (Murphy and Margolis, 1995). 
In adopting a materialist approach, I draw on Karen Barad’s work on the 
importance of matter; she proposes “a specifically posthumanist notion of 
performativity – one that incorporates important material and discursive, social and 
scientific, human and nonhuman, and natural and cultural factors” (Barad, 2003, p. 
808). Discourse and power matters, but in recent years as Barad explains, “there is an 
important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is 
matter” (Barad, 2003, p. 801). Yet any reliable understanding of the world – that is any 
understanding which has a persuasive claim to truth - must be based on an “intra-
action” (Barad, 2003, p. 815) between the material and discursive world. Matter is not 
an immutable concept, but is shaped by and in turn shapes the discourse. Discourse 
matters because matter matters; the primary and most persuasive social constructivist 
concern about discourse stems from the impact it has on material, living beings.  
A material-discursive approach is also important in seeking reliable knowledge. 
Discourse and matter are intertwined, forever linked and inseparable, and to focus on 
one without an understanding of the other does not provide a sufficiently full 
explanation of observed phenomena (Barad, 1998). To make claims about the 
problems with mental capacity law and how it might be improved, such critiques must 
be based on knowledge that reflects the reality of how law operates in practice. This 
cannot be gained from a purely discursive analysis. I agree with Nussbaum’s assertion 
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that what we need “is a subtle study of the interplay of bodily difference and cultural 
construction” (Nussbaum, 1999). As Barad also explains, too often matter is seen as 
“merely an end product rather than an active factor in further materializations” (Barad, 
2003, p. 810) which, if adopted, leads to many multiple and important non-discursive 
(and non-human) factors being ignored in the search for explanation of phenomena. 
Importantly therefore, material-discursive practices are central to the production of 
meaning and knowledge beyond the human sphere (Conaghan, 2013, p. 47). 
In the context of law, the messy inter-subjective relationship between language, 
tradition, ideas and behaviour make it very difficult to delineate between material and 
discursive causes. Furthermore, legal responses must simultaneously engage in 
discourse and representations of what the law is and apply it to real lives of the 
individuals before it. However, by subscribing to the turn towards discourse so 
dominant in academia today, it can result in “the discursive disaggregation of subjects 
from their physical, biological, environmental and material contexts, producing the 
neglect of actual living bodies” (Conaghan, 2013, p. 33). In contrast, Nussbaum’s 
assertion that we should be more concerned with living, breathing beings, reflects an 
important turn back towards material realism (Nussbaum, 1999; Conaghan, 2013, p. 
35).  The importance of feminist interpretations of materialism are that they are based 
in the social world. Social norms and relationality shape our behaviours (Nedelsky, 
2011). Similarly, my account of vulnerability in this thesis is explicitly material and 
embodied; it requires an understanding of the bodily, social and environmental 
conditions that cause and shape vulnerability. A material-discursive approach takes the 
view that analysing the intra-action between environment, bodies and discursive 
practices provides the best insight and understanding of phenomena (Barad, 2003, p. 
814). This is in contrast to the atomistic, individualistic approaches of traditional liberal 
theory. As outlined in Chapter Two, only relational accounts of existence can account 




2.2. Discourse analysis  
 
Building on my explanation of materialism, I now explain how I have carried out 
discourse analysis in parts of this thesis. Discourse analytic methods include focusing 
on the use of language and texts and how they reflect, create and produce the social 
world in which we live (Fairclough, 1992; Black, 2002; Blommaert, 2009). However, as 
Barad also explains, discourse is more than just the “property of words” (Barad, 2003, 
p. 818). She further states, “[d]iscourse is not what is said; it is that which constrains 
and enables what can be said” (Barad, 2003, p. 819). In taking this claim forward, I 
have used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to study the discourse that emerged from 
the social worker interviews and COP proceedings. CDA is a method that studies how 
text and talk enact and reproduce power and inequality within society (Van Dijk, 2015, 
p. 466). It involves using discourse analysis within a particular critical perspective. I 
have done so drawing on feminist approaches to power relations to show how 
individuals can escape “the homogenizing tendencies of power in modern society 
through the assertion of their autonomy” (McNay, 1992, p. 3). I understand power to 
mean the capacity to control the actions of others, but also incorporate Foucault’s 
conception of the productive capacity of power (Foucault, 1979); its ability to shape 
behaviour within a material context. However, Foucault’s analysis of power is too 
heavily concentrated on specific exercises of power by state institutions, rather than on 
the power that can be exerted laterally between individuals in less formal ways. Bell 
picks up on this when focusing on Foucault’s failure to consider the relationship 
between men and women, but it importantly applies to the relationship between 
individuals more broadly (Bell, 1993, p. 27). This is particularly so when considering 
abuse which typically involves females with mental disabilities being subjected to 
violence by males. In Chapters Four and Seven in particular, I focus on how these 
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relationships are responded to by law and social work, without assuming that law’s 
intervention is disempowering. 
CDA has been applied to judicial and regulatory language (Black, 2002; 
Harding, 2012, p. 434) but is a relatively new development in the legal field. It lends 
itself well to legal analysis because the struggle for neutrality in law reinforces law’s 
claim to truth (Foucault, 1980, pp. 8-9). Discourse analysis provides an important 
framework to explore how power is constructed and reflected through the courtroom 
and how judges, advocates and participants define the meaning and importance of the 
interaction (Holmes, 2005, p. 32). Whilst I accept that discourse reflects and reinforces 
knowledge, I do not proceed on the basis that “nothing has any meaning outside of 
discourse” (Black, 2002, p. 168). Instead I focus upon the “expression in language of 
relations of power and hegemony with a view to challenging and changing those 
relations” (Black, 2002, p. 169). I consider whether the discourse analysed reflects an 
understanding of existing stereotypes about vulnerable adults within this context. For 
example, in Chapter Four I highlight the operation of power through the practice of 
mental capacity law to designate particular adults as vulnerable in particular ways, and 
to consider the effect of this. In understanding vulnerability through a material-
discursive lens I consider the material boundaries within which the meaning of 
vulnerability has emerged. Moreover, assumptions emerging from the discourse about 
P’s limited role in the social work or court process reflect the wider hegemony of P’s 
material exclusion and the power imbalances underpinning mental capacity law.   
Importantly, CDA also provides a method to analyse communication. Social 
work is defined by communication between the professional and person being 
supported. Communication within such relationships is an essential part of achieving 
positive outcomes in social work practice (Trevithick, 2005, pp. 116-117). Courtrooms 
are equally characterised by communicative practices; it is not only the mechanism 
through which the arguments are conveyed but also highlights the underlying 
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assumptions they involve. Therefore the two cultures of the courtroom and social work, 
which are both heavily dependent on communication, naturally lend themselves to 
CDA to help to understand the life of each culture (Black, 2002, p. 164). Applying CDA 
to my interview data also allowed me to be sensitive to the different discourse used 
within single interviews and, furthermore, between interviewees (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009, p. 156). This ability to compare language provided an insight into how different 
professionals understood and applied their discourse to different scenarios. In addition, 
the often contrasting understanding between me and the interviewees of certain topics 
highlighted the disjuncture between law and social work, despite social workers 
ultimately having to apply and interpret the law on a daily basis (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009, p. 157). I then built on this to consider how it ties in with the types of cases 
observed in the courtroom. This was to assist in identifying the constraints and 
incentives as to why certain cases were pursued. In the parts of this thesis where I 
have undertaken a discursive analysis of my data, I have shown how discourse is 
shaped by and shapes environmental factors and why the use of particular discourse 
can be damaging for material, embodied lives (Black, 2002, pp. 177-178). 
 
2.3. A material-discursive analytic approach   
 
As outlined above, material-discursive approaches acknowledge that both matter and 
discourse matter. Therefore a material-discursive analytic approach considers that 
resources, and thus infrastructure, shape and constrain reality, language and 
experience, and vice versa. In analysing the data for this thesis I took account of the 
material reasons why particular language might have been used as well as 
understanding how language impacted on the material lives of those involved in mental 
capacity law. For example, in Chapter Six I explore the difference in the way that 
expert and experiential evidence was received in mental capacity law proceedings, 
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arguing that there is a hierarchy of evidence in this context, which reinforces whose 
evidence is given value. 
More broadly, the pathogenic vulnerability to abuse that women with mental 
disabilities experience is traceable to material-discursive causes. Harris argues that the 
infrastructure of defence and aggression has led to women being oppressed and 
subjugated throughout the human world (Harris, 1989, p. 84). He claims that “[s]ex is a 
source of aggressive energy and brutal behavior only because male chauvinist 
systems expropriate sexual rewards, allocate them to aggressive males, and deny 
them to passive, nonaggressive ones.” (Harris, 1989, p. 106). Others argue that it is 
woman’s distinct ability to reproduce through pregnancy which has been the cause of 
female oppression (Firestone, 1971). Similarly, in the disability context, as discussed at 
section 2.1 of Chapter One, it has been argued that the shape of the material world 
needs to be changed to effectively achieve change in the lives of disabled people 
(Garland-Thomson, 2011). A specific example is the lack of sex and relationship 
education for adults with mental disabilities and the related lack of opportunities for 
them to pursue relationships. These limitations in the every day lives of adults with 
mental disabilities does nothing to equip them with the abilities to understand, 
implement and respond to positive and harmful relationship practices (Hollomotz, 
2011). These multi-faceted examples of material causes, and failures, have led to the 
current marginalised position in which many adults with mental disabilities find 
themselves.  
Building upon this material reality of increased vulnerability to sexual and other 
forms of abuse against adults with mental disabilities, the discourse of vulnerability has 
been used to reinforce particular understandings of which adults should be eligible for 
legal and social care protection. The discourse of inherent vulnerability attributes the 
cause of vulnerability to inherent features, such as being a female or having a 
disability, rather than analysing the material underlying reasons why that person is 
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vulnerable. This construction is not harmful merely discursively, but it has embodied 
consequences for the individual in relation to her ability to control her body and make 
choices about how she lives her life. The language of vulnerability can reinforce and 
perpetuate the material causes of vulnerability; particularly when the labelling of groups 
deemed vulnerable can lead to them seeking protection in environments where they 
are at a higher risk of abuse (Hollomotz, 2011). Only a material-discursive analysis can 
account for the interconnected causes of vulnerability, something explored further in 
Chapter Four. Yet as with all material-discursive analyses, this does not mean that 
such a position inevitably results, but provides an understanding from which we can 
most effectively target responses. I argue throughout this thesis (and have set out the 
reasons why in Chapter Two) that targeting situational causes of vulnerability should 
be prioritised and I set out specific ways in which this can be achieved in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
3. Methodological Underpinning of Mixed Methods 
 
I now analyse this material-discursive approach in light of my choice of methods – 
observation and review of COP cases and social worker interviews. There were four 
main reasons why I chose to use these methods: to understand how the law operated 
in practice; to understand mental capacity law as a hidden site of power; to understand 
the culture of protection and empowerment; and, to strengthen the validity of the 
findings. 
Firstly, doing observation alerts you to the materiality of presence; that your 
norms and understandings prior to the observation occupy a physical space (Jacob, 
2012, p. 18). Carrying out observation heightened my awareness of the material reality 
of the cases.  Similarly, interviewing social workers who work with the law on a daily 
basis brings into clear focus the stakes of legal critique. As with reflections following 
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the Feminist Judgments Project (Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley, 2010), I realised that 
mental capacity law requires material actions which have material consequences for 
living beings. It is not sufficient to just critique, because law necessitates a judgment, a 
decision, within certain constraints. Therefore analysing and subjecting law to critique 
necessitates an understanding of the “living history” (May, 2011, p. 162) in which law 
operates. Criticising it from the outside without proposing an alternative or 
understanding the practicalities of suggestions for improvement is something I wanted 
to avoid.   
A second important underpinning of both methods was to shine a light on 
hidden locations of power in mental capacity law (Jacob, 2012, p. 25); this is important 
because key to power’s effectiveness is its secrecy of operation (Foucault, 1978, p. 
86). The COP has long been a concealed site of power and there has to date been 
limited qualitative empirical research published relating to it. It was only during this 
project in 2016 that the COP opened up access and, even then, those attending would 
not have access to the court files or case history that I was able to access.  In 
considering sites of power I have drawn on feminist analyses of power (Smart, 1989; 
Bell, 1993). Smart explains that law’s power is no longer solely or primarily situated in 
its juridical form but is tied up with disciplinary forms of power. This means that the 
formal power of law as control over individuals exercised through the judiciary and 
courts has changed and developed to define truth through more decentralised forms of 
regulating behaviour (Smart, 1989, p. 8). The methods I chose reflect this distinction; at 
one end observations of the COP provide an insight into the controlling nature of power 
in this context. Conversely, the social worker interviews provide insight into how 
disciplinary power is deployed by non-lawyers. There have long been critiques of 
looking at law through the doctrinal aspects or through courtroom analyses, in contrast 
to the social impact of law on the lives of those affected by it (Smart, 1989, p. 24). 
However, there is enormous value in analysing courts as a site of power, particularly as 
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their decisions have an impact on the lives of individuals and have an ability to produce 
and shape the realities of social work practice, something explored further in Chapter 
Seven. This thesis therefore provides an original contribution to this area by uncovering 
the hidden reality of mental capacity law in practice from the perspective of legal 
proceedings and social work practice.  
Yet a material-discursive analysis recognises that both juridical and disciplinary 
power can be used to create harm. I made a similar argument in Chapter Two about 
vulnerability being created by legal interventions (Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010). 
Whilst important, if law failed to regulate behaviour in this context, the exercise of 
power by those who abuse adults with mental disabilities could arguably be seen to 
have the same, or worse, effect. There are good reasons why the power of law should 
be resisted at times, but similarly the power of law could be reframed as a counter 
power to the exercise of power by the (often male) abuser. For example, if a person 
with learning disabilities was in a relationship with another person who it was known 
was sexually abusing them then that abuser’s power over P could be more damaging 
than law’s exercise of their power of intervention. So in choosing two methods which 
represent different sites of power, I consider whether law’s power is a negative, 
dominating form of power when compared with the disciplinary exercise of power by 
others in everyday life. In this regard I consider the inclusion of P in the legal process 
(Chapter Five) and the need to respond to vulnerability in non-coercive ways (Chapter 
Seven).  
Interviews were chosen to provide an insight into the culture and practices of 
social workers. Rather than trying to elicit their knowledge of specific laws, I used a 
semi-structured approach (see Appendix two) to build up a qualitative picture and to 
allow interviewees to elaborate in detail beyond pre-defined themes (May, 2011, p. 
134). The intention was to find out what social workers’ experiences were of using 
mental capacity law and how their stories reflected, or differed from, other 
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understandings. Elite interviews were chosen to explore the cultural systems relating to 
the social worker’s use of mental capacity law which outsiders, such as lawyers and 
academics, may not fully appreciate (Spradley, 1979; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 
147). However, as a lawyer interviewing social workers about their use of law it was 
important that I established my own understanding of their profession to gain their trust 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 147). Building on initial questions to build up a rapport, 
the interview data obtained was co-constructed between us to produce accounts of 
their use of law in this context (Spradley, 1979; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 17; 
May, 2011, p. 144) rather than necessarily being an entirely objective account. In this 
sense social workers were discursively constructing their own understandings of the 
issues we discussed. However, they were conveying stories that had a material reality 
behind them which I have used as a basis for claims of how social workers actually 
behave, albeit not necessarily observing such behaviour first hand.  
Observational research at the COP was undertaken to allow me to become 
immersed within the culture of proceedings (Jacob, 2012). Similarly to interviewing, 
observation provided a greater insight into the language used in the courtroom, the 
procedure of the case and the way in which the decisions were made. For example, in 
Chapter Six I explore the importance of expert evidence in proceedings. Furthermore, 
observation provided a particularly revealing insight into the extent to which P was 
involved in decision-making processes. Yet my position as observer was neither 
neutral nor static; similar to Barad’s analogy of scientific apparatus, my observations 
were an interaction with the material-discursive practices of the COP (Barad, 2003, p. 
816) and this was evident in my discussions with court officers, judges and case 
participants.   
A final important underpinning of the research methods was the need to 
strengthen the validity of the findings. As Geertz’s thick description explains, 
recognising the complex, interwoven, and relational nature of social phenomena is 
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fundamental (Geertz, 1973, pp. 9-10). Qualitative research methods allowed me to 
unpick the multi-dimensional aspects of the observed situation compared to that which 
a doctrinal analysis would allow. I was able to recognise and give value to particular 
observations and attempted to build an informed picture without necessarily having all 
of the information to make it whole. In this sense, the social worker interviews and 
observational research were complementary; they enabled the results from one data 
set to illustrate or elaborate the results from the other, sharpening an otherwise hidden 
picture (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989, p. 266). Similarly, using mixed methods 
helped to triangulate the findings. Triangulation refers to using different approaches 
each with different limitations or biases with the expectation that they will counteract to 
strengthen the resulting claims (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989, p. 256). This 
was achieved not only by adopting different methods but also by taking a material-
discursive approach which values a wider paradigm of knowledge (Greene, Caracelli 
and Graham, 1989, p. 257). 
I expected the data from the observation and interviews to provide different 
findings and have different limitations; firstly, the experiences of the social workers and 
the cases observed would not inevitably match up. Many social workers would never 
have been to the COP and those who had might have had very different experiences. 
In fact, it may be that only social workers with particular experiences, or those within 
particular local authorities, had the opportunity to bring cases to court. As such, it was 
a weakness of the methodology to not have been able to interview the social workers 
from the observed cases. However, when similar themes did occur as a result of both 
methods, this could be used to support assertions about the reliability of that theme 
given the quite different sources of data (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989). 
A weakness of the observational method was that it was more likely to be 
biased towards my own interpretations and preconceptions, particularly in light of my 
background having acted for NHS professionals as a solicitor. In contrast, the interview 
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data was more likely to be biased towards social workers’ perceptions as I was reliant 
on their stories rather than being able to test them against independent evidence. 
Immediately it is clear that any bias towards P’s experiences or understandings is 
missing. Interviewing P would therefore have strengthened the triangulation of the 
findings and I would have had an additional insight into how P perceived the law. 
Similarly, whilst I had the opportunity to speak to many of the judges involved in the 
cases observed, they were not formally interviewed and I did not have their permission 
to use quotes from our private discussions. However, the constraints of carrying out 
PhD research meant that I had to be selective in the methods used. I did not have the 
time nor the funding to carry out interviews with P, judges and other participants in 
addition to the research carried out. Whilst this is a weakness, it is reflective of the 
reality of doctoral research. Despite these methodological constraints, as I explain in 
Chapters Four, Six and Seven, similar themes were identified through inductive 
analysis of the observational and interview data. In this sense triangulation in using 
these different methods was used to strengthen the validity of my research findings 
(Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989, p. 256) and, therefore, my claims to how the law 
might be improved. 
The research was further strengthened by obtaining a purposive sample of 
cases for observation rather than only attending those that were most convenient or at 
an interesting stage (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 250). Of the 20 case files 
reviewed (see Table 3.1 below for summary of case information) I observed eight over 
11 separate hearings. The observed cases were selected based on those which most 
reflected the sex/marriage/contact theme underpinning the thesis as well as those 




Table 3.1: Summary of COP case files 
 
 Anonymised case 
name 
Sex Age  Disability Capacity domains 
reviewed 
1.  K County Council v 
SL 






2.  ML v (1) TL and (2) D 
County Council 
 
Male 82 Dementia Contact 
 
3.  Z County Council v 
FY 
Female 66 Dementia Residence, 
Proceedings, Care, 
Contact 
4.  Y County Council v 
(1) LC (2) GK (3) SC 







5.  W County Council v 
ZR 
Female 37 Learning 
disability 
Sex 
6.  C Borough Council v 
(1) DY (2) B Council 
 





7.  A County Council v 
(1) MT (2) KZ 







8.  H County Council v 
XC 





9.  M County Council v 
EV 


















11.  J Council v RK 
 






12.  K County Council v 
MW 




13.  N County Council v 
(1) GI and (2) DQ 














14.  N County Council v 
CA 





15.  YS v E District 
Council 












17.  P County Council v 
(1) SE (2) TM 





18.  V Borough Council v 
AY 
 














20.  O City Council v (1) 
AW (2) FW (3) YW (4) 
TW 












As Table 3.1 shows, I was able to record data from case files of 20 cases referred to 
me during January to May 2016. I understand from COP staff that all of the sex and 
marriage cases that were issued at the London COP were referred to my sample 
during this approximately four month period, plus additional contact cases where 
issues around relationships, sex or marriage were raised. To put these numbers into 
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perspective, during quarters one and two of 2016, there were 20 and 21 applications 
for a ‘one-off’ personal welfare order respectively (Ministry of Justice, 2017a). 
Therefore the sample I reviewed was likely to be illustrative of the sex and marriage 
cases that reach the COP given the numbers of applications made during that same 
period. 
Overall, using mixed methods and a hybrid methodology helped to create a 
more informed picture than a doctrinal approach. Inevitably certain perspectives were 
still left out, but a material-discursive methodology makes claims based on 
explanations of observed phenomena and therefore individual experience whilst 




In this section I outline the methods chosen for the research which included interviews 
with social workers, case observation and case file reviews. 
 
4.1. Interviews with social workers 
 
I experienced some difficulty in recruiting participants for the social worker interviews, a 
common challenge with elite interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 147). My initial 
interviews were not with currently practising social workers, although they all had 
recent experience of working with the MCA. However, it proved challenging to locate 
practising social workers who were willing to take part. In the process of research I 
slowly realised that not everyone is quite so interested in the issues you want to 
discuss (Jacob, 2012, pp. 17-18). I contacted a number of social workers, including 
directly through local authorities, but each contact typically resulted in one or two 
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participants. Whilst this was challenging, it meant that I obtained a broad and varied 
sample of participants (see Table 3.2 below for summary of participants). 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of interviewees 
 Anonymised social 
worker name 
Relevant experience 
1.  Robert Qualified social worker. Manager of a learning disability 
team in a local authority for six years during which time 
the MCA came into force and subsequently a manager 
for a transition social work team for a local authority for 
18 months. 
2.  James  Qualified social worker. 20 years experience working with 
adults with learning disabilities.  
3.  David  Qualified social worker since 2009 with experience of 
working primarily with older adults with mental health 
needs. 
4.  Thomas  Qualified social worker. Retired from full time social work 
for four years at the time of interview. Experience in 
management posts at various levels, mainly in mental 
health teams, with particular experience of implementing 
the deprivation of liberty provisions from when the MCA 
came into force until 2012.  
5.  Julia  
 
Qualified social worker. Experience as a local authority 
social worker with families where there was a child with a 
disability and role at time of interview was as a social 
worker at secure unit with inpatient and outpatient adults 
with mental health difficulties. 
6.  Alice  Qualified social worker. Experience in an adult 
safeguarding team for four to five years.  
7.  Sarah Qualified social worker. Experience in an adult 
safeguarding enquiry team for four years.  
8.  Andrea Qualified social worker.  Experience working with older 
adults and people with learning disabilities in three 
different local authorities. In role at time of interview for 
three years working with people with dementia. 
 
 
Purposive sampling was used to select interviewees (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 
1989, p. 258). This meant that I had certain criteria to help determine who to include in 
the sample. As Table 3.2 shows, initially I was open to interviewing any qualified social 
worker with past or present experience of working with the MCA in relation to adults 
with mental disabilities. However, as the research progressed, I realised that the social 
workers that were best placed to participate were narrower than my initial criteria and 
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that those with experience in either learning disability teams or adult safeguarding 
teams were the most suitable candidates. This was because they tended to have the 
most relevant experience of capacity cases concerning sex, marriage and contact. A 
further important feature of purposive sampling was that I did not have a set number of 
interviews to carry out because it would be based on my perception of when sufficient 
data had been obtained. One important aspect was that I had to ensure I was 
analysing the data as the interviews progressed and I found that transcribing the data 
myself was particularly useful in this respect. It also enabled me to note the aspects of 
the discourse that was relevant to my particular mode of inquiry and based on my own 
recollections of the interview (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 180).  
Samples were self-selecting in that I approached a number of organisations and 
individuals to distribute my request.81 The self-selecting nature of the social worker 
interviews meant that, in most cases, the social workers who were actively interested in 
participating had a specific interest, which meant they were engaged with the issues. 
The limit of self-selecting participants was that those who struggled most with 
implementing the MCA were left out or not as likely to want to participate. Furthermore, 
it may also have meant that those social workers experiencing the greatest resource 
pressures were also less likely to take part as they may have felt less able to spare the 
time. Having said that, in some senses this strengthens the validity of the data because 
it suggests that the social workers who I interviewed were on the more engaged end of 
the spectrum. 
In depth interviews were carried out with eight social workers. All were either 
currently practising or had previous experience of working with the MCA. This was 
                                                      
81 This included a university, local authorities in different parts of the UK and a number of other 
individuals who I contacted directly or through other contacts made. For two local authorities I 
had to go through a research governance framework process. For one this involved an 
application for research governance approval, for which I had to supply a copy of my research 
proposal, participant information sheets, consent forms, approach letters to social workers and 
complete an application form.  
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because I wanted to understand how the law post-MCA had been interpreted and 
applied in practice by non-legal professionals. All social workers interviewed were 
provided with a participant information sheet and consent form (see Appendix three). 
They were free to ask any questions before or after the interview and were free to 
withdraw from the research within six months following the interview date and no 
participants withdrew. Each social worker gave explicit consent for the interviews to be 
recorded using an audio device, transcribed and for quotes to be used in the research.  
I carried out face to face interviews to allow for a better rapport to be developed 
with the aim of obtaining more detailed data. I was guided by an in depth semi-
structured interview schedule (see Appendix two) (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 
130). Questioning was broken down into themes, including general questions about 
social workers’ understanding of the legal frameworks, specific questions about cases 
concerning sex and relationships and questions about the court process and supported 
decision-making. Whilst the interview schedule did guide my questions, interviewees 
were asked different questions as the research progressed and based on individual 
experience. I also tried to keep the questions open by asking questions such as “can 
you tell me a little bit more about that case…?”. This openness allowed for elaboration 
by interviewees where necessary whilst still maintaining a general structure to enable 
comparisons between different interviews (May, 2011, p. 135). The interviews were 
coded by hand based on emergent themes and according to my theoretical framework 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 202). This was done during data collection as well as 
after all data had been collected. Themes were identified partially based on deductive 
analysis of themes identified in advance such as vulnerability. My own hypothesis at 
the start of the research that vulnerability is internalised in this context was confirmed 
by the data analysis. However, new themes also inductively emerged during the coding 
process such as the privileging of expert evidence (discussed in Chapter Six) and 
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social workers’ perceived need to gain legal legitimacy for their actions (discussed in 
Chapter Seven).  
 
4.2. Court of Protection observations 
 
New COP rules came into force during the research which allowed court hearings to be 
held in public for the first time.82 I think this assisted the parties in giving consent as the 
pilot scheme reversed the presumption that hearings would be held in private to 
hearings being held in public. Having the explicit support and approval of the COP was 
also positive. It enabled participants to understand my attendance and I was seen in a 
more ‘official’ capacity rather than as a stranger (May, 2011, p. 173). On occasions 
when my presence at the COP was questioned I informed solicitors or barristers that I 
had approval from the Vice President of the COP and the Ministry of Justice. This 
approval was helpful in that it appeared to allay any concerns these professionals had 
about my right to be present. 
Confidentiality for all participants was the presumption except where this was 
waived by a judge, under which circumstances the information would already be in the 
public domain and therefore would not breach the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).  
Given the importance of confidentiality and anonymisation, all notes from the 
observation were typed at the time of the observation and stored in a drop box file, 
using boxcryptor to encrypt the data so that it was stored in a fully anonymised format. 
The data recorded was also anonymised immediately. Furthermore, I do not use any 
information in this thesis which, along with other information, would lead to P being 
identifiable.83 Case names have been anonymised and participants have been given 
                                                      
82 This changed during the course of my research, see Court of Protection Practice Direction – 
Transparency Pilot, which came into force on 29 January 2016.  
83 DPA Part 1 s 1 and s 33 (4). 
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pseudonyms. The names used should not be taken as the actual initials and/or names 
of participants and I have made no links with any reported COP cases.  
I made contact with HMCTS to gain approval for the research and this involved 
a meeting with the Vice President of the COP, Mr Justice Charles, who was extremely 
supportive of the research. The Vice-President provided his written authorisation and 
allowed me to review the court records. Whilst he provided this authorisation, which 
could be given under Practice direction 13A, supplemental to the Court of Protection 
Rules 2007 (COPr),84 he explained that it would still be at the discretion of each judge 
in an individual case to permit me to attend. This was because there may be objections 
from the parties and any approval given to me was subject to the direction of the 
court.85 Once I had received the approval of Charles J, I had a number of meetings with 
COP staff. We discussed the bureaucratic practicalities, including how cases would be 
notified to me. These staff acted as the gateway to the information and they gave me 
access to the cases requested. Being an observational researcher therefore involved 
relying on people working behind the scenes to decide what I was able to access 
(Jacob, 2012, pp. 18-19). It was also agreed that it would be helpful for the COP judges 
to be aware of my research. I therefore gave a presentation to COP judges based in 
London in September 2015 at their monthly meeting. Furthermore, Charles J wrote to 
the regional hubs for the COP to inform them of my research and that it had his 
approval.  
Alongside this process, I made the HMCTS Data Access Panel (DAP) 
application. Any research involving court files is required to have a Privileged Access 
Agreement (PAA) issued by the DAP, highlighting the duplication of consent that 
researchers have to go through. Whilst I already had the confirmed support of the 
                                                      
84 In this thesis any reference to COPr means the Court of Protection Rules 2007 (as amended 
by the Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015). These were the rules in force at the time 
of the research. The updated rules are referred to as the Court of Protection Rules 2017 and 
discussed briefly further in Chapter Eight.  
85 COPr 91 (2A). 
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COP, the DAP process was more challenging. After protracted discussions I was given 
approval to observe up to twenty cases relating to capacity to consent to sexual 
activity, capacity to marry and capacity for contact at the COP between November 
2015 and December 2016.86 These cases were chosen as they brought out issues of 
vulnerability and go to the core of the debate between protection and empowerment. 
Whilst sex and marriage capacity cases were my primary focus, contact cases draw 
out many of the same issues, with familial and friendship networks being in dispute. 
The reason for including these cases was because during my discussions with court 
officers it was believed that there would be relatively few cases relating to sex and 
marriage. However, in reality this was not a challenge I encountered as I easily 
reached the 20 case file limit within the research period. 
Once the approval was received, the first case I attended was not until February 
2016 showing how lengthy the processes were. The distinction between what was 
ideal and what was possible was a constant challenge, as with much observational 
research (May, 2011, p. 171). This had an impact on the number of cases that I was 
able to follow through to a final hearing. As such the outcome of the cases became 
less of an analytical focus as the research progressed, despite my own commitment to 
recognising the ends or outcomes of law, as well as the process or means by which 
justice is achieved (Riles, 2006, p. 61).   
In terms of the practicalities of accessing cases, a court officer in the technical 
team in London was my contact. Cases that fell within the sample were set aside for 
me to review at regular intervals (approximately once a month). I made notes using a 
case file review template (see Appendix four) and then reviewed the information to 
make a decision about whether or not it would be suitable for inclusion in the project. 
Cases were then noted by the technical team who wrote to the parties to inform them 
                                                      
86 The original period was until August 2016. However, this was extended by agreement from 
HMCTS to enable me to attend further hearings. 
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of my wish to attend the case, along with a copy of my participant information sheets 
and consent forms. Once the consent letters had been sent out, the technical team 
would liaise with me and the regional COP hubs to identify the hearing dates. 
As the research progressed I realised that participant-observation is never 
simply a passive experience of being an objective observer (Flood, 2005). In drawing 
on ethnographic approaches when carrying out courtroom observations, I became 
aware of the possibility that my presence might affect the content of what was 
observed (May, 2011, pp. 170-171). This was a real possibility as my perception was 
that the judge in each case was very aware of my presence. In every case, the judge 
explicitly discussed the case with me or invited me to provide my own analysis or 
comments before, during or after the hearings. Having access to backstage knowledge 
such as this was invaluable but was not something I had foreseen at the start (May, 
2011, p. 179). I became concerned that it had an impact on my perception of the court 
as I began to be treated as an insider by being invited to discuss the case with the 
judge in their chambers in a number of cases. Whilst my experience was positive, I 
found that I needed to detach myself to consider how open and accessible the court 
was from P’s perspective. As a young, keen researcher and qualified solicitor, I felt that 
the judges were more open to my presence and interested in my views, often in stark 
contrast to P’s role in the case. The impossibility of impartiality in observing is always 
challenging and whilst I strived to put aside my own often positive experiences, it 
inevitably shaped my outlook on the court as a site of power. However, this is a risk 
with all observational research which is not covert and the issue was how I managed it. 
This partly involved recording my reflexive views throughout and then critically 
reviewing them at a later date. Therefore whilst it is important to acknowledge the role 
of the researcher, in doing so I do not intend to make a purely subjective claim. I 
consider that the observational research I carried out provides particularly revealing 
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inductive insights which I do not suppose would be unique to my own research 
experience (May, 2011, p. 166; Jacob, 2012, p. 21). 
Following each observation I reviewed my field notes and additional notes were 
made with my thoughts and reflections on the process. Coding of the observational 
data was a similar process to the social worker interviews.  I initially analysed the data 
on a thematic basis with deductive themes such as vulnerability being predicted in 
advance. However, new themes inductively emerged from the data as a result of being 
a participant-observer (May, 2011, p. 163), for example the role of P in the court 
process and how her voice was often silent was something that became incredibly 
stark to me as the research progressed, which I explore further in Chapter Five. This is 
not as evident from case law which actually appears to put P at the centre, highlighting 
a weakness in analysing solely from legal texts presented as neutral and 
comprehensive.  Being so immersed in the process of observation and actively 
acknowledging your role as a participant, can bring great insights, particularly if you are 
treated as part of that group (Flood, 2005, pp. 43-44).  
 
5. Ethical Issues 
 
This project involved thinking about difficult ethical issues including about my role as a 
currently non-disabled person in researching disability (Barnes, 2008). I found that 
whilst I did not want to exclude the participation of those with mental disabilities, 
unfortunately it would have been extremely challenging to obtain ethical approval of 
research which involved working directly with people who lacked capacity under the 
MCA. Under s 30 MCA, research carried out on or in relation to a person who lacks 
capacity is unlawful unless it has approval from the appropriate body. For my research 
this would have been the Social Care Research Ethics Committee (SCREC). The two 
questions that the SCREC considers in relation to research ethics applications are: (1) 
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whether the research is related to the ‘impairing condition’ that causes the lack of 
capacity, or to the treatment of those with that condition, and (2) whether the research 
can be undertaken as effectively with people who do have the capacity to consent to 
participate. Applying this to my project, the research could not be said to relate to the 
‘impairing condition’, but it could have been argued that it relates to the treatment of 
those with that condition in that the research covers the law’s treatment of that group. 
Secondly, it was arguable that the research could have been as effective if carried out 
with people who do have capacity to consent. Whilst this was not straightforward, the 
test for capacity to participate in research is very low; under s 1 (2) MCA, people are 
assumed to have capacity unless it is established that they lack it. Furthermore, the 
test for capacity under s 3 (1) MCA requires the person to understand the information 
relevant to the decision, retain that information and weigh or use it to make a decision. 
They are also required to be able to communicate their decision. Therefore the test for 
capacity should have been very low in relation to my project because the method of 
observation was simple to understand as somebody sitting in the room and taking 
notes. However, based on the perception that many of the cases I was likely to 
encounter were likely to relate to people who had sufficient capacity to participate, I 
decided not to apply to SCREC as research with people who had capacity would be as 
effective. Therefore in including only people who had capacity to participate, the 
approvals required were from the University of Birmingham Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS).  
As I had decided to exclude those who lacked capacity to participate in 
research, I made it clear during my observations that any participants being observed 
must have capacity to take part in observational research. I did this by setting this out 
in a covering letter (see Appendix five) where I asked P’s professional representative to 
seek P’s consent to participate in the research and if any concerns at all were raised 
about her capacity to do so then I would withdraw from observing that case. I also 
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enclosed simplified and non-simplified participant information sheets and simplified and 
non-simplified consent forms (see Appendix six). On the occasions where P did attend 
the COP, assessment of capacity was carried out by those closest to P, typically the 
Official Solicitor. My approach was based on a presumption that P had capacity, as 
required by the MCA, unless there was evidence that she lacked it. Therefore if there 
were any concerns raised by any person about whether or not P fully understood what 
he or she was participating in then I was available to answer further questions or 
withdraw from observing. However, that did not happen in any case. In most cases, the 
parties did not respond to my request for consent in advance of the hearing date and 
therefore consent was sought on the day of the hearing instead. However, even on the 
day, participants were so busy preparing for the case that in reality, they showed little 
interest in my consent form or information sheets. As many ethnographers have noted, 
the contrast between the requirements of ethics review rarely matches up with the 
reality on the ground (Jacob, 2012, pp. 43-45).  In every case observed I had the 
approval of the judge who also ensured that all parties were aware of and consented to 
my attendance in court.  
The primary ethical issue posed by the social worker interviews was the 
possibility of identification. This is a central issue when carrying out interviews, but 
particularly so given the sensitive nature of the subject matter (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009, p. 62). Social workers were not so concerned about their own identity being 
revealed but the possibility of the identities of the individuals whose stories they were 
sharing. I also remained open to the possibility of having to respond to other ethical 
issues if they arose (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 69). Issues around identification 
were addressed by removing identifying material at the point of transcription of the 
interviews. In particular I removed references to names, locations and employers but 
information such as age and factual scenario remained. I have therefore given each 






In setting out the methodological underpinning of my research I have sought to 
highlight the reasons why the particular methods were chosen and how they interact to 
produce complementary, rigorous and original findings. In rejecting traditional 
epistemological positions, I have explained why I take a material-discursive approach 
(Barad, 2003; Garland-Thomson, 2011; Conaghan, 2013) to analysing this area of law. 
In particular, it allowed for an incorporation of the materiality of bodies, including what it 
means to live within the body of a mentally disabled adult, and how the material reality 
of their lives is affected by the practice of mental capacity law. I have drawn on the 
strengths of materialist analyses of the social and legal world alongside recognising the 
role that discourse plays in reflecting and shaping knowledge. In doing so my findings 
have a greater sense of complementarity and validity than taking a singular analytical 
approach. 
Particular insights from carrying out the fieldwork have also been explained in 
this chapter. Carrying out fieldwork was a rewarding personal experience as it added 
physical reality to the stories and theories I was used to reading. Of particular 
significance was the desire on the part of the judiciary to open up the COP to scrutiny. 
In doing so, the judiciary and court officers were aware of their responsibilities towards 
protecting the confidentiality of the subjects of proceedings. The COP has come under 
scrutiny and critique for being seen as a private court with limited public or media 
access despite efforts to improve transparency (Series et al., 2015a). Yet my 
experience was that the judiciary and staff at the COP were extremely helpful and 
willing to facilitate the project from start to finish. 
In the following chapter I build on my methodological approach to explore the 
meaning of vulnerability in mental capacity law by reference to my empirical data. I 
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argue that, materially and discursively, vulnerability is understood primarily as inherent 





CHAPTER FOUR: THE MEANING OF VULNERABILITY IN PROTECTING 




In this chapter I consider the interpretation of vulnerability in mental capacity law, 
specifically in cases concerning abuse. I argue that inherent approaches to 
vulnerability dominate the practice of mental capacity law, in contrast to understanding 
vulnerability situationally. The theoretical distinction between inherent and situational 
vulnerability (Mackenzie, 2014b; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b; Lindsey, 
2016a) and the approach I take in this thesis was explored in detail in Chapter Two. I 
apply this theoretical approach to the data obtained to show that social workers, 
psychiatrists, judges and legal professionals use the concept of vulnerability in ways 
that emphasise the inherent features that make a person vulnerable instead of the 
material, situational causes of vulnerability. I further argue that this has led to a 
paradox of under-protection and over-protection.  
In this chapter I firstly explore how, during COP proceedings, vulnerability was 
discursively constructed as inherent and argue that, in many cases, this led to over-
protection: that as a result of an inherent feature such as disability, P was seen to 
require ‘special protection’. The material manner of protection was typically focused on 
restricting and controlling P rather than addressing the situational cause of her 
vulnerable position. I also explore the discursive construction of vulnerability by social 
workers and argue that where social workers understood vulnerability as inherent, this 
more commonly led to under-protection. This means that the individual was viewed as 
inherently vulnerable and, as such, little was done to challenge the harmful forms of 
situational vulnerability in her life. This under-protection was particularly evident in 
cases of sexual violence against women, where responsibility for the vulnerable 
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situation was often attributed to the victim rather than being viewed as a surplus 
pathogenic vulnerability. I conclude by arguing that viewing vulnerability more 
situationally will achieve a better balance between empowerment and protection.  
 
2. Vulnerability in the Court of Protection 
 
In this section I use CDA to show that participants in the COP constructed vulnerability 
as inherent. By this I mean that where vulnerability was recognised, it was done so in a 
way that linked that vulnerability to something inherent, such as disability or gender. I 
focus on the oral language of the judges, barristers, solicitors and witnesses, as well as 
written information from court files and one written judgment.  
 
2.1. Vulnerability discourse in mental capacity law proceedings 
 
Whilst judicial discourse is important, it is not the sole focus of this chapter. This is 
partly because I only heard two oral judgments and one written judgment. There have 
also been analyses of judicial discourse in COP judgments elsewhere (Harding, 2012; 
Pritchard-Jones, 2016). Furthermore, relying solely on judgments limits the extent of 
analysis; judges are likely to have a high degree of awareness of their language, 
notwithstanding critiques of judicial awareness of the impact of their discourse 
(Harding, 2012). Given that judgment writing, as well as the writing of legal 
submissions and applications, involves a process of reflecting and redrafting, the more 
‘intuitive’ or ‘natural’ language used by participants within the courtroom might provide 
different insights into the construction of vulnerability. In this sense, it can shed light on 
the more ‘authentic’ thoughts and feelings in a way that analysing the revised, 
cautionary text of a judgment does not.  
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Firstly, many case files contained evidence that vulnerability was 
conceptualised as inherent rather than situational (see Table A1 at Appendix one). For 
example, in C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, the position statement of C 
Borough Council stated that DY had an IQ of 47 and a learning difficulty.  They said her 
associated co-morbidities included short term memory issues and deficiencies in 
receptive and expressive language, sequencing, prediction and planning. The 
statement then explained “As such she is particularly vulnerable and in need of 
substantial support in all but the most elementary aspects of daily life in order to 
maintain herself safely.” This shows that DY’s vulnerability was linked to her mental 
functioning (an inherent vulnerability), albeit according to the local authority the matter 
was before the court because of concerns about an abusive relationship (a situational 
vulnerability). Similarly, in OD v R City Council, the expert psychiatric report stated: 
 
OD clearly lacks capacity regarding contact. He has no understanding of 
his disability and vulnerability and need for positive contact and care in 
either the short or longer term. His learning disability undermines his 
ability to understand the motivation of others who may not have his best 
interest at heart. 
 
The expert went on to state “… OD is vulnerable to exploitation, this vulnerability is 
largely a result of his lack of capacity for sexual relationships...” Again, this related 
OD’s vulnerability back to an internal characteristic rather than treating it as situational. 
This status based approach is widely used through COP proceedings because: 
 
For the courts, it is far easier to attribute vulnerability to something 
concrete, or medical, such as their age or psychiatric condition, than it is 
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to try and navigate through a more complex set of circumstances… 
(Pritchard-Jones, 2016, p. 9). 
 
I now focus on one particular case, Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC, which 
concerned LC’s capacity to marry and capacity to consent to sexual relations. I 
observed six days’ worth of hearings for this case. This was separated into three 
separate hearings over a period of 5 months. The first was a review and directions 
hearing (hearing one), a hearing which was meant to be a trial which was put off to a 
later date (hearing two) and the final hearing which lasted four days (final hearing). LC 
was not present at any of these three hearings. I understand from the judge that LC 
had attended earlier interim hearings when the case first commenced, albeit she had 
not given formal evidence. 
The case concerned LC, a young woman in her early twenties with autism and 
a mild learning disability. LC had a close relationship with her mother, SC, and lived 
with her. She had a relatively large degree of independence – she had her own bank 
account, a part time job (working three days per week in total) and used public 
transport alone. LC had entered into a relationship with a man, GK. The relationship 
had lasted for more than three years when the proceedings commenced in 2015. 
During that time, LC and GK married without the knowledge of LC’s family. When, 
some months later, LC informed her mother that she had married GK in private, her 
mother informed social services as she was concerned that the marriage was just to 
enable GK to obtain a spousal visa to reside in the UK. Further, according to LC’s 
social workers, LC expressed unhappiness with elements of her relationship with GK, 
particularly anal sex, from which she sustained an anal fissure. The social workers 
explained that LC was ambivalent about the marriage, articulating at times both fear of 
and love for GK. A criminal investigation into the possibility that GK had raped LC 
during their relationship was also ongoing alongside the COP proceedings. The 
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evidence before the COP was that criminal investigations were proceeding both on the 
basis of LC lacking capacity to consent and/or that GK ceased to stop anally 
penetrating LC when she asked him to stop.   
The vulnerability of LC was mentioned on multiple occasions (in excess of 12 
times at the final hearing). Yet throughout the case, it was never made explicit what LC 
was vulnerable to and needed protecting from. In some senses it was implied that LC 
was vulnerable to all possible threats. In other ways it was suggested that LC’s naïve, 
trusting nature, alleged to be the result of her disability, made her vulnerable. For 
example, LC’s mother said that she was worried about LC’s vulnerability in relation to 
travelling. She explained that she would be happy for LC to travel on public transport 
locally, which she estimated to be a 20 mile trip, but that she thought LC would have 
problems with a longer journey from home. She was worried about such a journey 
because LC would have problems reading and with getting off at the right stop or 
making connections. However, in focusing on LC’s perceived difficulties in negotiating 
long distance travel, the focus was shifted towards LC’s inabilities and away from the 
material, situational reasons for her mother’s concern - that another person might 
abuse or exploit her. 
 
2.2. Act-specific versus person-specific approaches to capacity 
 
The discourse of inherent vulnerability was particularly evident in the reluctance to 
directly address the relationship between LC and GK as the reason for the case being 
before the court. The tests for capacity to consent to sex and capacity to marry are, as 
outlined at p. 18 in Chapter One, act-specific rather than person-specific 87  and 
therefore do not allow for the broader context to be considered. Yet LC was vulnerable 
                                                      




within a specific context, to the alleged exploitation by her husband. Instead of 
addressing this, the legal representatives and judge repeatedly linked her vulnerability 
back to her disability, for example in the following extract from the judgment: 
 
73. The evidence of the professionals is that [LC’s] abilities have not 
improved over time… In the circumstances, I am satisfied on balance of 
probabilities that [LC] did not have capacity to consent to sexual 
relations in [year] (and, specifically, at the time of her marriage). 
74. For the avoidance of doubt, her incapacity is due to her disability. 
 
In contrast, LC’s mother said “I wanted her to have experiences that most 20 year old 
women experience” and she explained that her concerns were the same as for any 
mother whose child is entering into a sexual encounter. LC’s mother’s comments 
implied that there was nothing inherent to LC that made her unable to understand sex 
and marriage, but that she was concerned about GK’s treatment of LC. Yet these 
comments were not focused on because, in law, their relationship was not relevant. 
LC’s vulnerability had to be characterised as inherent to fall within the ambit of the 
MCA which requires a “disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain” for a finding 
of incapacity. In LC’s case, the judge stated “I remind myself (perhaps particularly in 
this area) that GK’s motivation is not relevant and I must consider only LC’s 
understanding.” Judicial interpretation of these tests are criticised for failing to take a 
person-specific approach which reflects the particular relational challenges (Herring, 
2012; Clough, 2014; Herring and Wall, 2014; Series, 2014). Act-specific approaches to 
capacity do not allow for a consideration of the material pressures placed on a 
vulnerable adult by others. As Baroness Hale explains in R v Cooper (Gary Anthony): 88 
 
                                                      
88 [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1786 para 27. 
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it is difficult to think of an activity which is more person and situation 
specific than sexual relations. One does not consent to sex in general. 
One consents to this act of sex with this person at this time and in this 
place. 
 
Despite these comments, a person-specific approach has not been adopted under the 
MCA. However, as Clough explains:  
 
the situation specific approach advanced by Baroness Hale does not 
necessitate an evaluative focus on the suitability of a partner, or social 
engineering in the way feared. Baroness Hale is drawing attention to the 
situational factors which can impact upon a decision, echoing many of 
the concerns of vulnerability theorists. (Clough, 2014, p. 7). 
 
If a person-specific approach to capacity had been taken in LC’s case, this would have 
allowed the court to explore the factors that affected her ability to make a decision in 
relation to sex and marriage with GK. LC was not consenting to sex in general or 
entering into marriage in the abstract. LC could have been found to lack capacity on 
the basis that she was not able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information 
that GK was marrying her to further his own interests – namely to obtain the right to live 
in the United Kingdom. Similarly, it could have been argued that LC was unable to 
consent to sex with GK because she did not understand that she could say no.89 In her 
grandmother’s words, she felt that she had to “please my man”. This could have led to 
a finding, within the confines of mental capacity law proceedings, that LC lacked the 
                                                      
89 Also deemed to be part of the test for capacity to consent to sex in a number of recent cases, 
see A local authority v H [2012] EWHC 49, London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB [2014] 
EWCOP 53 and The London Borough of Southwark v KA [2016] EWCOP 20, albeit this remains 
an unsettled area of law, see Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38. 
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capacity to consent to sex and marriage with GK on a person-specific approach, whilst 
maintaining the potential for her to have sexual relations and even marry in future.  
During the final hearing, the court was also presented with evidence that LC 
had more recently shown greater insight into her “difficulties” than previously. Counsel 
for the local authority asked Dr Y, the independent expert psychiatrist, “do you think 
that change in her difficulties might correlate with not seeing [GK]?”90 This question 
implied that LC’s “difficulties” were affected by her situation and whom she had contact 
with. It was, indirectly, a situational analysis. Yet this, and other, suggestions were 
asked in a way that related back to LC’s inherent vulnerability – her so-called 
“difficulties”. Instead of characterising LC as inherently vulnerability, it would have been 
more appropriate to directly frame the problem as GK’s situationally pathogenic 
influence. The question might more accurately have been phrased “do you think that 
LC’s reduced vulnerability and general improvement in her wellbeing might correlate 
with her not seeing GK?” Using this approach could have led to a finding that LC 
lacked capacity to consent to marriage with this particular individual rather than that 
she lacked capacity in general with all of the resulting difficulties that accompany such 
a finding.91 However, this is not possible within the constraints of the current law92 and 
the outdated understanding of inherent vulnerability which informs it.  
 
2.3. Failure to provide support to achieve capacity  
 
As well as the problems with the act-specific approach to capacity, an inherent 
vulnerability analysis can lead to a failure to properly support a person to achieve 
                                                      
90 The point being that when LC met with Dr Y she was still, or had recently, had contact with 
GK. Whereas the more recent account to her solicitor followed a period where she had no or 
very little contact with GK. 
91 For example, the potential for quite intrusive measures to be placed on LC should she wish to 
engage in any future relationship. For a further discussion see Series (2014). 
92 IM v (1) LM (2) AB (3) Liverpool City Council  [2014] EWCA Civ 37. 
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capacity as required under the MCA and UNCRPD. For example, in LC’s case counsel 
for the local authority asked “If a person finds things difficult to understand, would you 
accept that they could be described as vulnerable?” She went on to query if a person 
“has difficulty understanding things and needs things made simple, do you agree that 
they are vulnerable and need protection”. This linked LC’s difficulty in understanding to 
her vulnerability. Such an approach resulted from the language of s 2 MCA, which 
characterises disability as emanating from an impairment of or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain. However, suggesting that a person who finds it difficult 
to understand things is vulnerable, defines them as such in relation to their disability. It 
becomes their disability rather than another feature that makes them vulnerable. This 
ignores the multiple, material causes of vulnerability as well as the many reasons why 
a person may find things difficult to understand.  
In framing understanding as causally linked to vulnerability, a medical model of 
disability was reinforced that did not take account of the situational barriers to 
furthering understanding. The distinction between the social and medical 
understandings of disability was outlined at p. 3 of Chapter One. Importantly for this 
chapter, medicalised discourse “situates the problematic aspects of disability firmly 
within the individual, and perpetuates the illusion that the state or society has no role in 
this” (Clough, 2015, p. 54). In contrast, the social model focuses on the social 
structures and environment that cause a person to experience disability, rather than 
their individualised, biological impairment (Oliver, 1990). As discussed in Chapter One, 
there are difficulties with both models. However, where a difficulty in understanding is 
treated as the cause of vulnerability, a medicalised approach is reinforced at the 
expense of considering how a person can be supported to achieve better, if not 
complete, understanding. For instance, if information was presented by a professional 
skilled in communication such as a speech and language therapist, or by a person 
close to the individual who they trust, their understanding is more likely to be 
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maximised. This is explored in Chapter Six where I advocate a relational approach to 
capacity assessments.  
I now return to two observed cases where efforts were made by the local 
authority to facilitate understanding, suggesting a more situational and UNCRPD 
compliant approach. Interestingly, these two cases were initiated by the same local 
authority. K County Council v SL and K County Council v MW both concerned 
applications for findings in relation to capacity to litigate, capacity to marry and capacity 
to consent to sexual relations. Both SL and MW were subject to forced marriage 
protection orders. In SL’s case, the report on capacity by the independent consultant 
psychiatrist explained: 
 
[SL] does not have capacity to litigate these proceedings, albeit this is 
borderline and it is recommended that she be involved in the main 
issues and decisions as much as possible… [SL] does have capacity to 
decide as to her care and support needs, does have capacity to decide 
where she lives, does not have capacity to have sexual relations and as 
a result of [SL] lacking capacity to consent to sexual relations, [SL] does 
not have capacity to marry. 
… 
However I would have to revise this opinion if a person [probably a 
woman speaking to her alone] was able to get her to describe the sexual 
act in simple terms and of the risks of infection. I do not think this is 
likely but am less certain in this case than I am in most cases. 
 
I would expect her to be able to learn this knowledge and gain capacity 
with a sex education course designed for those with mild learning 




Similarly in MW’s case the expert recommended further educative work on the basis 
that she may be able to attain capacity. In both cases proceedings were delayed to 
allow for educative work to be carried out. In SL’s case, following completion of further 
relationship education, it was found that SL had “acquired capacity” in respect of 
consenting to marriage and sexual relations and therefore proceedings were 
withdrawn. Similarly in MW’s case, following educative work it was found that she had 
capacity to consent to sex but lacked capacity to marry “due to deficits in 
understanding the relevant information, and using and weighing it to make a decision.” 
The relevant information being that “she did not understand that a marriage is a 
commitment for life”. This reversal in findings in SL’s case, and partial reversal in 
MW’s, was rare from the files I reviewed. It supports the notion that some local 
authorities take seriously the need to facilitate understanding rather than assuming 
vulnerability because of the presence of a disability.  
In the above sections I have highlighted that inherent approaches to 
vulnerability dominate COP discourse, which in turn can lead to a failure to provide 
support to achieve capacity. Rare cases show that a more UNCRPD compliant 
approach, attentive to the need to provide support to maximise understanding, is 
possible within the MCA.93 However, such an approach is dependent on the sustained 
and effective provision of support to adults with mental disabilities, and this is more 
likely to be facilitated if they are seen to be vulnerable for situational reasons (i.e. 
because of a lack of support) rather than being viewed as inevitably vulnerable for 
reasons related to their inherent features.  
 
                                                      
93 As well as the cases identified from my data, there are reported cases where educative work 
and the provision of support have overturned original findings of incapacity, for example see CH 
v A Metropolitan Council [2017] EWCOP 12. 
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3. Vulnerability in Social Work 
 
Vulnerability is a prevalent concept in social work (Fawcett, 2009, Hollomotz, 2009, 
Department of Health, 2017) and has generally referred to inherent features; for 
example, the Department of Health No Secrets guidance defined a vulnerable adult in 
relation to their mental (or other) disability, age or illness (Department of Health, 2000). 
In contrast, what others have described as “hidden vulnerabilities”, such as access to 
support and services, were not always exposed under previous legal frameworks 
(Clough, 2014, p. 372). In advance of carrying out the empirical data collection I 
expected that vulnerability discourse would be used in different ways from the more 
recent and nuanced theoretical understandings of vulnerability in feminist theory 
(Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a; Mackenzie, 
Rogers and Dodds, 2014b). Whilst this was to be expected, the interview discourse I 
explore in this section highlights the embedded nature of the inherent vulnerability 
approach. Furthermore, I argue that there is a fundamental link between social work 
understanding vulnerability inherently and material factors such as the rationing of 
access to adult social care. 
 
3.1. A material-discursive approach to inherent vulnerability 
 
The social workers I spoke to repeatedly related their understanding of vulnerability to 
inherent features, particularly disability, age or illness. For example, I asked James94 
“how would you decide if someone was a vulnerable adult?” and he said: 
 
                                                      
94 See Table 3.2 at p. 78 for a summary of the social work interviewees. James told me that he 
had 20 years experience working as a social worker with adults with learning disabilities, 
followed by various practice management roles. At the time of the interview, James was no 
longer a practising social worker but had been working in an adult social care research role for 
the past five years. 
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there’s the new Care Act come in isn’t there… previously you would decide by 
whether somebody fitted into one of your client group criteria… I guess the 
people who certainly had a profound learning disability, someone who had a 
mental health problem or if somebody was old and frail they would meet the 
criteria. 
 
James appeared to answer with what he thought was the legal or resource criteria for 
determining eligibility for safeguarding. David, another social worker,95 told me about a 
case where he was working with a 92 year old man who had been living with his son 
for eight years: 
 
and during that time there’d been several instances where son had assaulted 
his his Dad, erm, police reports and things like that had been, erm, submitted 
but throughout all that time Dad had had mental capacity to make those 
decisions so he wasn’t considered a vulnerable adult… 
 
In this quote David explained that vulnerability was linked to mental capacity, which 
relates back to disability through the “disturbance in the functioning of the mind or 
brain” requirement. Similarly another social worker, Julia,96 described one case where 
                                                      
95 David told me he had been a qualified social worker since 2009 and had always worked for 
the same local authority.  He had experience of working with older adults with mental health 
needs in a district assessment team and in a multi-disciplinary team. 
96 Julia told me that she had a number of years experience as a local authority social worker, 
originally working with children and families for around ten years, with a special interest in 
working with families where there was a child with a disability. She then moved to a forensic 
CAMHS (Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service) team, before moving to working with 
adults. Her role at the time of interview was as a practising social worker working within a 
secure unit with both inpatient and outpatient adults who have mental health difficulties and 




she was working with a young woman with a cognitive impairment; she repeatedly 
described her as vulnerable. She explained: 
 
there was one young woman in particular that, erm, she was very vulnerable, 
and we, it was difficult because she was vulnerable and she was also she was 
also from the Asian community so the sort of culture around whose money is 
whose and at what point people you know, we could be quite individualistic 
and this idea that you know as soon as your of this age it’s your money and it, 
so I think given that she was so vulnerable and, I felt it was important to 
protect, her rights over her her her money… 
 
When I asked what her concerns were, Julia explained: 
 
…not that her family, that I thought her family exploited her it was really about 
making sure from the beginning it was clear she was gonna have some 
cognitive impairment as a result of her mental illness and that she was more 
than likely would take that with her and therefore I just wanted to start the 
way we should go on, so make sure she understood this was her money and 
she had rights, and the family understood that too. 
 
I was surprised that Julia referred to this woman on more than one occasion as 
vulnerable if she was not suffering any harm. Julia appeared to focus on her  
vulnerability to harm caused by her cognitive abilities rather than any external threat of 
harm. Inherent characterisations of vulnerability such as this appeared repeatedly in 
my interviews and I suggest that understanding vulnerability inherently is a discursive 
response to the material rationing of access to local authority services. As Fawcett 
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explains, “The purpose of identification and assessment as a vulnerable adult is to 
guard against harm and generate support and access to services” (Fawcett, 2009, p. 
474). As a result of the material pressure on resources in adult safeguarding, rationing 
is primarily performed based on a discursive framing of a person being inherently 
vulnerable. That is, only adults who fit a narrow definition of being inherently vulnerable 
are able to access support and those who are vulnerable for other, situational, reasons 
are not. James highlighted the importance of rationing in adult social care: 
 
…the thing is with social work because it’s a limited resource a lot of it 
historically has been about putting a boundary around access to that resource. 
If you say anybody is potentially vulnerable then that means everybody could 
have a safeguarding investigation but that would mean nothing would it so, 
you, well, you’ve gotta focus the safeguarding, safeguarding role on people 
who are most vulnerable therefore need most support. 
… 
when you become a, when you become a manager in social care, erm, a lot of 
it is about trying to make your resources go as far as you can and to fulfil your, 
core responsibilities, so you’re not really looking for more work. 
 
In an interview with Andrea,97 the issue of resources also came up repeatedly. She told 
me: 
 
Well you’ve got some people where it’s really clear that they’ve got capacity 
                                                      
97 Andrea told me she had qualified as a social worker in 1987. On qualification she initially 
worked with children and families but later moved to working with older adults and people with 
learning disabilities in three different local authorities. She had been in her present role for three 
years where she worked in the community with people with dementia. 
 
 105 
or really clear that they haven’t and it’s the ones in, it’s just those ones really 
where you could really make that difference to their whole experience if their 
capacity was, erm, facilitated and that takes a bit of resources so it kind of 
depends on your, what’s going on for you, how many cases you’ve got like 
that, you know… 
 
These quotes highlight the importance of directing resources at cases that most need 
support. However, the way in which judgements about who needs support are made 
are constrained by inherent constructions of vulnerability. Robert, 98  for example, 
explained when asked what makes an adult vulnerable: 
 
I mean, I suppose what it means to me probably is, a, catch all for the people 
that might get a social care service. I suppose, I mean I think one of the by-
products of working for a local authority is that you inevitably draw a line, a 
too thick a line, between the people who are eligible for your support and 
people who aren’t so vulnerable adults would just be a general catch all for 
the people we support. I guess it’s who I instinctively think of although 
consciously many more people out there who are vulnerable even if they don’t 
meet very high local authority thresholds.  
 
I asked Robert about this eligibility criteria to interrogate further what these adults were 
vulnerable to and he explained: 
                                                      
98 Robert was a qualified social worker with a number of years experience in frontline and 
managerial roles. He was a manager of a learning disability team in a local authority for six 
years during which time the MCA came into force. He was also subsequently a manager for a 
transition social work team for another local authority for 18 months before moving to his current 





…someone has to have a mental or physical impairment, erm, that they, as a 
result of that consequentially they are unable to achieve two or more of the 
prescribed eligibility outcomes and as a consequence of that they, erm, there 
is a significant impact on their wellbeing. 
 
This statement reinforces an inherent vulnerability approach. Similarly, when asked 
what vulnerability means, Alice99 explained: 
 
We use it really now in relation to the Care Act as having care and support 
needs…people are vulnerable for more than that to be fair. I mean, people are 
vulnerable because of their emotional experiences in their lives, erm, people 
are vulnerable because of an imbalance of all the traditional types of power, 
you know, gender, erm, sexuality, race. 
 
She went on to tell me that those situational factors: 
 
don’t hit the Care Act and our team, safeguarding enquiries are linked to, erm, 
people’s eligibility through the Care Act. So it’s care and support needs… and 
Care Act links that back to disability of some form or another. 
 
S 13 Care Act 2014 requires that once it has been established that an adult has needs 
for care and support, the local authority must determine whether any of those needs 
                                                      
99 Alice told me that she was a social worker in an adult safeguarding team and had been in that 
role for the past four to five years. Before that she had worked with older people with a physical 
disability. Previously she also had experience working with adults with learning disabilities and 
with people with drug and alcohol substance misuse problems.  
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meet the eligibility criteria, i.e. whether or not that support will be funded by the local 
authority. Both Robert and Alice were referring to the s 13 eligibility criteria and the 
related provisions under Regulation 2 Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) 
Regulations 2015 (Eligibility Regulations). The Eligibility Regulations bind eligibility for 
support to a person’s inherent features – their “physical or mental impairment or 
illness”.100 However, it is by no means clear that such an approach is required in the 
safeguarding context. The Care Act requires local authorities to undertake 
safeguarding enquiries where the adult (a) has needs for care and support, b) is 
experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect, and (c) as a result is unable to protect 
himself or herself.101 S 42 (1) (a) makes clear that the safeguarding provisions apply 
even to those adults who are not receiving local authority support, possibly because 
they do not fall within the eligibility criteria under the Eligibility Regulations. Therefore 
the inherent understanding of vulnerability should not, legally at least, apply to adult 
safeguarding. 
Understanding vulnerability beyond the inherent is important in adult 
safeguarding which is expressly about protection from abuse. It cannot be the case 
that local authorities only have obligations to safeguard adults with a physical or mental 
impairment or illness. Furthermore, in cases of abuse, only targeting resources at 
those deemed inherently vulnerable would not address James and Andrea’s concerns 
about those who “most need support” or “where you could really make that difference”. 
If material resources are allocated primarily on the basis of inherent vulnerability, as 
appears, then this points towards a privileging of disability (McRuer, 2010) as those 
who are seen to be the most inherently disadvantaged are able to access support and 
services that those who are in greater situational need cannot. In some ways this is 
justifiable on the basis that adults with disabilities, particularly those suffering mental 
                                                      
100 Regulation 2 (1). 
101 s 42 (1) Care Act 2014. 
 
 108 
illness, suffer higher rates of domestic violence (and violence generally) than others 
(Martin et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2012; Plummer and Findley, 2012; Khalifeh et al., 
2013). However, it still excludes many other vulnerable adults who do not fit within the 
inherent vulnerability discourse.  
In taking an inherent vulnerability approach, there is also a failure to properly 
interrogate what the person is vulnerable to and a failure to target resources most 
effectively. Furthermore, a person’s vulnerability may be exacerbated by the interaction 
between their disability and their situation, for example if their ill health made them 
dependent on their abusive carer. It therefore ignores the complex interplay between 
inherent and situational vulnerabilities. If vulnerability were viewed more widely it may 
have the material effect of increasing social care demand at a time of decreased 
budgets (Humphries, 2013, Meakin and Matthews, 2015), but it may also lead to more 
targeted, efficient and preventative responses to abuse. For example, through better 
provision of sex and relationship education and early interventions which work with 
perpetrators of abuse. The importance of early preventative measures from a resource 
allocation perspective should not be underestimated.102 
In this section I have highlighted that the language of inherent vulnerability 
dominates adult social work. In particular, I have shown that discourses of inherent 
vulnerability are linked to the rationing of access to material resources in adult social 
care. Yet by focusing on the inherent causes of vulnerability, the situational reasons for 
a person’s vulnerable position are side-lined, meaning that there is a failure to respond 
to the source of the most harmful forms of pathogenic vulnerability. Therefore the 
language of inherent vulnerability is not only problematic for discursive reasons but 
also because it fails to target scarce resources at the root of the problem. 
 
                                                      
102 The need for preventative investment is well established in the public health context, for 
example see Alistar et al. (2014) but there appears to be limited research on preventative work 
within social work, see Gray (2013). 
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4. Inherent Vulnerability: Under-protection and Over-protection 
 
If, as I have identified above, the concept of inherent vulnerability dominates this area 
of law and is used to ration access to services, then it is both under and over inclusive. 
Many researchers are concerned about the prospect of over-protection. Hollomotz, for 
example, explains “overprotection is a hindrance to disabled people’s self  
determination, while it does not prevent sexual violence” (Hollomotz, 2011, p. 45). 
Conversely, the House of Lords Select Committee report on the MCA explained: 
 
the presumption of capacity, in particular, is widely misunderstood by 
those involved in care. It is sometimes used to support non- intervention 
or poor care, leaving vulnerable adults exposed to risk of harm. 
(Parliament. House of Lords, 2014, pp. 50-51). 
 
Constructing vulnerability as inherent can therefore lead to a paradox of under-
protection and over-protection. In the following sections I explain the different instances 
in which this takes place. I further argue that to achieve a better balance between 
empowerment and protection, vulnerability must be characterised situationally. This will 
help to guide more appropriate legal and social work responses and will better enable 
the pathogenic sources of vulnerability to be addressed. 
 
4.1. Under-protection and sexual violence 
 
I first explore the problem of under-protection where responsibility for the abuse was 
attributed to the adult for not protecting herself. This was particularly prevalent in 
relation to sexual abuse of women with mental disabilities; they were seen to engage in 
‘risky’ behaviour, and, as such, their vulnerability to sexual violence could have been 
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avoided if only they behaved differently. This characterisation of sexual vulnerability 
chimes with theoretical work on the intersection of female sexuality and people with 
disabilities (Doyle, 2010; Sandland, 2013a; Sandland, 2013b). Sandland, for example, 
argues that women and girls with learning disabilities are characterised as vulnerable 
and dangerous as a result of their sexual instinct (Sandland, 2013a; Sandland, 2013b). 
Such characterisations provide the discourse to “articulate and justify the need for 
legal-psychiatric, institutional, control of the dangerous/vulnerable sexuality of mentally 
deficient women” (Sandland, 2013a, p. 104). This vulnerable/dangerous dichotomy can 
also lead to under-protection. The sexual instinct analysis is central to under-protection 
because certain adults are not protected on the basis that they are perceived to desire, 
instinctively, the abusive sexual contact. Similarly, in feminist work on incest, girls 
within the family could be viewed as under-protected because the social order 
maintains and protects the status of their male abuser (Bell, 1993, p. 23). It is implied 
that if the victim did not desire the sexual contact then they would and should have 
avoided it like any other ‘normal’ person would do. The examples I provide in this 
section could similarly be viewed as “victim blaming”, a phenomenon prevalent in 
understandings of rape and sexual assault (Whatley, 1996; Grubb and Turner, 2012). 
By blaming the victim, the pathogenic vulnerability to sexual abuse is obscured and 
instead she is seen to be inherently vulnerable as a result of her disability or gender.  
Thomas’ interview 103  provides the clearest example. He explained that he 
worked on a case about a young woman coming up to her 18th birthday which went to 
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. He said that there was incredible concern 
about her vulnerability to exploitation as she was approaching adulthood. When I 
                                                      
103 Thomas had been retired from full time social work for four years at the time of the interview 
and was instead carrying out research into adult social care. He qualified as a social worker in 
1977 and practised for 12 years in a local authority. He then commenced a series of 
management posts at various levels, mainly in mental health teams. He told me he had 
particular experience of implementing the deprivation of liberty provisions from when the MCA 
came into force until 2012. 
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asked him about this exploitation he said: 
 
Sexual exploitation… just broad kind of brush of her circumstances, horrifying 
self harming during from about she was what 18, so from about the age of 14, 
erm, she had inflicted awful wounds upon herself as well as taking overdoses 
and that kind of thing. Her own family circumstances were that she was part of 
a family that had been well known in [X location] and at the time when the 
decision was taken for her to come into care which as I say was 14, 15 the 
circumstances surrounding that were extremely tragic her mother killed 
herself… her father had been one of the principal suspects for the abuse that 
she had suffered, sexual abuse that she’d suffered… there was a very close 
relationship between them so it was a very difficult … it wasn’t one where she 
didn’t want to see him anymore in fact it was exactly the opposite. 
 
Whilst Thomas referred to the situational factors which made the woman vulnerable, he 
focused on the things that she had done to herself, such as self-harming and 
overdosing. He later mentioned the likely reason for the vulnerability - the sexual abuse 
by her father – but still related it back to her. This woman presented as difficult to deal 
with because she still wanted to see her father and Thomas said there was a “very close 
relationship between them” and she kept “absconding to get contact with her father”. He 
explained: 
 
she actively sought the people who were her own father as well as other 
men… you could’ve possibly thought about finding some way of preventing 
him having contact with her, it wouldn’t a worked because well in our view it 
wouldn’t have worked because then she was at a period where she was 
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seeking something a relationship with… other men, another man, and with her 
father that we felt were, were the source of her vulnerabil- the source of her 
vulnerability lay in her as much as in any threat.  
 
I was surprised that responsibility for the problems the woman faced were not directly 
attributed to her father. Perhaps unsurprisingly Thomas also said that the woman had 
later struck up a relationship with an: 
 
[o]lder man, erm, and who had a history was known to the agencies up in the 
area where he was from… so there were police, the police force in this county, 
the police force in the area where this person went to. It was quite easy to 
locate her because everyone knew where this man lived and she was there. 
They’d go and pick her up and either the police force there would bring her all 
the way down or the other police would come up… 
 
Thomas’ interview contained many references to this woman’s failure to keep herself 
safe, suggesting a degree of victim blaming. For example, when asked about what 
vulnerability meant he said “…it’s making decisions where your own safety and wellbeing are 
at risk I think that’s what it means.” He also said that “the source of her vulnerability lay in 
her as much as in any threat” despite the fact that she was a 17 year old woman who had 
been sexually abused by her father and was suspected of being sexually abused by 
another older man with a criminal history. Thomas attributed blame for her vulnerability 
to her. Grubb and Turner explain in relation to sexual assault that when responsibility is 
attributed to internal factors such as the victim’s behaviour, victims are more likely to 
be considered to blame for their assault. In contrast when responsibility is attributed to 
external factors, blame is more likely to be attributed to the situational cause (Heider, 
 
 113 
1958; Grubb and Turner, 2012, p. 444). This is important because, as I later explain 
from p. 118, if responsibility for sexual violence is seen to be caused by the victim’s 
inherent features, this leads to under-protection as they are also viewed as to blame for 
engaging in risky activity and are therefore undeserving of material support from the 
state. This again highlights the link between the discourse of inherent vulnerability and 
the material rationing of resources. 
Later, when asked about the response to this woman’s situation, Thomas told 
me: 
 
it was always about bringing her back to her accommodation… in both areas 
the police would interview the young woman formally to establish if there 
were grounds for prosecution they certainly didn’t proceed with any 
prosecution at the kind of young woman’s end of things. The police in the 
man’s originating area were concerned about him and I don’t remember them 
proceeding with prosecution either but there had been concerns about his 
violent relationships with women in the past for which he had been convicted. 
 
This passage suggests that this woman’s pathogenic vulnerability to sexual abuse was 
not addressed in situational terms because the response focused on the individual 
woman by taking her back to her accommodation. Instead, viewing this woman’s 
relationships through a lens of pathogenic vulnerability would have been more 
reflective of the reality of her situation. She was in a harmful, abusive and vulnerable 
situation which also undermined her autonomy to make decisions free from those 
oppressive influences. The abuse also likely exacerbated her other vulnerabilities such 
as her self-harm. Her apparent choices to return to her abusers were most likely 
influenced by the role of male power within the complicated dynamic of familial 
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relationships (Bell, 1993) and the cycle of abuse that can exist for those who suffer 
childhood trauma (Noll, 2005). In a similar example in the context of mental capacity 
law, Robert explained to me that there was a woman with: 
 
quite a mild learning disability…we feared we knew, I think, routinely kind of 
sexually abused by a host of local taxi drivers…as you know the Mental 
Capacity Act doesn’t rule, you know, an unwise decision doesn’t make it an 
incapacitated decision and…she…certainly wasn’t protecting herself from the 
situation as much as we’d like 
… 
we decided that she wasn’t capacitated to consent to the sexual 
relationship…we really wrestled with the notion of her you know, what was 
she consensually having sex with them or not and we concluded that she 
wasn’t.  
 
Robert told me that he didn’t think this woman had capacity to engage in a sexual 
relationship with these men, and, furthermore, that it wasn’t a consensual relationship. 
Yet he also emphasised that she wasn’t protecting herself. I asked him what they did 
next and he explained: 
 
the police were very good, slow but, you know, we’re all over stretched I 
guess, there was a lot of multi disciplinary work so social worker, MAPPA 
[Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements] were involved…a community 
nurse, she lived in a supported living scheme there so she had a big support 
package and you know there was a lot of general work around trying to give 
herself things to feel positive about so, you know, her only source of validation 
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wasn’t the odd tawdry gift she got off people after they slept with her… the 
plan was she had finally said she wanted to move away and the plan was to 
find her a flat…and, you know, get her slightly out of the region and, you 
know, the police were very heavily involved with that and were investigating 
the crimes but were convinced rightly that whatever else she did she was 
probably a long way off having the courage to fight so they weren’t terribly 
optimistic on that. 
 
The focus on moving her to another area and the suggestion that a criminal 
prosecution was a long way off highlights that the problem was not viewed in 
situational terms. Furthermore, describing this abusive situation as “her only source of 
validation” highlights the link between inherent vulnerability and victim blaming. The 
woman in question was putting herself at risk because she was seen as having 
received pleasure or gain from these sexual encounters. The implication being that if 
she had not desired them then she would not have had sexual encounters with these 
men. Similar to the “colluding mother” and “seductive daughter” in relation to incest 
(Bell, 1993, pp. 83-85), the woman with mental disabilities might also be described in 
terms that convey her ‘sexually uncontrollable’ nature as a way of attributing 
responsibility for any abuse to her.  
This discursive understanding of sexual vulnerability as inherent to her further 
helps to push back against any claim this woman might have to state support. The 
material resources she might need so that she does not get validation from the men’s 
‘tawdry gift[s]’ need not be provided if she is viewed as inherently rather than 
situationally, and pathogenically, vulnerable to the harmful influence of these men. On 
one level Robert’s answer, referring to the provision of a support package and general 
work on feeling positive is encouraging and suggests that at least some steps were 
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taken to support the woman. However, the failure to take any action against the 
abusive men implied an excusing of their behaviour or an understanding that the 
woman encouraged it. Whilst local authorities cannot address the failures of the 
criminal justice system, they could encourage greater focus on the behaviour of the 
perpetrators of abuse. Furthermore, if local authorities are concerned about resource 
allocation, it is simply ineffective to remove a victim of abuse to another area and do 
nothing to tackle the abuser; further victims of that same individual are highly likely to 
materialise again, thus suggesting a very short-sighted approach.104 If local authorities 
want to both maximise resources and respond more appropriately to vulnerability on an 
individual level, only an understanding of both inherent and situational vulnerability can 
achieve that. 
In contrast, cases involving food intake or financial management, were much 
more keenly discussed by social workers as requiring intervention. These ‘non-abuse’ 
cases are a useful contrast because they highlight the difference in understandings of 
vulnerability depending on the subject matter. For example, where unhealthy/unwise 
choices were made in relation to a sexual partner, the individual was held responsible 
for those choices and interventions were limited. Yet in cases where the individual 
apparently lacked the self-control to make healthy eating choices, those choices could 
be interfered with and the unhealthy/unwise food could be removed from her 
environment. Situational responses were therefore much more common in dealing with 
‘non-abuse’ cases. For example, Julia told me about a vulnerable young lady she 
worked with that: 
 
there was also issues in relation to how much food she ate.  I mean, she, she, 
she was never diagnosed with pica, you know that eating disorder, but it 
                                                      
104 Evidence suggests that those involved in intimate partner abuse repeatedly reoffend, for 
example recidivism rates vary but are thought to at least be in the region of approximately 20-
40% (Babcock, Green and Robie, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
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seemed very, you know, it was almost like she could not stop herself eating if 
food was there she would eat it so I didn’t do the capacity assessment for that 
but she was deemed not to have capacity, it was, it was more than unwise 
decisions she was pushing her, her weight was just rocketing up and I guess a 
lot of it was medication related but it was all the carby stuff she just couldn’t 
stop herself eating. 
 
I informed my interview participants that my research was also exploring issues of 
abuse, yet I was repeatedly given examples such as these which I would not identify as 
abuse in any ordinary understanding of the concept. For example, Robert told me 
about a case which concerned a young man who he described as having a “dominant 
mother”. He didn’t think there was any exploitation but explained that “she was a 
vegetarian and then this was where the battle was normally fought was over the vegetarian 
question because she was vegetarian and was adamant that he would be vegetarian”. There 
was no question of abuse but there was an intervention to control this young man’s 
food intake, in contrast to the limited intervention in relation to the woman being 
“sexually abused by a host of local taxi drivers”. It appeared that the social workers I spoke 
to had very few examples of sexual abuse. This may be because they did not wish to 
share their stories. However, it felt that they had very little experience of intervening in 
such cases, suggesting a much greater willingness for involvement in cases of general 
welfare despite the high rates of sexual violence, particularly for adults with mental 
disabilities (Martin et al., 2006; Plummer and Findley, 2012; Khalifeh et al., 2013; 





4.2. Under-protection and failures of the criminal justice system 
 
Under-protection was also evident as a result of allegations not being pursued when 
raised by those with an inherent vulnerability. For example, Robert told me: 
 
if you are vulnerable you know, if you are elderly if you have a learning 
disability or whatever and someone commits a crime against you that gets 
investigated by the social workers…and the rest of the population get the 
police.  
 
When adults with inherent vulnerabilities suffer violence there is a perception that the 
criminal justice system fails to take action. The interaction between the police and 
social workers was a recurrent theme from my data. Whilst the failures of the criminal 
justice system to properly tackle abuse against people with disabilities are not the 
focus of this thesis, the issue requires further attention to consider how this failure to 
take allegations seriously results in a paradox of under-protection and over-protection. 
This is particularly important because, as outlined in Chapter One, Article 16 UNCRPD 
requires the state to: 
 
take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, educational and 
other measures to protect persons with disabilities, both within and 
outside the home, from all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse, 
including their gender-based aspects. 
 
Yet my research suggests that adults with disabilities who were seen as inherently 
vulnerable did not receive sufficient protection from abuse. For example, in one 
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interview, Sarah105 told me about a difficult case that she was in the early stages of 
taking to the COP. The case concerned: 
 
a girl in her twenties who’s got a learning disability and she’s married to a guy 
also in his twenties with a learning disability but this guy is known to be, he’s 
got a significant criminal behaviour.  
 
She went on to tell me that concerns arose when the woman: 
 
she’d presented in a and e, and said that he’d punched her on the arm and 
said she was worried coz she’s got a contraceptive implant… but then the 
police had came out and spoke to her and she’d given a different story. She’d 
also said when she was in a and e that her husband punished her for 
something that she’d done and she said that she’d gone to another house, 
another man’s house, and this man had paid her to perform a sexual act, her 
perform a sexual act on him so we were worried basically that she was 
involved in some kind of sexual exploitation. She’d gone back and told her 
husband what she’d done and he got her to strip off as punishment [laughs 
nervously] but when police came out, when they came out and spoke to her 
she basically backtracked and said none of this happened that she’d stripped 
off coz she was gonna have a bath [laughs nervously], that he hadn’t punched 
her they were play fighting, but then when we kind of looked into it over  back 
over like the last few years there’s loads of similar incidents like this and when 
                                                      
105  Sarah told me she was a qualified social worker and had been working in an adult 
safeguarding enquiry team for the past four years. She did not provide any further information 




we spoke to all different agencies, then it was quite scary then what we’d 
uncovered and then we uncovered all this about his criminal history and these 
rape charges and we were thinking, oh crikey… 
 
The local authority’s enquiries revealed that this woman’s husband had been charged 
with the rape of his sister and step sister and that he was also being investigated for 
raping another woman with a learning disability. Sarah went on to tell me that when the 
police attended to allegations of violence nothing was ever pursued, she said:  
 
… once they get there they always go out they always speak to her, but she 
never then makes the statement she always kind of like fizzles out because she 
never takes the next step… I think it fell apart from his sister, she withdrew 
early on and then it was due to go to court for his step sister in early January, 
apparently the court date was set and everything, but she said that she 
couldn’t go through with it, through it all, so it didn’t happen… so we’re hoping 
that it’ll happen with this other girl but it’s one of our cases, like she’s known 
to us coz she’s got a learning disability and that’s all kind of caught up in it so I 
don’t know whether that will happen either. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system appeared to make Sarah feel that 
she had to choose between doing nothing (under-protection) and pursuing a resolution 
that could prevent this woman from having a sexual relationship ever again (over-
protection). Sarah’s concerns are understandable in light of the failures of the criminal 
justice system. When adults with inherent vulnerabilities make allegations of sexual 
violence it often doesn’t proceed to criminal investigation or prosecution (Benedet and 
Grant, 2014; Ellison et al., 2015). Even where a complaint is made, there are high rates 
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of attrition throughout the criminal justice process. As Ellison et al. note, rape 
complainants with psychosocial disabilities: 
 
were significantly more likely to have their case no-crimed than 
complainants without…(11 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively) and 
significantly more likely to have their case dropped through a police NFA 
decision (45 per cent vs 38 per cent). (Ellison et al., 2015, p. 236). 
 
There is worryingly little research investigating the high attrition for rape complainants 
with disabilities. However, a number of reasons have been put forward. Firstly, 
attitudinal barriers exist in relation to sexual violence against people with disabilities. 
Meta-analysis evidence suggests that victims with a “less respectable” character are 
perceived to be more responsible for their sexual assault than those with a “more 
respectable” character (Whatley, 1996). Adults with mental disabilities, and more 
specifically women, have their character questioned and have been categorised as 
“dangerous” (Sandland, 2013b; Sandland, 2013a) and “over-sexed” (Doyle, 2010). It is 
possible therefore that some victims of sexual assault, particularly those with mental 
health diagnoses, are more likely to be blamed for their assault. This is more likely in 
relation to adults with mental health diagnoses because of their close links to other 
exacerbating factors such as poor housing, childhood abuse and addiction (Ellison et 
al., 2015). 
Relatedly, attitudes by those who work within the criminal justice system have 
been given as a reason for high attrition and low conviction rates. For example, Jordan 
explains, in a study of police responses to rape in New Zealand, that high levels of 
scepticism were found in relation to allegations made by victims with a psychiatric 
illness (Jordan, 2004). Similar concerns exist every step along the criminal justice 
process from police to prosecutors, judges to juries, albeit that evidence suggests “the 
 
 122 
highest proportion of cases is lost at the earliest stages, predominantly during the 
police investigation” (Stanko and Williams, 2013, p. 209). Yet even if the individual 
officer or prosecutor does not share this scepticism, they may still attribute that belief to 
those who ultimately need to be convinced (i.e. judge and juries) and therefore 
conclude there is no realistic prospect of conviction (Ellison et al., 2015, p. 234). 
Therefore the pervasive attitudes of disbelief about adults with inherent vulnerabilities 
appears to be a major factor in preventing them from receiving justice. 
Furthermore, for many different reasons people with mental disabilities may 
choose not to pursue a criminal justice resolution. There is evidence to suggest that 
they may be less likely to come forward and report a crime (Ellison et al., 2015, p. 230) 
and there is also evidence that people with a history of mental illness in particular are 
more likely to withdraw from the criminal justice process, albeit evidence on this latter 
point is mixed (Ellison et al., 2015, p. 236). Some may not recognise their experiences 
as criminal. For example, if a person has only ever experienced abusive relationships 
in their lives then they may perceive it as acceptable behaviour. Similarly, poor sex and 
relationships education may mean they struggle to understand and articulate their 
experiences of sex, whether abusive or not (Hollomotz, 2011, pp. 49-51). This 
‘voluntary’ withdrawal from the criminal justice system is also likely to be attributable to 
the widespread belief that the experience of giving evidence in a rape trial is not a 
pleasant one, and as Stanko and Williams explain “they cannot face such invasive 
scrutiny” (Stanko and Williams, 2013, p. 217). Perhaps this is exacerbated by the 
presence of inherent vulnerabilities as adults with mental disabilities in particular may 
feel less prepared, socially and mentally, to go through the potentially traumatic 
experience of being questioned and having one’s own health explored in court. These 
attitudes are certainly prevalent in relation to giving evidence in COP proceedings as I 
later explain in Chapter Five. Therefore such attitudes are likely to be even stronger in 




The low reporting rates and high attrition of cases relating to people with mental 
disabilities is likely to be caused by a complex interplay of factors. However, the 
presence of inherent vulnerabilities appears to be an important factor as such adults 
are less likely to have their allegations validated. This repeats the recurring failure to 
respect and protect disabled adults because their bodies are not subject to the same 
protections as other bodies (Fletcher, Fox and McCandless, 2008; Garland-Thomson, 
2011). It further leads to an over reliance on mental capacity law to solve the problems 
of abuse; when Sarah was faced with a situation where the criminal justice system 
failed to provide justice, she arguably had little choice but to turn to mental capacity 
law. Yet Sarah’s choices were constrained within this paradox of under-protection 
(failure of the criminal justice system) and over-protection (reliance on mental capacity 
law interventions). That is not to say that dealing with abuse should be the sole domain 
of the criminal justice system, a multi-agency approach is clearly required. However, 
the persistent failures of the criminal justice system to take action where victims have 
an inherent vulnerability leads to an over reliance on mental capacity law which, as I 
now explain, too often leads to over-protection. 
 
4.3. Over-protection and specific findings of incapacity 
 
There was limited evidence from the COP proceedings of under-protection and this 
was to be expected because such cases would not have reached a courtroom. Yet 
when findings of incapacity were made under the MCA, the resulting interventions 
often resulted in over-protection. I describe over-protection here as more protection 
than is required to maximise P’s autonomy and to support her to be free from abuse.  
In this sense, over-protection can also be pathogenic in that it can be harmful to the 
adult in question, undermine their autonomy and exacerbate other vulnerabilities. 
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Findings106 of incapacity provided numerous examples of over-protection. 18 of 
the 20 cases accessed involved allegations of abuse107 and 16 of the 20 contained 
findings (including interim findings) that P lacked capacity in at least one domain.108 At 
least ten of these 16 appeared109 to be final declarations. Seven of these ten final 
declaration cases were findings of incapacity to decide on care110 and six of the ten 
were findings of incapacity to decide on contact with others111 and incapacity to decide 
on residence.112 These findings cover nine out of the ten cases where final declarations 
in relation to capacity were made. The tenth case was Y County Council v (1) LC (2) 
GK (3) SC and the findings in that case related to sex and marriage capacity. In all of 
these cases, an allegation of abuse was present and findings of incapacity appeared to 
be used as a way of intervening to protect against abuse. This was both to protect P 
from abuse by others (n=14) as well as restricting P because he was perceived to be a 
threat of abuse to another (n=4). This highlights that the majority of cases I accessed 
resulted in findings relating to capacity to decide on residence, care and contact rather 
than capacity for sex and marriage, despite the latter being the primary selection 
criteria for cases at the initial stage. 
Findings of incapacity can result in wide-ranging decisions requiring varying 
degrees of monitoring. This is particularly likely if a person is found to lack capacity in 
relation to care and contact as this affects a person’s everyday life. Similarly in relation 
                                                      
106 By findings I mean court decisions rather than findings from the expert evidence.  
107 See Table A1, Appendix one. 
108 The four cases where there appeared to be no findings of incapacity were: K County Council 
v SL, ML v (1) TL and (2) D County Council, W County Council v ZR, J Council v RK.  
109 I use the term ‘appeared’ as it was not always clear from the case file whether findings of 
incapacity were interim or final. However, the figure of 10 is based on those cases which had 
either been closed, where it was expressly stated in a judgment that the order was final or 
where the finding of incapacity led to the matter being stayed for a lengthy period, for example 
to allow for an annual review of DOL. 
110 P CCG v QB, Z County Council v FY, C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, M County 
Council v EV, T City Council v CY, OD v R City Council, P County Council v (1) SE (2) TM. 
111 Z County Council v FY, C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, M County Council v EV, 
OD v R City Council, V Borough Council v AY, O City Council v (1) AW (2) FW (3) YW (4) TW. 
112 Z County Council v FY, C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, T City Council v CY, OD v 
R City Council, P County Council v (1) SE (2) TM, V Borough Council v AY, P CCG v QB. 
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to sex, once it is found that an adult lacks capacity the local authority is under a duty to 
protect them. The potential for over-protection in this context is therefore clear, as the 
judge explained in his judgment in LC’s case: 
 
In reaching that conclusion [that LC lacks capacity], I am well aware that 
this decision will have a very significant effect upon LC’s life and her 
freedom to engage in sexual relations. I take into account her ECHR 
[European Convention on Human Rights] rights. I have been told that 
she wishes to have a boyfriend or husband as other people do. 
Nevertheless, LC has very significant learning difficulties and is very 
vulnerable, and the court has a duty to protect her if she does not have 
the relevant capacity. 
 
This same concern appeared in my interview with Sarah. She told me that she was 
reluctant to take her case to the COP because of concerns about the impact of findings 
of incapacity. She explained: 
 
It would put me off if they were gonna be, if it was gonna be something really 
restrictive like that, if they were gonna say blanket, she doesn’t have capacity 
to make decisions… that she couldn’t form relationships with people, that 
would be, that would really concern me.  
 
Given her concerns, I asked what she thought a good outcome would be and she said:  
 
What I’d really like is to show her… that she’s got, there is a life kind of beyond 
her husband, that there is there is basically there’s a better world, because 
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she’d be devastated if we removed, if we were to take her away from her 
husband but that’s because all she ever knows, known, is her husband and her 
life is her husband because that’s all she ever sees and all she ever spends 
time with, so what I’d like is for her to be able to get out of that and see that 
actually there is a world beyond her husband and actually there are some kind 
of nice people in the world that don’t go about raping people and setting 
things on fire and that actually she could have a different life. 
 
For me this was an acknowledgement that her service user was not inherently or 
especially vulnerable and therefore did not need protection through a finding of 
incapacity which could have been disempowering for her. Sarah did not want to 
remove this woman from all potential risks on the basis of her disability; she simply 
wanted to show her that she could live a better life. Yet Sarah was concerned about 
the potential for the COP to control her service user and prevent her from enjoying the 
benefits of even a healthy relationship ever again. 
Similarly a COP case file highlighted that over-protection can result when using 
capacity law to respond to what is better characterised as a situational vulnerability. 
AW v O City Council, concerned a 34 year old woman, described as having 
emotionally unstable personality disorder, borderline learning difficulties and paranoid 
schizophrenia. The case concerned her capacity for contact with her family, in 
particular her father and brothers. The case was brought because there was a history 
of sexual abuse by her father and of inter-sibling sexual relationships. In notes of a 
best interests meeting shortly before proceedings begun it was said that: 
 
According to [AW] her dad and her brothers have recently started 
visiting [AW] after a long period of not being in contact. [Care manager 
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name] reports that [AW’s] neighbour has reported being introduced to 
[AW’s] dad. 
 
However, it was expressed elsewhere in the file that AW did not wish to see her family 
and there appeared to be confusion as to AW’s wishes. The court ordered that AW 
lacked capacity to conduct proceedings and make decisions about contact. As a result 
an order was made that it was in her best interests not to have any contact, directly or 
indirectly, with her father, brothers and sister. Yet rather than prosecute AW’s father or 
siblings, or take legal measures which restricted them, the law facilitated protection in 
the form of restricting and coercing the innocent, vulnerable party. Whilst a capacity 
determination is a form of protection, in a case such as this it failed to address the 
specific and surplus pathogenic vulnerability in AW’s life, namely the abusive family 
members. The approach taken risked undermining AW’s autonomy and failed to 
empower her as a decision-maker. Furthermore, the social workers caring for her 
would have been responsible for deciding who AW could or could not have contact 
with. This is concerning as sexual violence is notoriously prevalent within 
institutionalised settings and it is well established that abusers often seek positions of 
authority over people with mental disabilities (Hollomotz, 2011; Plummer and Findley, 
2012). Therefore, a blanket finding of incapacity in respect of contact was a form of 
over-protection which may also have exposed her to further pathogenic vulnerability; 
the court simply replaced one set of known risks with another set of unknown risks.  
A different case, NA v (i) GI (ii) DQ, highlights that a better balance between 
empowerment and protection can be achieved where more situational responses are 
adopted. The case concerned the relationship between a 62 year old woman, GI, and 
her husband, DQ. An urgent application was made by the local authority, NA, in 
relation to GI’s capacity to litigate, capacity to decide on her care, contact with others 
and where to reside. Since the couple’s marriage in 2012, the local authority stated that 
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there had been “in excess of 50 domestic abuse allegations that [GI] has made against 
her husband”.113 It was noted in the application that GI had Korsakoff’s syndrome due 
to alcohol consumption, personality disorder, depressive disorder and cerebral atrophy. 
In this case, as in most I reviewed, the local authority’s primary concern related to GI’s 
relationship with DQ, rather than her capacity in any general sense, although her 
health issues are likely to have had an impact on her cognitive abilities. An interim 
declaration of incapacity was made in relation to all of the mentioned domains114 and 
therefore the same criticisms I had of AW’s case also apply here. However, the 
difference in this case was that at a subsequent fact finding hearing the judge also 
issued an injunction as follows: 
 
[DQ] is forbidden whether by himself or jointly with any other person: 
 
a) To use or threaten violence against [GI] and must not instruct, 
encourage or in any way suggest that any other person should do so 
and 
b) To intimidate, pester or harass [GI] and must not instruct, encourage 
or in any way suggest that any other person should do so and 
c) Enter or attempt to enter the grounds of or premises known as [X] or 
any other property in which [GI] may from time to time reside, save for 
the purpose of supervised contact agreed in writing in advance by the 
social worker on behalf of [GI]. 
 
                                                      
113  This statement was written in 2016 meaning there were over 50 allegations over a 4 year 
period. 
114 Unfortunately it was unclear from the documents that I accessed what the final declaration in 
relation to GI’s capacity was, if such a final declaration was even made. 
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This case is explored in more detail in Chapter Seven, but this approach more clearly 
focused on the situational cause of vulnerability in GI’s life – her abusive partner. The 
injunction may be criticised on the basis that GI may have wished to maintain a 
relationship with DQ despite his abusive behaviour and we do not commonly intervene 
in the lives of adults without mental disabilities against their wishes when abusive 
relationships are identified.115 However, the injunction did not prevent DQ from having 
any contact with GI, it required that contact be supervised. Yet, for me, the crucial 
aspects of this injunction were not the restrictions on contact but clauses (a) and (b); 
that DQ would be committing an offence in breach of a court order for being violent or 
intimidating to GI. These two aspects maintained GI’s wishes to have some contact 
with DQ, if indeed this was what she wanted, whilst allowing for a civil law mechanism 
to protect GI should DQ’s behaviour have become abusive. Therefore redefining 
vulnerability in situational terms better focuses responses that directly address the 
cause of vulnerability, particularly where it is surplus and pathogenic. They further pitch 
the level of protection more appropriately, for example through the provision of 
educative work on sex and relationships or through restricting contact with an abusive 
partner, rather than restricting the vulnerable adult herself. 
 
                                                      
115 Although prosecutions where the victim does not give live evidence are now more common 
following guidance, see Crown Prosecution Service (2017). Similarly, non-molestation orders 
under s 42 Family law Act 1996 can be used, albeit they require initiation from the victim. 
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4.4. Over-protection and depriving a person of their liberty  
 
The final example of over-protection that emerged from my data was in cases where a 
deprivation of liberty was ordered. Of the 20 case files reviewed, at least 11 expressly 
involved a DOL. Under the MCA, individuals can be deprived of their liberty in a care 
home or hospital for the purpose of being given care or treatment.116 Para 15 Schedule 
1A MCA states: 
 
The relevant person meets the mental capacity requirement if he lacks 
capacity in relation to the question whether or not he should be 
accommodated in the relevant hospital or care home for the purpose of 
being given the relevant care or treatment. 
 
Furthermore, a person who may be deprived of their liberty outside of a hospital or care 
home, but with sufficient degree of state involvement, would also require court 
authorisation for that DOL.117 The DOL framework was implemented in response to an 
ECHR decision118 to enable care and treatment to be provided to adults who need it 
but cannot necessarily consent to being within a setting from which they are unable to 
leave. In many ways therefore it was intended as a protective mechanism against 
violations of the right to liberty rather than as a mechanism to facilitate control. The 
DOL framework has been widely criticised (Szerletics and O’Shea, 2012) and recently 
subjected to a Law Commission consultation (Law Commission, 2015; Law 
Commission, 2017). However, in the cases I observed, DOL authorisations appeared 
to be used as a way of managing P’s abusive situation; if P was deprived of her liberty 
                                                      
116 Part 1 s 1 (2) MCA. 
117 s 16 (2)(a) MCA, power confirmed in W Primary Care Trust v B [2009] EWHC 1737. 
118 HL v United Kingdom (2004) 40 E.H.R.R. 761. 
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within a particular care home or supported living arrangement, then care staff and 
others could restrict and/or monitor, her contact with abusive others.  
A DOL, either under Schedule 1A or as part of the court’s general welfare 
management powers, was authorised in at least 11 cases, all of which involved 
allegations of abuse.119 In many of these cases the court authorisation included more 
than simply an authorisation that P could reside in a particular place for the purposes of 
care or treatment. In some cases the order had the effect of supervising P’s contact 
during the period for which she was being deprived of her liberty, even where she had 
capacity to decide on contact. For example in T City Council v CY it was ordered that 
CY lacked the capacity to litigate, decide on residence, care and how her care needs 
should be met during times which she has contact with others. The order further stated 
that it was in her best interests to receive care in accordance with the contact plan, 
including during times which she had contact with SB. In effect, this meant that she 
was not allowed to leave or meet with others, particularly SB, without a carer. Similarly 
in Z County Council v FY, a hearing was scheduled to: 
 
determine what contact between the First [FY] and Second 
Respondents [FY’s husband] is in the First Respondent’s best interest 
and whether any conditions should be attached to the standard 
authorisation… 
 
Furthermore, in another case it was ordered:120 
 
                                                      
119 Z County Council v FY, W County Council v ZR, C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, T 
City Council v CY, N County Council v (1) GI and (2) DQ, N County Council v CA, YS v E 
District Council, OD v R City Council, P County Council v SE, AY v V Borough Council, PR 
CCG v QB. 
120 C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council. 
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That, reasonable and proportionate measures shall be taken by [CB] to 
place and to prevent [DY] leaving ‘the Placement’ and that in the event 
that she refuses to go to or leaves ‘the Placement’ that reasonable and 
proportionate measures are taken to place/return her to the same.  
 
The mechanism for protecting P through the DOL framework was, therefore, centred 
on restricting her movements, even though she was more often than not the innocent 
party situated within a context of abuse and pathogenic vulnerability. The use of DOL 
authorisations as a method of responding to situational vulnerability was problematic 
because it restricted the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of abuse. I consider this 
issue further in Chapter Seven and instead argue for a different approach to 
intervening in cases of abuse using mental capacity law, which better balance 




In this chapter I have explored how vulnerability is discursively applied in mental 
capacity law to safeguard adults from abuse. I have used CDA to argue that both law 
and social work still understand vulnerability in inherent terms, relating it back to 
features internal to the person such as disability. Furthermore, I have shown how such 
characterisations can lead to both under-protection and over-protection as the meaning 
of vulnerability is linked to material factors such as rationing of social care. As such, it 
is imperative that understandings of vulnerability are shifted away from inherent 
meanings, towards situational analyses of vulnerability.  Whilst the language and 
understanding of inherent vulnerability may provide privileged access to support and 
services for some who fall within that norm, it channels legal and social work 
responses that control the individual rather than the situational cause of abuse in their 
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lives. This focus on inherent vulnerabilities shapes the types of interventions that are 
used and, as I have argued, often lead to over-protection. 
In the following chapter I build on this argument that mental capacity law views 
its subjects as inherently vulnerable by considering P’s participation in mental capacity 
law proceedings. Using the analysis of vulnerability outlined in this chapter, I argue that 
constructions of inherent and situational vulnerability lead to P’s exclusion from 




CHAPTER FIVE: GIVING EVIDENCE AND PARTICIPATING IN COURT OF 
PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS: P’S SILENCE AND TESTIMONIAL 
INJUSTICE 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter I draw on my COP data to highlight P’s limited participation in mental 
capacity proceedings.121 I present this as a form of testimonial injustice which is the 
failure to value a person in their “capacity as a giver of knowledge” (Fricker, 2007, p. 
7). I firstly evidence P’s bodily absence from proceedings. I then explore the absence 
of P’s voice and identify, based on my data, the reasons for this. I argue that P’s 
absence from COP proceedings is a form of testimonial injustice. Whilst the formal 
evidential rules do not prohibit P from giving evidence, P is routinely absent and silent 
because there is a persistent assumption that she is inherently and situationally 
vulnerable. As a result of this assumption, her experiential knowledge is pre-emptively 
excluded from mental capacity law. Finally, I argue that valuing P’s experiential 
knowledge has important benefits, including empowering her as a decision-maker in 
her own life. Furthermore, giving P a voice is more likely to strike a better balance 
between under-protection and over-protection as the embodied consequences of the 
particular decision are more likely to be taken into account. I conclude the chapter with 
a discussion of the ways in which P’s participation could be facilitated. However, I 
express caution about the increasing turn to special measures as a way of dealing with 
the problem I identify. By reinforcing the belief that P is especially vulnerable, there 
remains the likelihood that, even with special measures, her evidence will not be 
attributed the same credibility as others.  
 
                                                      
121 I do not draw on the data from the social work interviews in this chapter.  
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2. Testimonial Injustice in the Court of Protection 
 
In identifying the testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) that emerged from these data, I 
focus on P’s silent voice and bodily absence from COP proceedings. 122  Fricker’s 
concept of testimonial injustice gets to the core of the problem; that P is unable to 
engage in the social practice of conveying her knowledge. Being silenced is the most 
basic form of testimonial injustice – the inability to communicate your knowledge to 
another. Whilst knowledge can be gained independently of experience, having 
experience strengthens understanding of phenomena (Collins and Evans, 2008). This 
is particularly important when the setting in which she cannot convey her knowledge 
relates to her understanding of matters as intimate as sex and relationships. P 
therefore has a persuasive experiential knowledge claim to put forward, based on the 
reality of her lived experience.  
Fricker’s theory focuses on testimonial injustice as caused by prejudice, with 
such attitudes leading to the speaker’s credibility being underestimated; this lack of (or 
reduced) credibility leads to their knowledge being ignored or devalued (Fricker, 2007). 
Fricker describes testimonial injustice to be the result of intentional prejudice, rather 
than of bad luck or “innocent error” (Fricker, 2007, p. 21; Sherman, 2016). Yet in this 
context it was more likely motivated by paternalism and concerns about P’s 
vulnerability rather than prejudice. Most, if not all, individuals working in the COP were 
not knowingly or actively prejudiced against P, nor were they motivated by a desire to 
deny her the opportunity to speak. Those who raised concerns about P giving evidence 
expressed it in relation to the detrimental effect they perceived giving evidence might 
have on her. However, this reflected a paternalistic attitude; that P needed to be 
protected for her own good. Such concerns did not typically arise in response to P 
giving evidence and having that evidence discounted. Instead she was pre-emptively 
                                                      
122 A summary of the cases are contained in Tables A1, A2 and A3, Appendix one. 
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silenced (Fricker, 2007, p. 130) because of paternalistic assumptions about her 
membership of a particular group – that she had a mental disability. 
Concerns about the paternalistic nature of professional and judicial responses 
under the MCA are clear in judgments123 and academic commentaries (Doyle, 2010; 
Cave, 2015; Taylor, 2016). In the previous chapter I also highlighted that over-
protection can result from paternalistic attitudes. This is notwithstanding that 
paternalism might be justified where an individual’s freedom to make voluntary choices 
is diminished (Herring and Goold, 2014, p. 14). Yet as a result of her vulnerability, P 
was paternalistically characterised as unable to provide evidence or attend 
proceedings. This finding suggests that those who argue that we should be wary of 
vulnerability might have legitimate concerns in this context. For example, Munro and 
Scoular have warned the language of vulnerability can be used to justify surveillance 
and intervention in the lives of those labelled vulnerable (Munro and Scoular, 2012). 
However, by interrogating what the individual is vulnerable to and why, a vulnerability 
analysis can still provide a useful insight into the reasons for P’s silence.  
I observed both inherent and situational attitudes towards vulnerability 
(Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a), drawing on my theoretical framework in 
Chapter Two. Inherent vulnerability was over-emphasised in the COP in contrast to 
acknowledging the universal vulnerabilities that we all share (Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 
2010). P was perceived to be especially vulnerable when attending court and providing 
evidence can be a challenging experience for many adults. Vulnerability was also 
viewed as situational because it was acknowledged that the court setting was a scary 
place which was seen as (especially) harmful to P. Therefore the interaction between 
both types of vulnerability underpinned P’s absence from proceedings. I consider the 
different ways that vulnerability was presented in relation to P’s participation and argue 
                                                      
123 In re A (Capacity: Refusal of Contraception) [2010] EWHC 1549 para 61, IM v (1) LM (2) AB 
(3) Liverpool City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 37 para 1, 42, 82. 
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that by labelling P as especially vulnerable (inherently and situationally), she was 
wronged in her capacity as a possessor of experiential knowledge. 
 
3. P’s Embodied Absence From Proceedings  
 
P’s absence was the most striking, albeit not surprising, theme that emerged from the 
observations. Of the 8 cases observed over 11 separate hearings, P was present on 3 
occasions. Of the case files reviewed, there was no evidence that P attended any of 
the hearings, gave evidence or spoke to the judge informally. I did not attend all 
hearings for each case observed, therefore cannot be sure that P did not attend others. 
However, it is widely accepted that it is unusual for P to attend or give evidence in the 
COP (Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016; Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a, p. 
98).124 Accordingly I would have expected such attendance to be noted in the court 
files. 
P’s absence from proceedings was of concern because her embodied presence 
in the courtroom should remind participants that the case will have an impact on a 
living person. If COP participants, particularly judges, do not engage with adults with 
mental disabilities, if they do not understand the embodied context within which P lives, 
then their own experience about what constitutes ‘normal’ embodiment risks becoming 
normative (Scully, 2012, p. 140). This means there is a risk that if the judge does not 
meet with P or have regular interaction with adults like P they may not fully appreciate 
what it means when an expert says that P is “very childlike” and “uninhibited”125 or that 
P has a “dementing illness of such nature and degree that she requires supervised 
care”.126 Furthermore, as a result they may use their own experience as the benchmark 
                                                      
124 It was also noted in CC v KK and STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 that “it was unusual for the 
subject of proceedings in the Court of Protection to give oral evidence” para 51. 
125 Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC. 
126 P County Council v (1) SE (2) TM. 
 
 138 
by which to compare others if they are not faced with the reality of differently embodied 
people. Therefore P’s presence forces a shift from an exclusive focus on abstract legal 
doctrine towards also acknowledging the lived reality for those involved in the case 
(Fletcher, Fox and McCandless, 2008, p. 323).  
Furthermore, the COP makes decisions that can have a profound impact on a 
person’s life, perhaps to a greater extent than any jurisdiction, except possibly criminal 
law. This is exacerbated because of the relational subject matter of the cases I 
observed. Even the criminal law does not have the extensive powers of the COP to 
make a prospective statement that a person lacks capacity to engage in sexual activity 
or to marry. Furthermore, the criminal law cannot prevent a person from engaging in 
sex except to the extent that they are imprisoned.127 The judge and participants should 
be compelled to face the reality that their decision might change P’s life. 
The importance of P’s embodied presence was explored in Shtukaturov v 
Russia.128 The case concerned an adult male with a history of mental illness who had 
inherited property from his grandmother. His mother applied to the court seeking to 
deprive her son of his legal capacity on the basis of a psychiatric report. The district 
court concluded that the applicant was legally incapable, despite the fact that he was 
not present for proceedings, was not aware of them and was only informed of the 
judgment by chance around a year later. The applicant subsequently wished to 
challenge this decision but was prohibited from having contact with his lawyer. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held unanimously that there had been a 
violation of Articles 5(1) and 5(4), 6 and 8. Whilst this case is different from many cases 
I observed in that the applicant did not have any representation, the ECtHR stated: 129 
 
                                                      
127 Or also possibly if the offender was subject to a sexual prevention order under s 104 (2) 
Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
128 (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 27. 
129 para 73. 
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In such circumstances it was indispensable for the judge to have at least 
a brief visual contact with the applicant, and preferably to question him. 
The Court concludes that the decision of the judge to decide the case on 
the basis of documentary evidence, without seeing or hearing the 
applicant, was unreasonable and in breach of the principle of adversarial 
proceedings enshrined in art.6 (1). 
 
Given the clear position under the ECHR,130 the COP has attempted to increase P’s 
participation. Rule 3A was enacted under the Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 
2015 and made provision to “ensure that in every case the question of what is required 
to ensure that P’s “voice” is properly before the court is addressed”.131 The primary 
focus has been on joining P as a party and in all cases I observed P was a party to 
proceedings, albeit P has not always been a joined as a party (Green, 2016). I have 
written elsewhere about the importance of P being a party to proceedings in cases 
which involve her deprivation of liberty, given the human rights implications and 
infantilising comparisons to children (Lindsey, 2016b). However, rule 3A does not only 
allow for P to be joined as a party, but also for the judge to order that P addresses the 
judge. 132  Importantly, it does not rely on an application by a party but can be 
commenced at the initiation of the judge.133 Yet this rule was not used to enable P’s 
participation in any cases I observed. This was disappointing given that the COP 
appeared to, formally at least, be making progress towards addressing P’s limited 
participation. However, it highlights that “some obstacles to political participation do not 
take the form of easily identifiable external barriers” (McNay, 2012, p. 234) but instead 
form part of the culture of the court process. 
                                                      
130 For further detailed discussion of these issues at the ECHR see Series, Fennell and Doughty 
(2017a). 
131 COPr PD 2A para 2. 
132 COPr 3 (A) (2) (d). 
133 COPr 3 (A) (1). 
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Given the ECHR jurisprudence and the more inclusive approach taken in the 
criminal and family law jurisdictions (Brammer and Cooper, 2011), it was concerning to 
see P’s absence from so many cases. This has also been noted in a recent report on 
P’s participation in welfare cases in the COP (Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a). 
This absence was particularly clear in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC. The 
case concerned LC’s capacity to marry and capacity to consent to sexual relations. A 
detailed background to the case was set out in Chapter Four at p. 93. In summary, the 
case concerned LC, a young woman in her early twenties with autism and a mild 
learning disability, who entered into a relationship with a man, GK. During the 
relationship LC and GK married without the knowledge of LC’s family and there were 
ongoing criminal investigations into GK’s alleged rape of LC. 
In hearing one counsel for the Official Solicitor explained that there was a letter 
from LC explaining that she did not wish to participate in the hearing and that she was 
stressed by it. In hearing two, counsel for the Official Solicitor explained that LC 
expressed a wish to attend court and speak to the judge but not to give evidence. 
However, as the hearing was adjourned this issue was not pursued. At the final 
hearing, on the morning of day three counsel for the Official Solicitor indicated that LC 
would like to see the judge in private “in order to express her wishes and feelings”. In 
response the judge explained that this was a “grey area” as to what purpose seeing the 
judge would serve. He explained that the whole purpose is that he can’t take evidence 
from her if he met her in private and that on the evidence he had heard, she might just 
say whatever was in her head at that particular time. He explained that it is clear from 
the rules that he should “encourage, allow and enable” a person who “hasn’t got 
capacity” to express views to the judge as much as possible. Yet LC did not attend 
court, nor did she meet with the judge privately, because, according to her barrister, 
she feared the prospect of giving evidence in front of everybody. LC’s physical 
embodiment was therefore never present at the crucial final stages of proceedings. It is 
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impossible to know the impact that LC’s presence might have had on the outcome, 
something I explore further in this chapter at section 5.2. 
 In not facilitating LC’s participation, her experiential knowledge of matters 
central to her life was not heard. LC was not present in court despite expressing 
(through others) a sustained, albeit inconsistent, wish to attend. The knowledge she 
had to convey would have gone to the core of the hearer’s need to hear it; by this I 
mean that what LC would have had to say would likely have included her 
understanding of sexual relations, how she experienced them with GK, her 
understanding of marriage and the voluntariness within which she entered that 
marriage, and her general wishes and feelings for her own life going forward. 
Furthermore, she could have given an insight into the embodied impact of any 
decision. 
Not only does her absence contradict ECHR jurisprudence but is also in tension 
with the provisions of the UNCRPD set out in Chapter One. For example, Article 12 
requires the state to “take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity”. 134 
Furthermore, the UNCRPD is guided by the “[f]ull and effective participation and 
inclusion in society”135 of people with disabilities. Therefore this under-protection of P’s 
right to participate and enjoy legal capacity may also contravene the UNCRPD. In 
addition, as Series et al. explain: 
 
it is difficult to see how a person’s ‘incompetence’ as a witness could 
decrease the weight that should be attached to their evidence, since the 
matter to be determined is their own understanding and subjective 
experience. (Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a, p. 102). 
                                                      
134 Article 12 (3). 
135 Article 3 (c). 
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Similarly, Donnelly explains that even where a person lacks capacity that individual is 
still likely to have an important contribution to make (Donnelly, 2009a).  Yet despite 
case law and international human rights instruments requiring that people with 
disabilities participate in decisions, this has not sufficiently taken hold in practice in the 
COP.  
 
4. P’s Silence, Vulnerability and Impaired Credibility  
 
In addition to concern over P’s limited presence at court, P rarely gave witness 
evidence. There are many aspects of a case for which P could provide evidence, for 
example on her understanding of decision specific issues such as particular sexual 
relationships or marriages, or more broadly to enable the judge to gain a picture of her 
presentation. In civil law proceedings, it is for the judge to determine, at his or her 
discretion, whether or not to allow particular evidence to be heard.136  Furthermore, 
every person is a competent witness  unless they fall within certain categories 
(Halsbury’s Laws, 2015) albeit that in Enfield LBC v SA MacFarlane J stated:137 
 
The difficulty faced in the present case, and it will be a difficulty which in 
varying degrees will be faced in the majority of capacity and best 
interest cases under the MCA 2005, Part 1, is that ‘P’ is unlikely to be a 
competent witness. 
 
The legal approach to giving evidence is set out in a recent COP case. A County 
136 See for example Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 32.1 and COPr 95. 
137 [2010] EWHC 196 para 31. 
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Council v (1) AB (2) BB (3) CB138 confirms that the test is whether or not the witness 
would understand (a) the solemnity of the occasion and (b) the responsibility to tell the 
truth. In that case, both the civil and criminal law approaches to witness evidence were 
considered. The criminal law test139 requires a consideration of whether a person is (a) 
able to understand questions put to them and (b) give answers to them which can be 
understood. It was suggested by Counsel for AB (the subject of the proceedings) that 
this approach should be adopted because it was a lower threshold and “the civil test is 
too restrictive and is out of step with the modern approach, particularly in a jurisdiction 
such as the Court of Protection”.140 However, Rogers J declined to incorporate the 
criminal statutory framework into the COP jurisdiction as he stated that was a matter for 
Parliament.  
Whilst the test for witness competence is not settled, A County Council v (1) AB 
(2) BB (3) CB suggests that the legal test is whether or not the witness would 
understand (a) the solemnity of the occasion and (b) the responsibility to tell the truth. 
In relation to the solemnity of the occasion, the witness must appreciate the nature and 
obligation of an oath or affirmation.141 In relation to the second part, the court’s focus is 
on whether or not the adult understands the moral duty to speak the truth. However, 
case law suggests that no inquiry is usually made into the understanding of such moral 
duty, suggesting it is interpreted very broadly.142 The case law on this point is limited 
and much of it comes from the criminal law. For example, medical evidence may be 
adduced to show that a witness suffers from a mental disorder which may affect the 
138 [2016] EWCOP 41. 
139 s 53 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
140 para 43. 
141 R v Wade (1825) 1 Mood CC 86, R v Samuel Hill (1851) 169 E.R. 495. Also see Spittle v 
Walton [1870] L.R. 11 Eq. 420 which found that a preliminary inquiry into a person’s 
competence to give evidence in civil proceedings is required to determine whether they 




reliability of their evidence.143 Despite the rejection of the lower criminal law threshold, 
A County Council v (1) AB (2) BB (3) CB maintains the view that P should participate in 
proceedings. Whilst general rules on competence apply, such rules do not have a high 
threshold and the civil law does not require expert evidence to support the giving of 
testimony.144 
Given the relatively low test for competence to give evidence, in many cases it 
should not have been difficult to show that P was competent to testify. Yet P did not, in 
any case observed, give formal witness testimony, nor could I see any record of such 
evidence in any case files reviewed. Whilst it may be argued that the threshold should 
be lowered to match the criminal law provisions, in my observations these rules were 
not the primary obstacle to P having a voice as they were not discussed and no 
findings on competence were made. In the following sections I explore the three ways 
in which P’s voice was silenced, with the reasons centred on her perceived 
vulnerability and resulting lack of credibility.  
 
4.1. Inherent vulnerability and the pre-emptive lack of credibility  
 
As outlined in Chapter Four, it was evident that P was perceived to be inherently 
vulnerable because of her disability which led to under-protection and over-protection. 
This stereotype of vulnerability operated to silence P and undermine her credibility as 
an experiential knowledge giver. In Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC expert 
psychiatric evidence was taken from Dr Y on P’s capacity to give live evidence.145 Dr Y 
was equivocal on LC’s capacity essentially explaining that it would depend on how the 
questions were put to her. By this she did not only mean that if things were explained in 
                                                      
143 Toohey v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1965] A.C. 595. 
144 Wigan Council v M, C, P, GM, G, B and CC [2015] EWFC 8. 
145 Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC. I do not believe this is unusual and has also been 




simple language then LC might be able to understand better, but she also implied that 
LC could be easily led to answer questions in particular ways depending on how they 
were asked. Dr Y explained that “it’s difficult to know her understanding of the truth” 
and that she would need some evidence to support the fact it’s the truth because “she 
is too trusting”. She explained that “most people I see are very worried about court 
cases” and “scared about the law” but that “She [LC] wasn’t worried about the court 
and that it might result in outcomes that she didn’t want.” The expert said this  
“demonstrated her [LC’s] trust in authority”. However, as was suggested by Counsel for 
LC’s husband, her trust in the authority of the court arguably strengthened LC’s 
understanding of the requirement to tell the truth rather than undermined it; she 
appreciated the importance of giving evidence to a court, which could have lifelong 
consequences for her. Whilst one might expect a person to have some concerns about 
the court process, the fact that she did not express this to the psychiatrist assessing 
her should not have supported a conclusion that she lacked capacity. In fact, the 
psychiatrist went on to say when asked about the potential harm that LC was a “robust 
character” who was able to “bounce back from things”. 
Dr Y also explained that LC was very keen to please. She explained that girls 
and women with autism are keen to fit in and be socially accepted and that LC had a 
tendency to copy what other people were doing. These descriptions appeared to 
construct LC as not credible because, as a result of her disability, she would say 
anything to fit in, notwithstanding that this is not a part of the test for competence to 
give evidence. Rather than considering possible situational reasons why LC might want 
to fit in and ways of encouraging more authentic responses. Similarly, LC’s social 
worker, KN, giving evidence explained that LC would often laugh when she couldn’t 
answer the question or change the subject.  The evidence that LC was likely to change 
her mind and give different answers depending on who she was speaking to came 
through in the judge’s comment that from what he had heard LC might just say 
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whatever is in her head at that particular time. These comments worked to reduce LC’s 
credibility and attribute it to inherent factors such as her mental disability, pre-emptively 
silencing her voice. No finding was made about LC’s capacity to give evidence and she 
did not provide any oral evidence.146 LC’s solicitor explained “she has come to the 
understanding she would have to talk to everybody” and that whilst she had been 
informed that the request was to “see the judge in private”, by the third day she had 
expressed a wish not to give evidence.147 Yet many adults would find the prospect of 
giving evidence unsettling and the universal nature of vulnerability should have been 
emphasised instead of viewing P as especially vulnerable. 
People with disabilities have long been understood as especially vulnerable, 
which has led to the silencing of their voice and over-protection. Of course ‘people with 
disabilities’ are not a homogenous group and particular voices have been silenced 
more than others. This is particularly so in mental capacity law as the logical, rational 
and legalistic voice the law requires is not typical of many people. Of course this is why 
legal representation is essential given the complexities of negotiating the legal process. 
However, when the court focuses on the exceptional reasons why P’s voice should not 
be heard, “the law produces the very subjects it claims to protect” (Scott-Hill, 2002, p. 
401). It does so by constructing, or allowing the evidence to construct, P as inherently 
vulnerable and therefore unable to give evidence. Consequently this is more likely to 
lead to a finding that P lacks capacity and result in her over-protection. In LC’s case 
her disability was used as evidence that she was too vulnerable to attend court and 
that, even if she did, what she had to say could not be relied upon. LC was ultimately 
found to lack capacity to litigate, to consent to sex and to marry and I do not know 
whether hearing P would have changed the outcome. However, the limited number of 
                                                      
146 Notes were made available to the court of her meetings with her solicitor at which she 
expressed various opinions, wishes and feelings.  
147 This was disappointing given that it was the only case observed which went to a full trial. 
Most cases never got that far as agreement between the parties was reached outside of court, 
typically in favour of P lacking capacity. 
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reported cases where P has been actively involved suggest having a voice does affect 
the outcome, something I return to in section 5.2. 
Similarly, silencing P’s voice through framing her as especially inherently 
vulnerable often resulted from comparisons with children. Power has long been used to 
silence those perceived to be vulnerable to prevent them from challenging their 
vulnerable status, for example, the silencing of children is well documented (James, 
James and McNamee, 2004; James, 2008, 61; Brammer and Cooper, 2011). As Murris 
explains “credibility deficit is related to age” (Murris, 2013, p. 248). Therefore the 
discourse in the COP which infantilised adults helped support a generalised opinion 
that P was unable to give evidence because what she had to say could not be relied 
upon to be truthful because of her childlike nature. As a result, her voice should not be 
heard and she could be silenced. Dr Y gave evidence describing LC as “very childlike” 
and that she functions at the age of 7 or 8. 148 Yet British Psychological Society (BPS) 
guidance states: 
 
In practice, some clinicians are known to use child development scales 
or children’s intelligence tests to profile aspects of intellectual 
functioning of very disabled adults… attempts to derive extrapolated IQ 
scores from the use of developmental scales or child intelligence tests 
constitutes extremely dubious practice and is not recommended. 
Likewise, the practice of referring to ‘mental age’ when reporting on the 
level of intellectual or social functioning of adults should be avoided. 
(British Psychological Society, 2000). 
 
                                                      
148 This was not the only case where infantalisation took place but it was the most striking, 
perhaps because of the oral testimony. The police statement in K County Council v MW also 
referred to MW as having the capacity of an 8 year old.  
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Whilst Dr Y was a psychiatrist and therefore this guidance would not have applied to 
her, it is concerning that such age comparisons are still being made as they only 
impact negatively on assessments of capacity (Herring, 2010) and can result in over-
protection. It is perhaps not surprising that if Dr Y viewed LC as comparable to a 7 or 8 
year old child that she concluded that LC lacked capacity to consent to sex and 
marriage. In fact, Dr Y went on to expressly link the two by stating that it was her 
understanding that it was illegal to have sex with someone who functions at the age of 
7 or 8. 
Furthermore, reference was made to LC’s relationship with her teddies in 
excess of 17 times throughout the final hearing. Whilst on some occasions this was 
used to highlight flaws in LC’s husband’s case that he did not realise that LC had a 
learning disability until some time in to their relationship, at other times it was used to 
question LC’s credibility. For example, counsel for LC asked her social worker whether 
the presence of her mother and her teddies would have been equally valid at her 
wedding. To which the social worker responded that whilst teddies are “very very 
important” she did not know that she could honestly say that they were as important as 
her mother. This attempt at silencing through infantalisation constructed LC as 
vulnerable and, as a result, undermined her credibility.  
Infantilising adults with mental disabilities exacerbates their perceived lack of 
credibility, resulting in the silencing of their voice. However, there are many differences 
between adults with mental disabilities and children. Shoemaker gives three important 
distinctions (Shoemaker, 2010); firstly, mentally disabled adults are physically more 
mature than children. This will often mean they have been employed, have fallen in 
love and have had sexual experiences. This was the case for LC who had a job, had a 
large degree of independence and was in a sexual relationship. Secondly, the impact 
of physical and social factors should not be underestimated because they often lead to 
the adult developing greater emotional maturity as a result of life experience. For 
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example, LC had the experience of a serious adult relationship over a number of years 
at the time of the COP hearings. Furthermore, she had seen relatives and others marry 
and have children. Finally, they have greater cognitive maturity than children of a 
comparable developmental age. This means that because the adult has been at their 
level of development for a longer time period than children would be (because children 
move on to the next stage in adolescence) they have experienced that level of 
functioning on a daily basis for many years. As a result they have a more developed 
understanding of their own abilities, limits, likes and dislikes than a child would have at 
such an age. 
Therefore whilst Dr Y described LC as comparable to a 7 or 8 year old, this was 
an unpersuasive comparison given that a young child would not be able to do the 
things LC had, such as be in regular employment, travel, go to college and have a 
sexual relationship. Drawing parallels between the two undermines the important 
distinctions that law draws between adults and children. It further serves to exclude P’s 
voice on the basis that she lacks the credibility to speak that an adult normally 
possesses. The attempt at comparing adults and children by age, as well as the 
repeated reference to inherent and especial vulnerability, operates to undermine P’s 
credibility, silence her voice and, ultimately, results in over-protection.    
 
4.2. Situational vulnerability  
 
As well as the attribution of vulnerability to inherent factors, there was evidence that 
those involved in proceedings were concerned that P was situationally vulnerable. 
Participants perceived P to be vulnerable within the courtroom and therefore they 
sought to avoid this by not calling her to give evidence. This was also achieved by 
speaking to P in private or outside of the court, which was viewed as less anxiety 
inducing. As made clear in A County Council v (1) AB (2) BB (3) CB, even if P is 
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deemed to lack competence, she can still provide information to the court. COPr 95 (d) 
gave the COP the power to admit evidence and COPr 95 (e) states that the court 
may:149 
 
admit, accept and act upon such information, whether oral or written, 
from P, any protected party or any person who lacks competence to give 
evidence, as the court considers sufficient, although not given on oath 
and whether or not it would be admissible in a court of law apart from 
this rule. 
 
This may have been brought in to allow judges to speak with P separately for example 
by meeting with them outside of court, which has occurred in a small number of cases 
(Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016). However, evidence given in this manner is 
usually unsworn, therefore limiting its weight. Case law has concluded that evidence, 
which would otherwise be deemed hearsay, can still be admitted from an otherwise 
incompetent witness under the Civil Evidence Act 1995 under COPr 95 (d).150 Evidence 
under rules 95 (d) and (e) could be admitted by the judge informally speaking to P 
outside of the court or by the judge visiting P at another location. For example, Jackson 
J noted in Re M151 that a district judge visited P in her care home and made a written 
record of the meeting to inform the court.152 However, the fact that it does not carry the 
same weight can have important consequences. For example, in Y County Council v 
(1) LC (2) GK (3) SC, the judge noted that if he did not hear directly from P then if 
asked to rely on anything she has said to others, the weight given to such evidence 
would be very small. Furthermore, the judge explained that if LC spoke to him in 
                                                      
149 Inserted by Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015.  
150 Enfield LBC v SA [2010] EWHC 196 para 30. 
151 [2013] EWHC 3456. 
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private to bear in mind that “I won’t be able to hear evidence from her” and that he will 
“only be able to tell people what she thinks”. This suggests that it is in P’s interests to 
give evidence in court otherwise her opinions will, perversely, be given less weight than 
those relaying the same information on her behalf. Therefore whilst the information 
provisions within COPr 95 (e) can prevent P’s voice from being silent, her voice still 
has less power than others.  
Another case I observed where P was characterised as situationally vulnerable 
was T City Council v CY. The case concerned a 49 year old woman’s capacity to 
decide on residence, care and contact. CY was described as having a mild to 
moderate learning disability and emotionally unstable personality disorder. The case 
was brought due to concerns about CY’s relationship with her male partner, SB. The 
local authority and CY’s parents were concerned about his influence on her particularly 
in relation to her heavy alcohol consumption. It was also noted that there were previous 
concerns about CY being sexually exploited in exchange for alcohol.  
In addition to the capacity declarations sought, CY was subject to a DOL under 
Schedule A1 MCA. CY objected to being placed under a DOL and was not happy with 
the restrictions on her ability to go out, again highlighting over-protection. However, 
CY’s litigation friend accepted the advice of the expert that she lacked capacity to 
decide on matters of care and residence. The final hearing proceeded on the basis of 
agreement and primarily considered what CY’s best interests were in relation to care 
and residence. Unusually, the judge spoke with CY directly in the courtroom at this final 
hearing, with counsel, her solicitor and her litigation friend present, but without the 
other parties (local authority and CY’s parents). I was excluded from these discussions 
before the case commenced, which lasted for approximately five minutes. When CY 
came out of the courtroom she said that she did not want to go in for the rest of the 
hearing because the judge is “going up top now”, implying that she did not want to be 
there when he was sitting in the typical judge’s position, presumably in contrast to him 
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sitting at her level during their informal discussion. CY promptly left the building and the 
other parties and I were invited into the court.  
On entering court, the judge explained that he understood that CY was quite 
frightened to come to court so he thought that speaking to her separately would be 
more appropriate. This is a clear example of a situational response to her perceived 
inherent vulnerability. He explained that he kept a note of what she told him and what 
he asked her. He explained that it wasn’t to be evidence in the formal sense. He did 
not expand on what he meant. On reflection he must have been referring to COPr 95 
(e). Yet it was not clear that P lacked competence to give evidence, nor was it clear 
why such informal measures could not have been taken alongside swearing her in and 
thereby enabling her voice to be given greater weight. There was also an attendance 
note in the court file that CY said to her litigation friend that she was frightened of court, 
but following lots of questions and answers between them she said “I’m going to do it, 
going to go” and “gave thumbs up” and “seemed quite enthused”. This suggests that 
what CY needed, like many others, was reassurance, information and support to 
facilitate her attending court. 
In reality, many reasons for P’s limited participation can be attributed to 
situational vulnerability. It is well established that giving evidence can be stressful, both 
for ‘vulnerable’ people and others (Hunter, Jacobson and Kirby, 2013; Henderson, 
2016). That is not to minimise any anxiety or distress that somebody with a mental 
disability may additionally experience. Dr Y explained in her report in LC’s case that 
her attitude to the court process was “frivolous” and, as previously stated, that she was 
a “robust character” who can “bounce back from things”. Therefore, it should not be 
assumed that a person’s disability might make the court experience especially more 
difficult for them than anyone else. A lack of access to epistemic goods such as 
education (Fricker, 2013, p. 1318) about what the court process involves are arguably 
greater barriers for people with mental disabilities than others given their poor 
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educational experiences. Of course P, in many cases, is situationally vulnerable; if she 
does not know what to expect or has not been asked for her views then it is 
understandable that she may express fears or concerns about attending court. 
However, situational vulnerability should be addressed in terms that address that 
specific vulnerability factor whilst minimising the potential to undermine the credibility 
and weight of P’s evidence. For example, in A County Council v (1) AB (2) BB (3) CB, 
a visit to the court was arranged as a way of preparing AB to participate in future 
hearings. Constructing P as inherently or especially vulnerable more often than not 
leads to P’s absence from proceedings. This denies her the opportunity to be heard or, 
when she is heard, the value of her evidence is diminished.  
 
4.3. Rejection of P’s voice 
 
Finally, I explore the testimonial injustice that occurs where P has a voice. Deflated 
credibility judgements involve rejecting a person’s knowledge when it is heard 
(Wanderer, 2012). This rejection of knowledge can be seen in the rhetoric which 
references P’s wishes but does not lead to any substantive difference in outcome. CY’s 
case provides an example; this was the only case observed where P attended the final 
hearing and spoke directly to the judge, therefore giving her a voice and embodied 
presence. Whilst it was not formal witness testimony in that it was unsworn, it was still 
‘evidence’ as it formed part of the information before the judge in the case. 
Furthermore, the judge attempted to allay CY’s fears and concerns about attending by 
agreeing to meet with her separately with fewer people present. This was a 
commendable step given P’s absence from other hearings I attended.  
At the start of the hearing, the judge explained CY’s wishes as she had 
expressed them; he explained that she said she didn’t like “DOLS”, because she didn’t 
like people watching her one to one and didn’t like going out with staff. He also said 
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she told him that she didn’t understand the reason for the “DOLS”. She said that SB 
was her boyfriend and that she sees him once a week. CY was asked by counsel why 
she was at court and she responded that she did not know. The judge said that he 
explained the reason was because he would be making a decision about her living 
arrangements. She was then asked if she wanted to stay for the hearing and she said 
no she didn’t and then asked to leave, which the judge described as “understandable”. 
Despite CY being physically present and having a voice to tell the judge what she did 
and did not want, the judge authorised the DOL, and ordered that it would become a 
standard authorisation under Part 4 Schedule A1 MCA, renewable annually. He also 
declared that CY lacked the capacity to litigate, to decide where to reside and to decide 
on her care. The judge noted that the expert evidence about CY’s capacity to decide 
on matters of contact was “not sufficient”. I took this to mean that the presumption that 
she had capacity to decide on contact had not been rebutted by the expert evidence. 
The judge then explained that restricting CY’s contact with her partner, SB, through her 
lack of capacity to decide on matters of care “circumvents the entire problem”. This 
meant that CY’s wishes to no longer be subject to a DOL were ignored and she was to 
be subject to a care plan as she lacked capacity to decide on her care needs. This 
meant that she would always need a carer with her, even when spending time with SB, 
because he could not properly care for her. 
Similarly in P County Council v SE P’s expressed wishes and feelings were 
sidelined. The case concerned an 80 year old woman with dementia who had lived at 
home for a number of years with her partner, TM. The COP proceedings started 
following a police attendance at the property, where they raised concerns about SE’s 
living conditions. SE raised no concerns and said she was happy with TM looking after 
her. SE was subsequently admitted to hospital in a confused and disorientated state. It 
appeared that SE had not seen her GP for 5 years although she had had some contact 
with district nurses. SE also had a daughter, LM, who it is said she had not seen for 5 
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years as TM didn’t want LM to go to the flat. The case proceeded as the social workers 
had concerns about SE’s living conditions and TM’s ability to provide her with suitable 
care. There were concerns about TM’s treatment of SE, although no findings of fact 
were made in that regard. However, the allegations of mistreatment by TM were the 
backdrop to the case. 
Following the previous court hearing (4 months before the final hearing I 
observed) SE was moved to a care home with a DOL standard authorisation. Since 
removal from her home, contact with her daughter had been re-established. TM initially 
attended the care home to visit SE although it was understood that at the time of the 
final hearing he had not visited for 2 months. Both SE and TM opposed her removal to 
the care home. In the final hearing, which I attended, the judge held that SE lacked the 
capacity to make decisions about her care and residence and lacked the capacity to 
manage her property and affairs. However, it was held that SE did not lack capacity to 
decide on contact or sexual relations. The reasons for this are explored further in 
Chapter Seven. The judge went on to explain that under s 4 (6) (a) MCA when 
considering the best interests test she had to consider SE’s wishes and feelings. These 
included SE’s repeated expression of her wish to return home and be cared for by her 
partner. The judge noted that at the time of the final hearing that remained SE’s wish. 
Furthermore, at a meeting shortly before the final hearing between SE, her litigation 
friend and her solicitor, SE was informed that the contents of an independent social 
work report indicated that it was not feasible for her to return home, to which SE 
apparently stated “well I could just die” and made reference to cutting her throat. The 
judge, in referring to this incident, noted that the solicitor and litigation friend were 
“unclear” about SE’s wishes and feelings at that point.  
The judge further explained that the litigation friend had raised concern about 
SE’s deterioration in her physical and mental health following the last hearing. SE had 
become immobile, in need of hoisting and feeding by care home staff. In contrast, SE 
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had previously been described as chatty and had a good sense of humour. The judge 
said that it was not known if this was the result of her illness or a result of SE doing 
less for herself and losing her abilities because she had now effectively become 
“institutionalised”. Despite SE’s clear wishes and feelings being expressed through 
others, the judge held that it was in SE’s best interests to remain in the care home. 
Both CY and SE had their knowledge and experience about living with their 
condition devalued. In particular, the fact that SE deteriorated following removal to a 
care home should have raised concern and arguably any final declaration that it was in 
SE’s best interests to remain in the care home should have been delayed for further 
evaluation. Furthermore, whilst understanding SE’s vulnerability in a situational sense 
to some degree, the approach taken ignored the other situational factors which 
impacted upon SE’s vulnerability, particularly institutionalisation. The harms that can 
result from institutionalised settings are well established (Hollomotz, 2011). This 
approach of ‘care home is best’ failed to take account of the many and multiple social 
and situational reasons for a person’s vulnerable position and highlighted the resort to 
over-protection that can result from particular characterisations of vulnerability.  
The cases above highlight that even where P had a voice, it was less powerful 
than the voice of others. Furthermore, being given a voice alone was not always 
sufficient to change the case. My observations suggest this was partly the result of P’s 
lack of embodied presence throughout proceedings, suggesting a need for both voice 
and body to come together to be most effective in conveying experiential knowledge.  
 
5. Facilitating P’s Participation 
 
In this section, I outline the importance of facilitating P’s participation. I break this down 
into the intrinsic value in P’s participation and the impact it can have on the outcome of 




5.1. Intrinsic benefits 
 
A participatory approach requires that a person is facilitated to take part in decision-
making which affects them (Donnelly and Kilkelly, 2011). Participation does not require 
that the individual makes all decisions for themselves or has complete control of the 
decision-making process. Therefore in discussing participation I do not mean that the 
individual’s decision-making autonomy should be respected in the substantive sense, 
because their wishes may ultimately be overruled. However, involving a person in 
decisions which affect them is still intrinsically important. It has positive psychological 
effects and enhances their sense of control over their life (Winick, 1994). Furthermore, 
securing participation is one way of representing to the person that they have some 
control over their own lives, even if the ultimate decision does not go in their favour.  
For example, CY appeared happy with having attended court in her case, 
despite her initial reservations about doing so. It is difficult to know without being able 
to follow up with CY directly, yet my impression of her leaving the court that morning 
was certainly positive. In fact, evidence suggests that a person is more likely to 
respond positively to a decision in which they are involved even where it goes against 
their wishes (Dennis and Monahan, 1996). Furthermore, the degree of coercion that a 
person experiences is associated with the degree to which they feel they have been 
heard and treated during the process (Dennis and Monahan, 1996). Therefore I 
suspect that CY would have felt more empowered as a result of being able to attend 
proceedings and speak to the judge than if she had not attended, even though the 
outcome may have been the same.  
Involving P is also important because, as Donnelly explains, a person’s 
understanding is a matter of degree. In contrast, the law treats her as either having 
capacity or not. It is important that the person is involved in the decision-making 
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process, even if they are held to lack capacity, because they are still likely to have an 
important contribution to make (Donnelly, 2009a, pp. 11-12). For example, the 
possibility of physical restraint being used in a case where P strongly objects to a 
particular course of action suggests that P’s views must be considered. Her 
embodiment should not be ignored when deciding what is in her best interests as 
different bodies may experience interventions differently. For example, in In Re A 
(Capacity: Refusal of Contraception),153 discussed at p. 54 of Chapter Two, the High 
Court held that a woman lacked the capacity to make decisions about contraception 
because of the coercive pressure to refuse contraception from her husband. However, 
the court also held it was in Mrs A’s best interests to receive contraception only if she 
consented to it,154 thereby recognising that forced interventions are disempowering. 
Similarly, in Wye Valley NHS Trust v B 155  Jackson J refused to grant the Trust’s 
application for foot amputation on the basis that even though Mr B lacked capacity to 
make the decision, he opposed having his foot amputated and therefore whilst his 
opposition continued it would not be in his best interests. Jackson J explained “a 
conclusion that a person lacks decision-making capacity is not an "off-switch" for his 
rights and freedoms”.156 Therefore, involving P is important because it respects and 
empowers P as a decision-maker and allows her to articulate to the court the 
consequences of any decision.  
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5.2. Improved outcomes 
 
There are also instrumental benefits to participation. It is widely accepted that when the 
person about whom the decision is being made is involved the decision-making 
process is improved (Donnelly, 2009a). For example, hearing P can change the 
decision as it results in the provision of more accurate information. For instance CC v 
KK and STCC157 concerned an 82 year old woman who lived in a nursing home but 
wanted to return to her bungalow. Baker J heard oral evidence from KK and, as a 
result, found that she had the capacity to make decisions as to her residence and care, 
contrary to expert evidence. In discussing KK’s evidence he explained:158 
 
Overall, I found in her oral testimony clear evidence that she has a 
degree of discernment and that she is not simply saying that she wants 
to go home without thinking about the consequences. 
 
Baker J clearly and repeatedly referred to KK’s evidence in his judgment159 and hearing 
P’s evidence clearly made a difference to the outcome. In LC’s case, counsel for the 
Official Solicitor noted that they were aware of CC v KK but that it was not appropriate 
in this case for LC to give evidence. No reason was given, other than that the facts 
were different, which is, of course, true for every case.  
Similarly, in a number of observed cases it was said that P was reluctant to 
discuss intimate matters. This suggests that reliable knowledge about P cannot solely 
be obtained by other. For example, in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC, Dr Y 
explained that when asked about sexual intercourse, there was a lot of giggling and 
embarrassment from LC. Similarly, her grandmother, giving evidence about a 
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conversation where LC said that she has to have sex to “please my man”, explained 
that she does not have to do anything she doesn’t want to do, to which LC promptly 
changed the subject. Likewise, LC’s social worker explained that she doesn’t answer 
questions put to her, instead she just laughs or tries to cover it up by changing the 
subject.  Similarly in H County Council v XC, evidence from the court file suggested 
that within weeks of educative work on relationships and marriage commencing, P 
refused to engage with staff and attend the sessions. There could be many reasons for 
this, but if P were reluctant to express his knowledge, one way of gaining further insight 
would have been for the court, or judge, to hear from P directly. It may be that P would 
express the same level of discomfort at speaking in a courtroom. However, that cannot 
be known in advance and more accurate information could have been obtained by 
hearing from P directly.  
The problem with privileging expert evidence over hearing from P directly is that 
court decisions turn on the presentation of evidence. Evidence can be obtained and 
conveyed to the court by a barrister, solicitor, litigation friend, or expert. However, 
experiential knowledge is best conveyed by the individual herself. In fact, that is why 
hearsay evidence is given less weight – because it is based on indirect knowledge.160 
Yet if P is not given sufficient time, weight or credibility to put forward her evidence, the 
evidence of the expert will nearly always be preferred. This can be seen in reported 
cases where the judge has met with P, which have different outcomes from those 
where the expert evidence alone is relied upon.161 It was therefore concerning in cases 
observed where it was suggested that the judge meet with P that such suggestions 
were not taken up. This occurred in LC and SE’s case, both cases where the expert 
evidence was preferred and findings of incapacity were made.  
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The focus of the case changed as a result of P’s attendance in one case I 
observed - K County Council v SL. This was the only case where there was a complete 
reversal in findings of incapacity following educative work. The case concerned SL’s, 
capacity to marry, have sex, decide on residence and litigate. 162   The case also 
included an application for a forced marriage protection order under s 63C FMCPA. 
The forced marriage element related to SL’s capacity to enter into a marriage, albeit 
there were concerns about her relationship with her father as allegations of violence by 
him and her uncle had been made.163 It was clear from the comments of counsel for 
the local authority that SL’s attendance at the hearing was unexpected. Whilst SL did 
not give formal evidence (which was to be expected as it was a preliminary hearing), 
the judge addressed SL directly, asking her whether she was still at college and what 
her plans were. She explained, articulately, that she had recently quit but that she had 
attended college for three years. She further explained that she would like to start the 
same course again in travel and tourism. Only very shortly after this exchange and a 
few minutes into the hearing, the judge explained that as SL seemed to have a good 
idea of personal relationships he didn’t want to commission something “unduly 
intrusive”. He further explained that he didn’t want somebody “investigating P’s life” 
unless it was really necessary as she had a “right to be private”. He ordered that the 
expert was only to investigate SL’s capacity to marry, capacity to litigate and capacity 
to decide on care and residence. 
The judge’s direct engagement with SL appeared to be a central factor in his 
concern about being too intrusive. Having heard from an articulate, clear and engaging 
woman, the judge appeared reluctant to order investigations beyond those that were 
“live” issues i.e. there was no evidence of any sexual relationships that required 
investigating. However, when I later reviewed the case file again it appeared that the 
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expert did provide an opinion on capacity to engage in sexual relations, following 
transfer of the case to a regional court. My perception was that SL’s presence had a 
subtle impact on the direction of this case as it narrowed the issues and reminded 
those involved of the potential impact of a finding of incapacity. The High Court judge 
who heard the case is known for his attempts to include P, an opinion based on his fair 
and compassionate judgments. This may therefore have been why the case took a 
different turn. However, my view was that SL’s attendance also enabled her barrister to 
convey her wishes more persuasively. For example, he explained her clear wish that 
she would like to get married in the future. Whilst lawyers often focus on formal legal 
rules, the result of something as simple as P’s attendance, including the resulting 
ability of her barrister to put matters in context and for the judge to put a face to an 
otherwise abstract discussion, must have some impact on judicial decision-making. 
The extent to which this impacts on decision-making is controversial,164 but at the least 
being able to draw on real life experiences and better understand the person is likely to 
have some impact.165 
 
5.3. Reforms and special measures for ‘vulnerable’ witnesses 
 
Finally, I discuss ways in which the testimonial injustice I observed could be 
addressed. One critique of a testimonial injustice analysis is that it relies on the virtues 
of individuals to become aware of their judgements and take action to put them right. 
As a result it is said to be unattainable in practice (Sherman, 2016); individuals, even if 
they had the ability to identify their prejudices, struggle to act correctively. However, 
this critique is less persuasive in relation to institutions such as the COP. The court 
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system can and should be able to take corrective measures (Anderson, 2012), for 
example through judicial and advocate training/guidance aimed at increasing P’s 
participation (Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016; Series, Fennell and Doughty, 
2017a). One example of a corrective measure is the use of ground rules hearings to 
address the vulnerability of witnesses before they give evidence. In one observed 
case, a ground rules hearing was suggested,166 showing that the COP are learning 
from other areas. 
The increased use of special measures should also be considered (Charles, 
2016; Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a). Special measures have been in place in 
the family and criminal courts for some time (Burton, Evans and Sanders, 2007; 
Brammer and Cooper, 2011; Ruck Keene, Cooper and Hogg, 2016). Special measures 
include the use of screens and curtains, live link so that the witness does not have to 
physically be in court, or allowing examination in chief to be pre-recorded. Such 
measures preserve the weight of evidence as it will generally still be sworn, but attempt 
to make the experience less anxiety inducing. The use of special measures and 
reasonable accommodations to facilitate P’s participation has been recommended 
alongside the provision for additional funding (Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a, pp. 
131-132). Whilst these recommendations are useful, I also consider some of the 
challenges with special measures.  
Witnesses in the COP could give evidence remotely under COPr 98, albeit this 
is not something I saw used and one court clerk said that live links, when used, were 
“not the same”.167 Using a live link to give evidence still excludes P’s body from court 
participants. The interaction between bodies and environment can provide many 
advantages which may be lost through giving evidence remotely. For example, a 
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special measures such as video links have many benefits, there remains a barrier between 
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person’s character and body language can become clearer in their physical presence 
(Burton, Evans and Sanders, 2007, p. 7). As such, giving evidence via a live link may 
lack the impact of giving evidence in court (Fairclough, 2017, p. 222). There are also 
challenges with the technology. For example, Munby P recently said in relation to 
special measures: 
 
None of this will work, as it should and must, unless our courts are fitted 
out with the necessary facilities and have the necessary ‘kit’. The simple 
fact is that they are not and do not – and they must be. (Munby, 2017). 
 
Special measures are not a worthwhile a solution if the facilities are not sufficient. Live 
link might provide comfort if P would be put off by the presence of their suspected 
abuser in court or would feel uncomfortable discussing intimate matters. Yet using live 
link when the technology is poor could harm the quality of evidence rather than 
strengthen it despite the comfort it may provide to P. Another ‘special measure’ that 
might be more useful are familiarisation visits. These are visits to the court building 
(and even courtroom) prior to the hearing at which P would give evidence, with the 
intention of alleviating any fears P might have and answering any questions (Burton, 
Evans and Sanders, 2007, pp. 4-5). However, even if a range of special measures 
were more clearly available, in other contexts there have remained barriers to their use 
in practice (Fairclough, 2017). 
Special measures alone are unlikely to solve the problem of testimonial injustice 
unless the content of P’s evidence is also given weight. This is because focusing on 
special measures risks maintaining the status quo assumption that there is something 
‘especially vulnerable’ about P. Instead special measures should be used where there 
is evidence of specific, situational vulnerability and targeted against those concerns. 
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Such measures should not be seen as a way of avoiding the need for P to come to 
court at all but as a way of facilitating P’s participation.  
The COP should instead amend the Court of Protection Rules 2017 to include a 
clear presumption that P should give evidence in proceedings. A presumption that P 
gives evidence would help to ensure that P is assumed to have capacity to give 
evidence unless there is evidence that she lacks it. Whilst it is suggested elsewhere 
that it will be rare for P to have competence to give evidence (Charles, 2016; Series, 
Fennell and Doughty, 2017a), this assumption is premature. As highlighted above, in 
no observed case was a determination made about P’s capacity to give evidence; it 
was simply assumed that she lacked capacity. This is despite the test for capacity to 
give evidence having a low threshold and not being the same test as capacity to 
litigate. A presumption that P should give witness evidence may also work to challenge 
persistent attitudes that P is especially inherently vulnerable so that when her voice is 
heard, it is not devalued. Routinely hearing the voice of mentally disabled adults may 
further help to reduce the marginalisation they experience and show that they also 
have an important contribution to make. 
A presumption in favour of giving evidence should also result in more situational 
responses to vulnerability. For example, if P expressed a fear of court, this would have 
to be addressed through special measures rather than excluding P altogether. Some 
may argue that this risks placing P in a stressful situation against her will. However, 
sworn evidence need not always be given in court, despite the embodied benefits of 
doing so. Evidence can be submitted in written form through a witness statement168 or 
given orally through live link. Yet any concerns should be addressed through amending 
the situation within which P would give that evidence rather than assuming she is not 
competent to do so.  
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The presumption that P would give evidence would be rebuttable. Therefore if 
evidence were presented that P lacked the competence to give evidence, bearing in 
mind the low threshold, then she would not have to do so. Any concerns that giving 
evidence might be harmful for P must be balanced against the evidence that it is in P’s 
interests to have her voice heard. Yet involving P must not be a superficial exercise, for 
example in other contexts there have been concerns that involving children in decision 
making has been a way of disguising the lack of choice on offer (Donnelly and Kilkelly, 
2011, p. 28). A clear presumption that P should give evidence in her case would go 




In this chapter I explored the reasons for P’s absence from COP proceedings, despite 
moves to facilitate her participation. In light of this, I have framed P’s absence, 
specifically her absence from giving sworn evidence, as a form of testimonial injustice 
underpinned by paternalistic attitudes which view adults with mental disabilities as 
especially vulnerable. Whilst P can, in some cases, appropriately be described as 
vulnerable, this routine characterisation without specific evidence as to why P is any 
more vulnerable that others is concerning. By attributing her vulnerability to the 
existence of a mental disorder, this works to exclude P’s voice and body from 
proceedings and limits her participation in decision-making. Furthermore, such an 
attitude undermines her credibility in the exceptional cases where she does give 
evidence. 
 There remain many barriers to P conveying her experiential knowledge and I 
have briefly explored the role that special measures might play in addressing some of 
these barriers. However, focusing on special measures risks falling back into the trap 
of characterising P as especially vulnerable in respect of giving evidence. Therefore 
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whilst I support the increased provision for special measures, they must be 
implemented alongside changes in attitudes to P’s participation. The risk in excluding 





CHAPTER SIX: EXPERT AND EXPERIENTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURT 





In this chapter I build on Chapter Five where I investigated the role of P’s evidence in 
COP proceedings. I now turn to the role of professional evidence in mental capacity 
cases. I argue that law views psychiatric knowledge as a form of objective technical 
expertise, and therefore as a reliable claim to truth about P’s mental capacity. I criticise 
this characterisation and instead argue for greater weight to be placed on ‘experiential’ 
forms of knowledge such as that possessed by social workers, which is currently 
devalued in mental capacity law. 
In Chapter Three I discussed the epistemological stance that I take in this 
thesis, arguing that there is a material reality to be discovered but that the ability of 
researchers to discover it is limited by their material-discursive intra-action with the 
world (Barad, 2003; Barad, 2007). Therefore when referring to ‘knowledge claims’ I 
mean each reliable claim to represent the likely reality of a situation. I understand a 
reliable knowledge claim to be one that has a persuasive claim to represent truths or, 
more likely, partial truths (Harris, 1995), albeit constrained by material-discursive 
factors such as bodies, resources and linguistic practices. In this chapter I build on this 
understanding of knowledge to consider the way that mental capacity law accepts 
expert knowledge and discounts knowledge drawn from experience.  
I frame my analysis in section two below by reference to notions of objectivity 
and specifically question whether psychiatric knowledge has a reliable claim to be 
uncovering objective truths about mental capacity. I argue that experiential knowledge, 
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gained both from personal and professional experience, is instead more likely to be a 
reliable knowledge claim about mental capacity because of the importance of knowing 
how particular individuals think and make decisions in situated contexts. Relying on 
experiential knowledge is also more likely to facilitate situational responses to 
vulnerability in cases of abuse because a broader range of factors about P’s life are 
likely to be considered. In section three I show based on my empirical data that mental 
capacity law treats psychiatric experts as possessing superior evidential knowledge, 
privileging psy expert evidence over evidence from experience. Finally in section four I 
argue for an embodied relational approach to assessing capacity, which values the 
experiential knowledge of those professionals who have a relationship with P. 
 
2. Knowledge Claims About Mental Capacity 
 
In this section I outline the difference between expert and experiential knowledge. I 
focus on the expert knowledge of the psy professions (Smart, 1989) because, from my 
data, this was the expertise that was most often relied upon in mental capacity cases. 
Psy professionals include, but are not limited to, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
psychiatric nurses and psychotherapists. In contrast to expert psy knowledge, I 
consider social work knowledge as a form of experiential evidence, based on the 
professional experience of social workers. Drawing on the distinction between expert 
and experiential knowledge, I argue that a person’s mental capacity to make decisions 
is not best understood through psy knowledge because it does not have a persuasive 
claim to represent objective knowledge about P’s mental capacity. Instead, the more 
reliable way of understanding P’s capacity is through eliciting a range of experiential 





2.1. Expert knowledge and the psy professions 
 
In this thesis ‘expert knowledge’ is used to describe specialist technical knowledge. An 
individual can gain specialist technical knowledge based on research, learning, skill or 
practice. Whilst there may be various sub-categories of expertise such as contributory 
or interactional (Collins and Evans, 2002; Collins and Evans, 2008), I focus on 
technical knowledge claims. One of the ways law identifies expert knowledge is where 
the expert has historical legitimacy and support from respected bodies. For example, 
medical knowledge is seen as a form of expertise and the General Medical Council and 
the British Medical Association both list in the region of 50-60 specialisms (British 
Medical Association, 2017a; General Medical Council, 2017). If a party in legal 
proceedings sought to rely on a new or less well-established domain of expertise then 
they would have to convince the court this was necessary. For example, this occurred 
with forensic psychiatry experts in criminal trials (Loughnan and Ward, 2014). Smart 
argues that law gives power to psy experts and, for example, in cases where law steps 
back it allows the psy professions to intervene instead. This occurred in criminal trials 
where women who had been subjected to domestic abuse had then killed their abusive 
partner. In those cases where law chose not to imprison the “battered woman” (Walker, 
2009) it instead constructed their situation in psy terms requiring them to undergo 
psychiatric treatment (Smart, 1989, p. 47; Armstrong, 1999). This highlights law’s 
determinative role in deciding who is recognised as an expert. 
Expert knowledge claims are claims to objectivity; they are claims to likelihoods 
of truth informed by specialist, technical knowledge that represents society’s best 
understanding of phenomena. Technical expertise is, in many cases, a reliable form of 
objective knowledge.169 For example, an experienced surgeon likely has an objectively 
reliable claim to possessing technical surgical expertise. This is because she has 
                                                      
169 In so far as it is possible to be so, see my discussion in Chapter Three. 
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learned and practised the skills required to perform a specific, technical task. However, 
knowledge treated by law as technical expertise is, in many cases, founded upon 
highly subjective knowledge about the world. For example, McKenna and Graham 
argue that “[t]echnocratic discourse appears to be objective and rational because of its 
pseudoscientific appearance. But it is precisely the opposite in most cases” (McKenna 
and Graham, 2000, p. 224). By this they mean that in using language that appears 
objective, the communicator is obscuring the many value judgements contained within. 
Psy professionals are often appointed in capacity cases to provide technical 
expertise, framed by the COPr as “objective evidence”.170 Whilst expert evidence is 
restricted to “that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings”,171 an expert 
is appointed in proceedings to provide an “objective, unbiased opinion on matters 
within his expertise, and should not assume the role of an advocate.”  172 However, I 
argue throughout that the phrase “objective, unbiased opinion” is misplaced in the 
context of psy knowledge about mental capacity. This is because mental capacity is 
not a concept best understood through the application of technical expertise. As I 
explain in section 2.3 below, the uncertainty within and beyond psy knowledge about 
mental disorder impacts on the validity of the technical claim to objectivity that psy 
professionals make about mental capacity. 
Considering the test for mental capacity in more detail, evidence under the 
diagnostic threshold of s 2 MCA could fall within the definition of expert psy knowledge 
if it is accepted that technical expertise is required to establish an impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain. Diagnosis and treatment are at the 
core of medical expertise. Psychiatry is the branch of medicine that deals with 
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorder. Therefore if a diagnosis of mental disorder 
                                                      
170 COPr PD 15A. 
171 COPr 121. 
172 COPr PD 15A. 
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is deemed required under s 2 MCA173 then psychiatry, being the specialist branch of 
medicine concerned with mental disorder, is likely to be the authority sought (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2017). 174  The leading authority on medical expertise, the 
Bolam test, was also centred on the expertise of diagnosis and treatment. In that case 
it was held that a person “is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with 
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art.”175 Whilst this test has been modified in recent years,176 it still represents 
the cornerstone of how medical (and other) expertise is received by law. For example, 
Foster and Miola argue: 
 
There are many examples of the law abdicating responsibility for ethical 
issues to professional medical ethics, particularly in the context of 
Bolamisation, and it must be acknowledged that in some cases this is 
now being reversed.
 
Nevertheless several examples remain, and we 
would not wish to overstate the extent or significance of de-
Bolamisation—Bolam is still there and the law still contains a (medically) 
paternalistic streak. (Foster and Miola, 2015, p. 510). 
 
This analysis is important because it highlights law’s continued deference to medicine 
in the realm of their expertise and indicates why psy professionals are appointed in 
mental capacity cases. Yet Ruck Keene et al. explain: 
 
                                                      
173 I accept that there is some dispute over the labelling and even existence of mental disorder, 
which is not explored in this thesis, for further discussion see Foucault (1965) and Fennell 
(1996). 
174 In the UK to become a fully qualified psychiatrist can take up to 13 years, a period which 
includes completing a medical degree, foundation training and then specialist training in the 
different branches of psychiatry. 
175 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 587. 
176 For example by Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] A.C. 232. 
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It is not necessary for the impairment or disturbance to fit into one of the 
diagnoses in the ICD-10 or DSM-V… therefore, the term “diagnostic” 
test is misleading – the important thing is that there is a proper basis 
upon which to consider that there is an impairment or disturbance. 
(Ruck Keene et al., 2016, p. 10). 
 
Therefore the framing of ‘diagnosis’ as a requirement under s 2 MCA is misleading as 
a diagnosis of disorder is not strictly required. There are also concerns that having a 
diagnostic threshold at all is discriminatory and that the MCA framework is 
incompatible with Articles 5 and 12 UNCRPD in this regard (Bartlett, 2012; Harding, 
2015; Disability Rights UK, 2017; UK Independent Mechanism, 2017). However, it is 
this ‘diagnostic’ framing that encourages the use of psy expert evidence about 
capacity. This is because, in practice, assessment under a diagnostic test is routinely 
viewed as a clinical question. Evidence is most likely to be provided by a psy 
professional (Ruck Keene et al., 2016, p. 10) as a result of their perceived technical 
expertise in diagnosing mental disorder. Whilst s 2 MCA remains in force, it is therefore 
likely to continue to encourage the adducing of psy evidence about mental capacity 
even though their technical expertise in determining mental (in)capacity can be 
challenged, as I explain further in section 2.3 below.  
 
2.2. Experiential knowledge and social work 
 
Experiential knowledge by contrast emanates from a person’s own perception of 
things. It is more obviously subjective than knowledge of technical matters. Having 
experience of something does not automatically equate to having knowledge, but 
experience can strengthen a knowledge claim as it usually provides an increased 
understanding of phenomena. Whilst evidence given in legal proceedings based on 
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personal experience is often viewed as a less persuasive knowledge claim, experience 
can enable a person to provide more realistic examples to strengthen their claim. A 
knowledge claim based on personal experience need not possess evidential certainty 
to be reliable, but should have “sufficient rigour for proceeding” (Lee, 2017, p. 12). For 
example, it should not be an untruth as proven by a more objective source such as an 
image recording. 
I further categorise experiential knowledge as personal or professional. One of 
the missing aspects of personal experiential knowledge that differentiates it from both 
expert and professional experiential knowledge is the absence of formal learning or 
certification (Collins and Evans, 2002). Professional experiential knowledge is similarly 
gained from the individual’s personal interaction with the world, but it relates to matters 
in their professional lives for which they may also have professional certification. Lee 
suggests that evidence from professional experience is a category of knowledge itself, 
distinct from technical knowledge, arguing that it relies heavily on personal perception 
and professional judgement (Lee, 2017). To some extent this has similarities with 
personal experiential knowledge as it is based on subjectivity, but is couched in 
professionalised language. Part of professional experiential knowledge is therefore 
having the experience to make judgement calls, drawing on experience. 
Professional experiential knowledge can only be gained from putting 
professional skills into practice and is therefore not a persuasive knowledge claim “until 
it has been used for a professional purpose” (Eraut, 1994, p. 120). For example, a 
trainee doctor may have a persuasive claim to expert technical knowledge, but she 
may lack professional experience given that she has not put her knowledge into 
practice. In contrast an experienced practising doctor is both a technical expert and 
possesses professional experiential knowledge. Social workers fit more clearly within 
this typology of professional experiential knowledge. To qualify as a social worker 
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requires completing an undergraduate degree course in social work integrated within a 
practice setting. Undertaking a social work qualification includes learning about: 
 
…the variety of legislation which is applicable to social work, social work 
theory, research, ethics and values. There is a big emphasis on practical 
learning… Social workers need skills in problem-solving, 
communication, working with others and patience. (British Association of 
Social Work, 2017). 
 
Many of these skills are not technical but are based on a situational and material-
discursive understanding of human life. That is not to deny that social work is informed 
by evidence based practice; social workers do draw on evidence about what 
interventions or strategies work in what contexts, notwithstanding how some have 
questioned the usefulness of evidence based practice for social work (Petersen and 
Olsson, 2015). However, social work often involves dealing with multiple, layered and 
long-standing different social (and other) issues in a person’s life, rather than one 
single issue (Trevithick, 2008, p. 1215). This is important because, in contrast, a doctor 
typically specialises in an area and is therefore dealing with a single problem to a much 
greater extent than social workers.177 A social worker may be able to point to different 
evidence bases for different ‘problems’ in a person’s life, but solutions to those 
problems might conflict in ways that are less obvious for the psy professions, which in 
turn impacts on the knowledge claim that can be put forward. Furthermore, social 
workers draw on their personal judgement about what works in a given case, rather 
than advancing a technical solution. 
                                                      
177 Whilst this is not the case for all doctors such as General Practitioners (GPs) who cover a 
broader range of health problems, although even GPs can become accredited with a specialist 
interest (Royal College of General Practitioners, 2018). 
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Whereas the psy disciplines have developed an exclusive claim to possessing 
expert technical knowledge about the diagnosis of mental disorder, social work has 
“difficulty articulating and demarcating an exclusive knowledge base” (Trevithick, 2008, 
p. 1213). Social workers struggle to make knowledge claims about mental capacity 
based on objective, technical reasoning, making it more difficult for them to frame their 
knowledge as a claim of expertise. Instead, the knowledge claim of social workers is 
experiential; it is based on their experience of working with service users through their 
perception and understanding of the relational and situational factors at play in their 
service users’ lives. 
 
2.3. Expert versus experiential evidence and the test for mental capacity  
 
I argue that greater value should be placed on experiential, rather than expert, 
evidence about mental capacity. This includes the professional experiential knowledge 
of social workers and the personal experiential knowledge of P, as argued in Chapter 
Five. This is because “overdependence on medical expertise contributes to the 
minimisation of the voice of individuals whose capacity is being assessed” (Kong, 
2017, p. 21). Furthermore, whilst the discourse of subjectivity around social work has 
the effect of delegitimising their experiential knowledge, expert psy knowledge about 
mental capacity can equally be subjected to a critique of subjectivity. For example, 
there are reasonable disagreements about diagnosis of mental disorder, within and 
beyond the medical field. Despite this being the primary technical basis upon which psy 
evidence on mental capacity is sought. In fact, “[c]ompeting schools within the psy-
complex hold divergent beliefs regarding the existence of specific conditions” (Romelli, 
Frigerio and Colombo, 2016, p. 1). There are also debates over the extent to which 
psychiatric expertise has a legitimate claim to a biomedical foundation. For example, 
Romelli et al. undertook an analysis of the discursive strategies used in the Diagnostic 
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), one of the leading manuals used by 
the psy professions, published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
(Romelli, Frigerio and Colombo, 2016). They argue that the use of empiricist and 
biomedical language in relation to the classification of mental disorder, which is often 
referred to as “the empiricist repertoire” (Burchell, 2007; Romelli, Frigerio and 
Colombo, 2016), has contributed to the legitimation of psychiatric discourse. In 
claiming that the diagnosis of mental disorder is empirically based, the psy professions 
imply “the existence of a knowledge base about mental disorders that is valid, 
regardless of beliefs in etiology or treatment” (Cermele, Daniels and Anderson, 2001, 
p. 229). However, this medicalised, seemingly objective, language obscures the hidden 
value judgements and the often-present disagreements and uncertainties that lay 
behind the classification and diagnosis of mental disorder. Such classification is 
reinforced over time to give those psy disciplines a legitimate claim to expertise.  
The Chair of the British Psychological Society also highlights difficulties with the 
DSM approach including the challenges in agreeing definitions of mental disorder, the 
limits of neuroscience and the problems in elucidating an epistemology of mental 
disorder (Frances, 2010; Frances and Widiger, 2012). Frances and Widiger further 
explain: 
 
the scientific data underlying descriptive psychiatry never provide a clear 
and unique right answer about where to set diagnostic boundaries…by 
far the most important deciding factor should always be whether this 
change… is more likely to help or hurt patients. (Frances and Widiger, 
2012, p. 114). 
 
Therefore, the seemingly objective and technical nature of the knowledge claims made 
about mental capacity by psy experts can be challenged on the basis that diagnosis of 
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mental disorder is not without reasonable disagreement within and beyond the field. 
Therefore if psy expertise about mental capacity is not as technically objective as it 
appears, then much of its value, as with any other profession, comes from the 
experience of having a professional relationship with P.  
A further reason why psy expertise should be given less weight in mental 
capacity law is that the test for mental capacity is a legal one developed through the 
MCA 2005, informed by case law,178 and which aims to determine whether P is able to 
make decisions for herself. Mental capacity is therefore a legal concept, which does 
not require specific technical expertise to understand. As explained in section 2.1 and 
discussed further above, it is arguable whether psy experts have a valid knowledge 
claim about diagnosis of mental disorder and, even if they do, a medical diagnosis is 
not required under s 2 MCA. Furthermore, if the intention in creating the MCA was to 
import a technical psychiatric approach to understanding capacity then one would 
expect the legislative and psychiatric language to align, but it does not. Case, in 
analysing the role of psychiatrists in evaluating the functional test, argues that it is 
“fairly common for expert witnesses to make reference to P’s ‘lack of insight’” (Case, 
2016, p. 364). Whilst ‘insight’ is not the focus of this chapter,179 Case shows that much 
of psy expertise extends beyond the requirements of the MCA, highlighting that the 
legal test for mental capacity is not predicated on psy technical expertise. 
 If specific technical expertise is not legally required, it must be considered 
whether there is any normative value in appointing a technical expert. In relation to the 
functional test under s 3 MCA, I argue that the value of a technical expert is limited. 
Firstly, being able to identify whether P understands the relevant information (criteria 
                                                      
178  See Re C (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 F.L.R. 31 and Re MB (Caesarean 
Section) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426. 
179 Although it was used in at least two of the cases that were included as part of the COP 
sample, for example in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC the word ‘insight’ was 
mentioned at least 15 times at the final hearing. The term was also used in the case file in H 
County Council v XC. 
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a)180 or is able to communicate her decision (criteria d) requires little or no technical 
expertise. It should be open to any person who has an interpersonal relationship with P 
to determine whether or not she can understand information. Furthermore, given that it 
is typical for the expert in COP cases to have only one meeting with P, it is difficult to 
see how such a meeting could accurately reflect P’s understanding of any topic, let 
alone more complex domains of capacity. Most people who become the subject of 
capacity proceedings will require information to be presented in an accessible format 
and their understanding is likely to be facilitated by communication with those with 
whom they have a developed relationship (Hollomotz, 2011; Harding, 2012). Despite 
the relational benefits of capacity being assessed by those with a pre-existing 
relationship with P, “some judges appear to prefer the evidence of independent experts 
who do not have an immediate relationship with the person whose capacity is at issue” 
(Donnelly, 2010, p. 153). In contrast, adducing the knowledge of any professional who 
has experience of working with P is more likely to facilitate her understanding of the 
relevant information and encourage her to communicate her decision.  
I now turn to the criterion of being able to retain information (criteria b). Whilst in 
principle this is something that a psy expert could comment on, it is not something that 
necessarily requires their technical expertise. Retention of information is a simple test; 
it requires a person to have the ability to recall information, implying a timeframe into 
the criteria. In fact, s 3 (3) MCA states: 
 
the fact that a person is able to retain the information relevant to a 
decision for a short period only does not prevent him from being 
regarded as able to make the decision. 
 
                                                      
180 Which also includes understanding the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision, 
s 3 (4) MCA. 
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Provided that P could recall and recite the information at a later date, or at the end of 
the conversation, it is unclear why a psy expert is best placed to comment. Again, if 
psy expertise is sought on one occasion, then the expertise in identifying retention of 
information is limited because the expert is relying on a small snapshot of P’s abilities. 
For example, P may feel uncomfortable speaking to a person she does not know or 
have a rapport with. In contrast, a person with professional experiential knowledge is 
more likely to gain accurate information because they should have a developed 
relationship with P. This undermines the psy expert’s technical knowledge claim to 
represent the objective truth about P’s capacity because their knowledge is incomplete 
compared to a person with experiential knowledge about P. 
In relation to the final criterion, ‘being able to use or weigh the information’ 
(criteria c), the subjectivity of psy knowledge is particularly clear. It is also a more 
confusing test, partly because the words ‘use’ and ‘weigh’ might pull in different 
directions. For example, using information to make a decision does not necessarily 
involve weighing it up because information could be accepted unthinkingly. 
Furthermore, the use or weigh requirement is more normative because it implies that 
there is a mechanism of being able to tell whether or not a person has used or weighed 
the information. Given that no person is yet able to enter a person’s brain, they will 
have to make their judgement based on what P tells them and/or does. The test allows 
for a value judgement about how a person ought to respond/behave when weighing up 
or using information (Banner, 2012, p. 1040). Therefore if the decision does not fall 
within a particular set of outcomes that implies a lack of using or weighing. Therefore 
“[a]n unreasonable conclusion is highly likely to be viewed as evidence of incapacity” 
(Donnelly, 2010, p. 116). This is despite the MCA being clear that unwise decisions 
should not be treated as incapacitous decisions. 181 In this sense, technical experts 
making an ‘objective’ judgement may be more likely to work backwards from the 
                                                      
181 s 1 (4) MCA. 
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decision to a finding of incapacity. Basing this judgement on technical knowledge 
contrasts with considering how the individual weighs and uses information by reference 
to experiential knowledge about past decisions, which is likely to reflect a more 
accurate understanding of P’s mental functioning.  
The final reason that expert psy evidence should not be valued over 
experiential evidence is that, in this context, it typically starts from an inherent 
vulnerability approach. Psy professionals are more likely to focus on the internal factors 
that impact on decision-making rather than considering the situational reasons 
underpinning a person’s impaired capacity. This is important for the reasons outlined 
throughout this thesis including that many capacity cases are brought because of 
abuse. The focus on inherent features can be seen in the training and professional 
requirements of the psy professions. For example, to practice psychiatry requires a 
medical degree and psychiatrists must be able to assess a person's state of mind, 
diagnose mental illness, use treatments and medication, and help a person recover 
(Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2013). To become a clinical psychologist requires a 
psychology degree, a period working in a healthcare setting and completion of a three-
year professional doctorate. Psychological expertise involves using psychological 
mechanisms to understand the mind using a “variety of methods available including 
psychometric tests, interviews and direct observation of behaviour. Assessment may 
lead to advice, counselling or therapy” (British Psychological Society, 2017). In 
mainstream psychiatry and psychology, emphasis is placed on understanding the 
internal workings of the mind or brain and carrying out interventions to address 
individual, inherent vulnerabilities. This is in contrast to taking the situated body as the 
starting point and considering the impact of wider factors in a person’s life. 
Social work by contrast is inherently relational and situational. It does not start 
from an assumption of inherent vulnerability but instead social workers are encouraged 
to seek out the diverse reasons for a person’s vulnerable position. By focusing on her 
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environment and taking a holistic approach, social workers are likely to have a more 
informed understanding of P than a technical expert who will typically only meet P on 
one occasion. In a context of abuse, this means that social workers might be more 
likely to pick up on the situational causes for impaired decision-making, rather than 
attributing impairment to the internal workings of the individual’s mind. As a result, 
social workers can advocate solutions to address P’s situational vulnerability, such as 
the provision of support or the targeting of measures against situational causes of risk.  
For all of the reasons outlined above, experiential knowledge is often more 
informed than expert knowledge in this context and allows for embodied, situational 
and relational factors to be considered, which leads to more nuanced responses to 
vulnerability. I therefore argue that law should value experiential forms of knowledge 
about mental capacity, which is a concept best understood through relational and 
situated knowledge about P. 
 
3. Hierarchies of Expert and Experiential Evidence 
 
In the sections below I show that there is a hierarchy of evidence in mental capacity 
law. I focus on the status of psy evidence (characterised as expert knowledge) 
contrasted with social work evidence (characterised as professional experiential 
knowledge), having considered the role of P’s evidence (personal experiential 
knowledge) in the previous chapter. Despite my arguments above, my data suggested 
that the technical and ‘objective’ psy evidence was placed above evidence from others 
such as social workers whose evidence was viewed as more ‘subjective’. This is 
noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, preferring psy knowledge over social work 
knowledge reinforces an inherent vulnerability approach in the evidence base for 
capacity decisions. This is problematic for the reasons identified throughout this thesis 
including that it discounts the multi-faceted situational causes for a person’s 
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vulnerability which, in turn, can lead to situational solutions such as the provision of 
support being ignored. Secondly, the way that the COP treats evidence on capacity is 
likely to have a ‘trickle-down’ effect on capacity assessments carried out outside of 
legal proceedings. By this I mean that if experiential evidence is devalued by the COP, 
then it is also likely to be devalued in non-legal settings. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge the prospect of law-making not being confined to the COP but also to 
those (usually psychiatric) experts who have the authority to shape capacity 
judgements outside of formal legal processes through “hidden law-making” 
(Montgomery, Jones and Biggs, 2014). 
 
3.1. Psy evidence 
 
Of the 20 case files reviewed, as outlined in Table A3 Appendix one, six contained 
expert reports from psychiatrists and three from clinical psychologists. There were two 
cases in which independent social work reports were obtained, with a further six cases 
where social work evidence was also included, usually being a report on capacity used 
as evidence in the local authority’s COP3 application form. A further two cases 
contained reports from other disciplines (sexual health counsellor and learning 
disabilities nurse), although one case (H County Council v XC) also included an 
independent report from a clinical psychologist which was the main report used to 
determine P’s capacity. These data also suggest that clinical psychology reports are 
used in some cases instead of psychiatric reports, highlighting that further analysis is 
needed as to the differences between the two disciplines and what this might mean for 
findings in capacity cases. 
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There is no longer182 any requirement for a capacity assessment to be carried 
out by a person with specific medical expertise, albeit as suggested above medical 
professionals are more likely to be used. Whilst Donnelly explains that “[c]ourts have 
long relied heavily on expert medical evidence regarding capacity” (Donnelly, 2009b, p. 
469), this reliance is not required by case law or statute. For example in A Local 
Authority v SY it was stated by Keehan J: 183 
 
I am told by counsel that it is more usual for the assessment of capacity 
to be undertaken by a medical practitioner or a psychiatrist. The 
assessment in this case demonstrates that an appropriately qualified 
social worker is eminently suited to undertake such capacity 
assessments.  
 
Furthermore, Sir Nicholas Wall P, giving judgment in G v E, confirmed that psychiatric 
evidence is not required in every capacity case:184 
 
Provided there is credible expert evidence upon which the court can be 
satisfied that the individual concerned lacks capacity that, in our 
judgment, is sufficient. It would simply be unreal to require psychiatric 
evidence in every case, quite apart from the fact that it would, in some 
cases, be irrelevant.  
 
Evidence from the COP cases reinforced the value attributed to expert (particularly 
psychiatric) evidence in legal proceedings. For example, in all of the 10 cases that 
                                                      
182 Under a previous Practice Direction (declaratory proceedings: incapacitated adults) [2002] 1 
All ER 794 annex A, it was stated that “[e]vidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist who has 
assessed the patient . . . is generally required”. 
183 [2013] EWHC 3485 para 22. 
184 [2010] EWCA Civ 822 para 61. 
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reached a final capacity determination, the outcome in seven of those cases was 
consistent with the capacity recommendations of the expert (see Table A3 Appendix 
one which also shows the outcome of the cases by the end date of the research). Of 
the remaining three it was unclear from the case file whether or not an additional 
medical expert was appointed, rather than the expert evidence being disregarded.185  
In a number of cases, even where P disagreed with the decision of the expert on 
capacity, her representative accepted the expert evidence and the case proceeded on 
the basis of agreement and deference to the expert opinion, for example T City Council 
v CY (expert discipline unknown), OD v R City Council (psychiatric report), P County 
Council v (1) SE (2) TM (psychiatric report) and P CCG v QB (psychiatric report).  
In some cases judicial discourse also reinforced the perception that law remains 
deferential to psychiatric experts. For example, in P County Council v (1) SE (2) TM the 
judge explained at the final hearing that the psychiatric report stated that it was likely 
that SE had dementia, that she was cognitively impaired and that she needed further 
investigation. The judge later stated that there was “no clear challenge to her [the 
psychiatrist’s] evidence by [TM] and [SE’s] litigation friend and the local authority 
accepts it.” The judge concluded that she would accept the psychiatrist’s conclusions, 
as they were thorough and conducted over a number of meetings. There was no 
analysis of the substance of the conclusions or their appropriate categorisation as 
matters of psychiatric expertise, and the evidence appeared to be accepted uncritically.  
In only one case reviewed did the psychiatric evidence hold, contrary to the 
social work evidence, that P did have capacity and proceedings were withdrawn.186 In 
that case the social worker’s statement concluded that SL lacked the capacity to marry 
and to consent to sexual relations on the basis of her learning disability and concerns 
that she was being placed under undue influence by her boyfriend and/or father. 
                                                      
185 Z County Council v FY, V Borough Council v AY, O City Council v (1) AW (2) FW (3) YW (4) 
TW. 
186 K County Council v SL. 
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However, the social worker’s statement in that case was made before a period of 
educative work had been carried out. The psychiatrist’s initial view was that SL lacked 
the capacity to consent to sexual relations, and therefore marriage, but that because 
he was “less certain in this case” than in most cases, he explained “I would have to 
revise this opinion if a person [probably a woman speaking to her alone] was able to 
get her to describe the sexual act in simple terms and of the risks of infection”. The 
psychiatrist’s subsequent report found that SL had gained capacity and therefore 
proceedings were withdrawn.  
In only one other case was there was a partial reversal of the social worker’s 
initial findings that P lacked capacity. In K County Council v MW, the psychiatrist 
concluded, and it was accepted by the judge, that P had capacity in respect of sex but 
not marriage. As noted in Chapter Four, these two cases both originated from the 
same local authority, which was highly supportive of facilitating P’s understanding, and 
this may explain the shift in outcome. These data suggest that evidence from psy 
professionals was therefore repeatedly adduced, even though in only one case did it 
completely overturn the original social work finding on capacity (and only following a 
period of educative work). This could be interpreted simply as a corroboration of the 
social workers’ original capacity assessments in the majority of cases. However, I 
argue it suggests something stronger: that evidence from psy professionals was 
perceived to have greater authority than the evidence of others, particularly social 
workers. This occurred even where it was expressly acknowledged that the psy expert 
misinterpreted the test. For example, in his judgment in LC’s case the judge stated: 
 
I wholly accept that the professionals misunderstood the legal test in 
their initial reports. However, in my judgment the medical experts 
approached the issues in a fair and objective way and were not 
“overprotective” in their views. The reasoning of both Dr [Y] and Dr [S] 
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(who dealt with fewer issues) was convincing and based on the 
evidence available to them, and upon thorough testing I found their 
assessments to be balanced and convincing.   
 
Therefore despite the fact that the psy expert ‘misunderstood’ the legal test, authority 
was still accorded to the psy evidence. The status of psy evidence was similarly 
affirmed in H County Council v XC. In that case the judge, and XC’s family, were 
clearly unhappy with the amount of time that it was taking to conclude the matter. I 
observed the first hearing in February 2016 and at the second hearing in September 
2016, which I also observed, no expert had yet been instructed. My observational 
notes show that the judge said to the local authority representative: 
 
J – I have to do care cases in 26 weeks and 12 weeks reports done as 
absolute maximum. Going to have a further hearing in 1 week. You will 
find someone who can do the work in a shorter period of time, it’s just 
ludicrous. 
 
LA– Some difficulties. Requirement for female expert to undertake the 
report. Have copy of Dr J CV here. [handed up to judge] 
 
J – Nothing particularly special. Spent 12 years in special educational 
needs disability tribunal, huge no [number] of professionals to do this 
kind of work. COP spending far too long to do cases for far too long. 
Need to get these cases resolved quickly. All we need is somebody with 
expertise in LD [learning disabilities] with adults, huge no [number] of 




The judge went on to qualify this by saying “I promise you there are a huge number of 
experienced clinical psychologists available” and ultimately a clinical psychologist, 
rather than a psychiatrist, was instructed in that case. There was already social work 
evidence available upon which the interim decision on capacity was based, albeit it 
was not perceived to be independent by XC’s family. The fact the judge was so 
insistent on broadening the range of experts shows the engrained hierarchy in 
appointing experts in the COP, despite there being no statutory requirement for this. 
However, the fact that he suggested a clinical psychologist rather than another 
professional such as a social worker reinforces the status of the psy professions in 
respect of capacity judgements.  
 My observations confirm the perception that psychiatric experts outweigh any 
other in the COP (Suto, Clare and Holland, 2002; Case, 2016, p. 261; Series et al., 
2017b, p. 65) even though this is not required by law. Other professionals, including 
clinical psychologists, social workers and learning disability nurses, also provided 
evidence on capacity (see Table A3, Appendix one). However, psychiatrists and 
clinical psychologists were predominantly appointed as the independent expert witness 
and preference for their evidence was reinforced through the way the COP received 
their evidence.   
 
3.2. Social work evidence  
 
In contrast to the above, it was clear from my interviews and COP data that social work 
evidence had a lower status. For example, David told me about a case where he said 
he was really proud of his preparation but explained that when it came down to doing 




I’d gone out with a consultant psychiatrist and looked at what I’d got and he 
said no don’t worry about that I’m gonna do it, so that was a bit irritating… it 
was the department’s responsibility to follow the law in relation to this 
vulnerable chap but obviously it was then deemed that the health professional 
would be more senior and more expert than I would in assessing capacity… so 
he did the assessment, which I was quite frustrated about. 
 
The lower status attributed to social work evidence by the COP was firstly made clear 
in that social work evidence was predominantly used on the COP3 application to 
support the local authority’s position on capacity rather than social workers being 
appointed as independent experts in their own right. In the majority of the cases where 
the social worker provided evidence on the COP application, further evidence was then 
sought, usually from a psychiatrist (see Table A3, Appendix one). The fact that the 
social work evidence was more often than not treated as insufficient as a basis for a 
capacity determination supports my argument that professional experiential social work 
knowledge (framed as subjective) was attributed lower evidential value than expert psy 
knowledge (framed as objective). This was the case even when reaching the same 
conclusion. However, this observation is complicated by the issue of independence 
(discussed in more detail at section 4.2 below), as it could be argued that a social 
worker completing a COP3 form to bring the case to court has already made up their 
mind about capacity. It is therefore likely to be in P’s interests to have an independent 
expert review the evidence on capacity in the hope that they will come to a different 
decision from the social worker. Whilst this is persuasive in theory, I question whether 
this is, in fact, the reason why social work evidence was devalued and, in any event, 
adducing independent psychiatric evidence did not usually assist P’s claim to make her 
own decisions.  
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A review of recent case law suggests this phenomenon of appointing an 
independent psy expert occurs less frequently where the expert providing evidence as 
part of the application to the COP is a psychiatrist. For example, Re QQ187 concerned 
an application brought by a psychiatric hospital in relation to a 26 year old patient’s 
capacity to make an advance decision and to decide on medical treatment. In that case 
Mr Justice Keehan explained:188 
 
Dr G, QQ's responsible and treating clinician for the last 12 months, has 
prepared three reports, which I have read, and she has given brief oral 
evidence before me today… Without hesitation I accept entirely the 
evidence of Dr G, that throughout the time that she has been involved 
with QQ she has lacked capacity to make decisions on the issue of her 
treatment in relation to receiving anticoagulation medication. 
 
There is no evidence from the judgment that an independent capacity assessment was 
obtained or relied upon. Yet I suggest that had the person responsible for QQ’s care 
been someone other than a psy professional, an independent expert would very likely 
have been appointed to provide evidence on capacity. Whilst in some cases 
independent experts will still be appointed even where psychiatric evidence is relied 
upon in the COP application, QQ was not the only case where the treating clinician’s 
evidence was deferred to. 189  The fact that this case concerned medical treatment 
should not change the position. If the primary reason why an independent psy expert is 
appointed in welfare cases is the need for independence then the same approach 
                                                      
187 [2016] EWCOP 22. 
188 para 3. 
189 See also AN NHS Trust v A [2015] EWCOP 71 and Cambridge University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v BF [2016] EWCOP 26. Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust v AB [2014] 
EWCOP 50 and Cheshire & Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z [2016] EWCOP 56 
are both similar cases where the treating clinicians’ evidence was given weight, albeit in both 
cases an opinion from another expert was also obtained.  
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should be taken in medical treatment cases too. Yet it is less likely precisely because 
treating clinicians can more easily characterise their evidence as objective, technical 
expertise than other professionals such as social workers. 
This hierarchy of evidence was also clear from the language used from the 
COP and interview data. When analysing these data using CDA, the framing of social 
work as subjective appeared to influence this hierarchy. For example, in the judgment 
in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC the judge explained: 
 
I do accept that there is almost inevitably some element of subjectivity in 
the approach taken by social workers who are trying to protect the 
welfare of a vulnerable adult, and that is so in the present case – where 
the concern of the local authority was concentrated upon the marriage 
and the relationship between [LC] and [GK] (the specifics of which are 
not relevant to the general questions this court must answer). 
Nevertheless, on factual issues and when assessing [LC]’s ability to 
understand and process information and deal with issues, I considered 
[social worker’s] evidence to be fair and balanced. 
 
In addition to judicial discourse, the social workers I spoke to viewed their own role as 
based on their subjective judgement. All of my interviewees explicitly talked about their 
own judgement in specific cases. However, they were not able to point to a specific 
technical basis for their decisions, instead consistently referring to their experience. In 
doing this, and in referring to matters such as perception and judgement rather than 
diagnosis and treatment, the social workers presented their own knowledge using 
subjective discourse. For example, James talked about how he would decide whether 




… partly discussing with other professionals, with the individual if they can, 
that sort of thing. I know that’s not a, I mean I don’t know if there is now but 
there certainly wasn’t when I was there a particular framework to decide what 
the outcome was, it was much more subjective. 
 
David also felt that he did not always have the time to make judgements or make them 
with the same confidence that he thought a judge would be able to: 
 
I think again because the, the actual the applied sense of the law feels 
different to how a judge might unpick it… in that, for example, a judge could 
sort of have confidence in establishing, you know, what is an appropriate 
timeframe or… a judge could sort of feel or give the impression of feeling 
confident about something. 
 
It became clear from analysing the discourse of mental capacity law that social workers 
viewed themselves, and were viewed by law, as having a large degree of subjectivity in 
their decisions about mental capacity. This construction of subjectivity meant that 
social workers’ knowledge was valued less than that of psy professionals. This may 
have been additionally caused by their lack of knowledge about law, the courtroom and 
evidence giving. For example, Robert said “it’s scary and inaccessible the law, you know”. 
James told me “it was deemed to be time consuming, lengthy”. David explained about his 
experience with the court process saying “I had to write the court report and that was a 
really chastening experience for me”. Julia said “I get a little bit confused when it comes to 
the Court of Protection part of things so the higher level stuff and what you would take there 
and what you wouldn’t.” Sarah told me about a case (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four, p. 119) that she was in the initial stages of bringing to the COP, she said 
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“I’m worried that, I don’t want to feel underprepared or that they’re gonna ask us a question 
that we just don’t know, or that we’re gonna look yeh, silly in some way.” I did not interview 
psychiatrists so it is difficult to know their experience of the COP. However, most of the 
social workers I spoke to felt intimidated by and unsure of the process of applying to 
the COP. Perhaps it is unsurprising that if social workers found the process of giving 
evidence in COP proceedings challenging, this further weakened their evidential claims 
compared to the psy professions. 
Similarly, in P County Council v (1) SE (2) TM the judge noted that the findings 
of the IMCA (Independent Mental Capacity Advocate) were that SE showed full 
understanding of all matters discussed and appeared to show capacity and clear 
expression of wishes and feelings. However, my observational notes record that the 
judge went on to state: 
 
I am not satisfied the assessor took into account her ability to weigh up 
info as part of process. Part of that is her limitations on mobility and 
ability to look after herself. BIA [Best Interests Assessor] reports that 
ward sister and colleagues considered, each time felt she had capacity 
to understand her situation and agree to her stay on the ward. Not clear 
how thorough. What is clear are that P’s wishes and feelings are 
important in making a BI [best interests] decision. 
 
She then contrasted this evidence with that of the psychiatrist, my notes record: 
 
Think likely that she has dementia. She is cognitively impaired, needs 
further investigation as part of clinical care. Goes on to deal with 
discussions of P, gives her opinion that P lacks capacity to litigate, 
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decide on care and residence and to manage property and affairs. She 
does not lack capacity in relation to contact or sexual relations. In so far 
as latter, insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity. No 
clear challenge to her evidence by [other parties], accepts it. I accept 
her conclusions, thorough conducted over no [number] of meetings. 
 
In addition to the discursive positioning of psy as objective expert knowledge and social 
work as subjective experiential knowledge, a further reason why social work evidence 
had less authority was the role of the judge. Quite apart from their technical legal 
expertise, judges also display a high degree of professional experiential knowledge. 
The majority of judges have extensive professional experience as barristers,190 which 
informs their perception of cases. Similarly, in a number of reported cases, discussed 
at section 5.2 of Chapter Five, judges have highlighted how meeting with P or 
attending her care home has changed their perception of the case, for example see my 
discussion of CC v KK and STCC.191 In Wye Valley NHS Trust v B192 Jackson J held 
that whilst B lacked the capacity to make decisions about his leg amputation, it was not 
in his best interests to have his leg amputated against his wishes, going against the 
medical expert evidence in the case. This is a case where Jackson J personally visited 
B, stating “there is no substitute for a face-to-face meeting where the patient would like 
it to happen”.193 As a result, Jackson J appeared to get a sense of his personality, 
reinforcing in the judgment his perceptions about B’s independence,194 clearly informed 
by his own meeting with B.  
                                                      
190 For example, statistics from 2017 confirm that 66% of court judges in England and Wales 
were former barristers (Judicial Office, 2017). 
191 [2012] EWHC 2136 at p. 159. 
192 [2015] EWCOP 60.  
193 para 18. 
194 paras 21, 43, 45. 
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Therefore if judges view themselves as possessing similar subjective 
knowledge to social workers based on their material, relational experiences with mental 
capacity law’s subjects, both from professional experience generally and from meeting 
P in individual cases, it is perhaps unsurprising if they place less weight on social work 
evidence. In contrast, the validity and hierarchy attributed to expert knowledge means 
that judges are still deferential to the technical expert claims of medicine (Woolf, 2001; 
Donnelly, 2009b, p. 487). Furthermore, “medical law has traditionally been overly 
deferential to the medical profession, and… this has led to a medicalisation of non- 
technical issues” (Foster and Miola, 2015, p. 512). This is despite the diminishing 
judicial deference to medicine in areas such as clinical negligence following Bolitho. 
However, this phenomenon of diminishing deference appears not to have taken hold to 
the same extent in other areas such as consent and best interests (Foster and Miola, 
2015, p. 518). This extends to decisions about mental capacity, particularly where 
expertise can be claimed in relation to the traditional domain of medical skill – 
diagnosis. 
 
3.3. The contrast between psy and social work evidence in the COP: Y County Council v 
(1) LC (2) GK (3) SC 
 
The hierarchy of evidence was clear from my observations of Y County Council v (1) 
LC (2) GK (3) SC, which is discussed in detail as it provides an example of the contrast 
between the different types of knowledge and evidence in the COP. In that case, a 
psychiatrist, Dr Y, a clinical psychologist, Dr S and a social worker, BC, each gave 
written and oral evidence. BC carried out the initial capacity assessment following a 
safeguarding alert, which led to the COP application five months later. As part of the 
COP proceedings, BC made three witness statements and was orally cross-examined. 
BC concluded that LC lacked the capacity to consent to sex and to marry. It was stated 
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that LC had met with BC on around 15 occasions, with Dr S for around four hours over 
three sessions and with Dr Y on one occasion for two and a half hours. Therefore the 
extent of contact with P had an inverse correlation with the authority attributed to the 
capacity opinion.  
The local authority, as part of their initial assessment, instructed Dr S to provide 
a further assessment of LC. Dr S worked for a local NHS Trust. On the first two 
occasions LC attended the meeting with Dr S with her mother and was assessed alone 
for around one to one and a half hours. On the final meeting Dr S met with LC for 
around one hour with the aim of feeding back on the assessment and on that final 
occasion a community learning disability nurse was present. In relation to the functional 
aspect of capacity, Dr S explained that she felt LC would not be able to understand the 
psychological effects of pregnancy and had difficulty reporting her own emotions. She 
explained that in LC’s case it would be difficult for her to consider how a situation might 
impact on her emotionally and imagine the future. Dr S further explained that the “lack 
of depth” to LC’s knowledge (of sex and pregnancy) was “of concern” and that “her 
responses didn’t match the rest of her presentation that made it have a textbook feel”. 
Dr S concluded that LC lacked the capacity to marry and in her initial report concluded 
that LC may have had the capacity to consent to sex. However, in light of seeing Dr Y’s 
report on capacity, Dr S concluded that LC lacked the capacity to consent to sex. Dr S 
said that LC “had demonstrated very limited insight into her learning disability” and 
therefore she deferred to Dr Y’s (later) assessment that LC lacked capacity in relation 
to sex and marriage. Dr Y was appointed as the independent expert following the 
commencement of COP proceedings. Dr Y provided three written reports to the court 
as well as oral evidence. Dr Y concluded at all stages that LC lacked the capacity to 
consent to sex and to marry. 
The psychiatrist’s opinion was given the most weight by the judge. In 





The opinion of independently instructed experts is likely to be of 
considerable importance, but the court must look at all of the evidence. 
It is the decision of the court (and not the expert) as to whether there is 
capacity in any particular area.  
 
However, he went on to state: 
 
That has particular relevance in the present case, where the experts 
initially applied tests of capacity which were incorrect; and in which I 
have been asked by the OS to concentrate upon their evidence in Court 
on [LC]’s understanding of particular issues. 
 
Therefore even though the judge acknowledged that the experts used the incorrect 
legal tests, he still applied weight to their oral evidence, particularly the psychiatric 
evidence. For example, the judge phrased his analysis in discursive terms that 
relegated the non-psychiatric evidence to secondary status by emphasising the 
psychiatric evidence and referring to the other evidence in brackets, writing “In oral 
evidence, the view of Dr [Y] (and of Dr [S] and Ms [BC])”. On this point the judge 
quoted only from Dr Y’s (psychiatric) report and not any of the others. My observational 
notes further reinforced this hierarchy: 
 
SW [social work] evidence was persuasive, felt like she had a much 
better grasp of LC’s character and was able to draw on her meetings in 
a way that seemed much more genuine than the experts. She appeared 
to have been criticised for not knowing the law and clearly valid to some 
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extent, but she sought it out and was more accurate than the other two 
[experts]. Yet SW evidence seemingly less important, submitted to judge 
that they are experts on issues of contact, care and residence by OS, 
but clearly judge did not find persuasive from his comments in his case 
management judgment. 
 
I found the social work evidence in this case to be more persuasive and on reflection 
this was because it was based on detailed experiential knowledge; the social worker 
drew on her numerous meetings with LC and conveyed her personality and character 
with depth, whilst also highlighting the impact of her abusive relationship with GK. Yet 
the judge placed greater weight on the psychiatric evidence even though, as I explain 
next, the psychiatrist’s technical expertise was difficult to identify, particularly in relation 
to the functional approach to assessing capacity. 
The use of technical, seemingly objective language by Dr Y and Dr S was 
evident in relation to the diagnostic threshold. Dr S explained that she carried out what 
is commonly known as an IQ test based on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS) test, and that on this assessment LC had an IQ of 57, which represents the 
lowest 2 percentile of the population. Similarly, Dr Y explained that LC had a mild 
learning disability and explained what this meant given the differences between 
psychology and psychiatry. She said that psychiatrists have to consider “what level of 
functioning within the learning disability range” which doesn’t take away from the fact 
that LC was in the “extremely low range” but that in terms of learning disability it is 
“helpful to know whether mildly, moderately or severe”. To which my notes summarise 
that Counsel for the Official Solicitor asked  “is it fair to say someone with mild learning 
disability as you’ve used might be able to travel and have a job whereas with severe 
would need constant one to one input from another adult?” and Dr Y responded 
“absolutely”. This diagnostic evidence was an important part of the case for capacity 
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because of the need to satisfy the court that LC had an impairment of or disturbance in 
the functioning of the mind or brain, an example of the inherent vulnerability focus. This 
was presented, particularly by Dr Y, in objective discourse; she was able to go through 
the tests carried out in detail, seemingly to convince the court that the approach was 
rigorous and scientific and part of her medical expertise.  
Yet on a deeper critical discourse analysis, the technical basis for Dr Y’s 
evidence was much less clear. For example, at the start of her evidence she explained 
“when I was thinking through [LC’s] level of understanding, I would estimate her to be 
functioning around [age] 7 or 8”. As outlined at p. 147 of Chapter Five, the use of 
infantilising language about LC was present throughout, challenging the presentation of 
evidence on the diagnostic threshold as legitimately technical. Furthermore, a 
situational understanding of LC’s (in)capacity would have focused instead on the  
influence of GK in negatively impacting LC’s decision-making. This is different from 
arguing that it was LC’s autism or learning disability that impaired her capacity under 
the diagnostic test. This is because any adult, with or without a diagnosis, can be 
influenced by an abusive partner which may impair or disturb the functioning of their 
mind or brain. 
Dr Y took a seemingly more situational approach when considering the 
functional test, which does have the potential to allow for a more nuanced, situational 
analysis because it requires the individual to understand information relevant to the 
decision and the reasonably foreseeable consequences. In turn this means that there 
should be some focus on external factors and not solely the internal workings of the 
individual’s brain. In this case, Dr Y was asked about LC’s ability to weigh up 
information about contact with GK under the functional test and she said “I think that’s 
quite difficult to assess as when he’s not in contact with her she’s able to talk things 
through with people who have her best interests at heart but as soon as he’s back in 
contact with her he’s a persuasive character”. This resonates with much of the 
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discourse throughout proceedings about LC’s acquiescence. Counsel for the Official 
Solicitor explained “The psychiatric and social work evidence does go to [LC]’s 
capacity to weigh matters because of suggestibility, comply and acquiesce, and 
inability to understand motives”. Counsel repeatedly tried to bring the evidence back to 
the legal test by using the language of weighing and retaining because the experts 
were not doing this. My observational notes record that Dr Y did not mention the words 
weigh or retain once in her oral evidence. Dr S only mentioned weigh three times and 
did not mention the word retain at all. Therefore the language of the functional 
approach was not used in the oral psy expert evidence at all, even if she did focus on 
the more situational elements of LC’s vulnerability under this aspect of the legal test.  
In relation to LC’s understanding of the relevant information, Dr Y explained that 
she “understands by having sex you can get pregnant, when asked about how many 
times she said she thought you’d have to be having sex every day to get pregnant”. 
She further explained that in LC’s mind, you have sex and then you have a baby. She 
said “I don’t think she has any idea what happens in between. She knows you have to 
have a midwife, but she doesn’t know what the m idwife is for, what tests you might 
have to have etc.” In relation to LC’s understanding of marriage Dr Y explained that LC 
did not understand the social aspects. She said “she has a slightly old fashioned 
concept” and this was because she believed that [GK] would go to work and buy the 
house and that she would stay at home and do the cooking. Dr Y went on to explain 
that LC thought that once married she wouldn’t be allowed to speak to other men. 
None of these factors were part of the relevant information LC needed to understand to 
fulfil the functional threshold, albeit it arguably does represent a more situational 
understanding of LC’s vulnerable position.  
Pre and post-MCA studies have also found a failure to use the functional 
approach to assess capacity (Suto, Clare and Holland, 2002, p. 48; Emmett et al., 
2013). Nine years after the coming into force of the MCA some psychiatrists appear not 
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to use the language of the functional approach, instead determining capacity in relation 
to social factors such as understanding of ‘normal’ social expectations and by making 
comparisons with children. Yet in allowing a psychiatrist to discuss social factors, those 
factors are effectively “redefined using clinical euphemisms… to remove or neutralise 
the moral character of the issues at stake” (Case, 2016, p. 375). Dr Y’s comments 
about the functional approach were in fact comments on normative moral matters that 
had little to do with Dr Y’s ‘objective’ psychiatric expertise. Despite that, the judge 
placed greater weight on the psychiatric evidence, using it to support his finding that 
LC lacked capacity in respect of sex and marriage. This approach of uncritically valuing 
expert psy evidence over experiential evidence undermines its value in other contexts 
and further fuels conflict between professionals and law’s subjects in mental capacity 
law. This is despite evidence on the functional threshold not needing to be given by a 
psy professional to be a reliable knowledge claim. 
 
4. Valuing Relational, Experiential Evidence 
 
Lee makes the important point that “expert or technical knowledge claims… are best 
defeated by challenges expressed as competing technical knowledge claims” (Lee, 
2017, p. 21). Therefore the ‘independent’ psy evidence will typically be preferred in 
cases where it is framed as expertise. I conclude this chapter by arguing for a relational 
approach to determining capacity, which values experiential, rather than expert, 
knowledge. A relational approach to assessing capacity involves removing the need for 
an expert capacity assessor who is an “objective outsider” (Donnelly, 2010, p. 113) and 
instead focuses on understanding P’s situated position. This should further enable 




4.1. Relational capacity assessments: valuing experiential knowledge  
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, my embodied, relational approach draws on the work of 
feminist scholars (Nedelsky, 1990; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Nedelsky, 2011). 
Relationality acknowledges that choices cannot be properly understood without seeing 
them in context – without taking account of the multi-dimensional social, economic, 
political and geographical features of the person’s life. This is in contrast to 
understanding the world as composed of atomistic, rational actors. Embodied 
relationality further grounds this recognition of context within an understanding that 
humans live and navigate the social world through their bodies (Fletcher, Fox and 
McCandless, 2008, pp. 157-158; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a). However, as 
Harding explains, there is a “lack of definitional interrogation of what relationality 
means in the everyday, situated, lives of individuals” (Harding, 2012, p. 431). 
 Therefore an embodied, relational approach to assessing capacity would 
foremost involve recognising that a capacity assessment is itself the product of a 
relational interaction. As Donnelly states, “Regardless of who carries out an 
assessment of capacity, at a fundamental level, the assessment must be recognised 
as a personal encounter between two people” (Donnelly, 2009b, p. 477). Therefore a 
relational approach accepts that where that encounter is based on a positive 
relationship, it is likely to be more facilitative of P’s autonomy. In this sense a relational 
approach to capacity assessment recognises the benefits of relationships to facilitating 
capacity and responding to situational vulnerability.  
However, relational theory also recognises the harm that relationships can 
create (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Exploitative relationships might be less common 
in the professional context,195 but a poor or non-existent relationship with the capacity 
                                                      
195  By this I mean that legal proceedings should identify allegations of abuse by the 
professionals working with P and therefore abuse by the psychiatrist or social worker is 
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assessor can undermine P’s understanding. For example, if an independent 
psychiatrist was appointed to assess P’s capacity and made that judgement based on 
a single meeting of no more than a couple of hours, as in most cases I observed, the 
lack of a developed relationship between the two could be a major factor underpinning 
a finding of incapacity. This is firstly because of the need to have information presented 
in an accessible format, ideally over more than one occasion (Donnelly, 2010, p. 112). 
Secondly, P may feel unable to express her ‘true’ feelings or may feel untrusting of a 
person in authority. That is why there has been such a focus in the literature on 
involving those around P in the decision-making process (Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, 
2016).  
As well as the material benefits of facilitating capacity and strengthening P’s 
autonomy, having a capacity assessment carried out by a person who has experiential 
knowledge about P is more likely to get to the material reality of P’s understanding. 
This is for all of the reasons identified above – that where P does not understand or 
attempts to resist the professional’s line of communication they are less likely to gain 
accurate information about P’s understanding. Experiential knowledge is strengthened 
by having direct experience of how P functions and by having a good relationship with 
P from which accurate information can be obtained. The need for a relational approach 
is also important because of the need to understand the material, embodied 
consequences of a decision of (in)capacity. Those who are familiar with the person, 
whether professionals or family members, are therefore likely to have a valuable 
contribution to make (Chan, 2004; Herring, 2013). They may better understand what 
assistance P needs to be able to understand and retain information, how she comes to 
her decisions, what factors she values and what support might be needed to facilitate 
her capacity.  
                                                                                                                                                            
probably less common, albeit there are cases of abuse by professionals and abuse by family 
members should similarly not be underestimated, for further discussion see Hollomotz (2011) 
and Plummer and Findley (2012). 
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The unfortunate reality of capacity assessments is that “the issue of P’s 
capacity will often comprise a value judgement, informed by the decision-maker’s 
perspective on where the line between autonomy and best interests decisions should 
be drawn” (Case, 2016, p. 376). This is because the subject matter of the case, and 
therefore the outcome (Donnelly, 2010, p. 114), is likely to influence the capacity 
judgement that is made by all involved. For example, in LC’s case I question whether 
the outcome would have been that she lacked capacity were it not for the allegations of 
abuse by GK. In fact, reported cases support this observation. For example, A NHS 
Trust v DE, FG, JK, C Local Authority, B Partnership Trust,196 concerned whether or 
not DE had the capacity to decide whether to have a vasectomy. In that case, the COP 
did not prevent two learning disabled individuals from consenting to sex in the 
situational context of their loving relationship. Instead it was respectful towards the 
relationship between two adults who, in different relational contexts, may well have 
been deemed to lack the capacity to consent to sexual activity.  
When cases involve allegations of abuse it is not surprising that such judgments 
fall on the side of incapacity because of the imperative to protect. However, this is 
partly the result of not having P’s embodied presence at court and also the limited use 
of situational interventions both under the MCA and other jurisdictions. Furthermore, by 
failing to prioritise the opinions of those who know her best, it is easier for the COP to 
ignore the implications of findings of incapacity. As I explore in the following chapter, in 
cases of abuse if the imperative is in favour of protecting the vulnerable adult then this 
also risks her being controlled through law. A central way of challenging this is by 
limiting the value attributed to the knowledge claims of those who do not have a 
relationship with P. Instead, by viewing capacity in relational, embodied terms, the 
evidence of those professionals (typically social workers) and P’s family and friends is 
likely to be given greater value. 
                                                      




4.2. The case for independence? 
 
One of the primary critiques of a relational approach to capacity assessments is that 
there is value in an independent assessment. Those closest to P may have strong 
views about what they think is best and may even be acting for personal gain. 
Therefore a professional or family member may seek to persuade P of a particular 
outcome, rather than truly facilitating P’s own decision-making. Therefore in some 
cases independence is necessary to avoid bias, both real and perceived. 
More often than not, independence was raised as an issue by the family or P 
rather than any other party.197 It is understandable that those subject to mental capacity 
law proceedings may not feel comfortable with the evidence of their social worker 
being used for a finding of incapacity. This is because in most cases social workers will 
have brought the matter to the COP and therefore may be perceived to have already 
‘made up their mind’. This perception of bias must be addressed. However, appointing 
a technical psy expert raises a number of other concerns as identified above and does 
not provide a solution to this challenge.  
Instead, it must firstly be reinforced that the judge is an independent arbiter and 
is best placed to determine the weight to be attributed to the social worker’s evidence. 
Secondly, whilst social workers need to be empowered to put forward their opinions, in 
some cases it may still be necessary to appoint an independent assessor. For 
example, where P raises concerns about their social worker or where the judge 
decides that the evidence is not reliable in some way. Therefore where there are 
concerns about the professionals involved in the case (or at the initiation of the judge) 
                                                      
197 For example, this occurred in H County Council v XC and was a clear undertone of the 
cases where P challenged their deprivation of liberty under s 21A MCA including YS v E District 
Council, OD v R City Council and T City Council v CY. 
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an independent social worker,198 should instead be appointed to step in and assess P’s 
capacity. Importantly, this should not be a one-off assessment but needs to involve a 
regular period of work with and review of P’s situation from a holistic, rather than a  
purely psy perspective. The purpose of this extended interaction would be to enable 
the independent party to understand P’s position more comprehensively than a one off 
assessment allows. Alternatively, the role of the IMCA could be expanded. At present, 
IMCAs can only be appointed where the person is found to lack capacity and in relation 
to specific decisions. 199  The role could be strengthened by involving IMCAs at an 
earlier stage. However, this may change the nature of the role of an advocate beyond 
what is desirable given the need for P to have a trusted person who can advocate on 
their behalf.  
Some may raise material, resource concerns about engaging additional 
professionals to work with P on a longer-term basis. However, firstly this would only 
happen in cases where there were concerns about a lack of independence. Secondly, 
the cost of instructing psychiatric experts is also high.200 Whilst s 49 MCA reports can 
be ordered, which require an NHS Trust to provide a report at no cost to the parties,201 
this does not always occur.202 Furthermore, given that s 49 also makes provision for a 
local authority employee to provide a report, there is no legal reason why a social 
worker from another local authority could not be instructed. This would involve no 
                                                      
198 Or another professional who is regularly involved in P’s life. I refer to social workers here as 
they were the professionals that most often brought the COP proceedings. However, a speech 
and language therapist might be appropriate, or if P’s main contact was with a learning disability 
nurse then they may be the best professional etc. 
199  Those are decisions for serious medical treatment by an NHS body, provision of 
accommodation by an NHS body, provision of accommodation by a local authority or where the 
person is subject to Schedule A1, see s 35-41 MCA and Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) Regulations 2006. 
200 There is no set fee that can be charged for reports of this nature. However, by way of 
comparison, fees charged to the Crown Prosecution Service for a Consultant’s day rate would 
be £298.25, plus other expenses such as travel or compensation for absence from practice 
(British Medical Association, 2017b). In reality, the fees associated with assessing P, preparing 
a reports and ultimately attending a trial are likely to be significantly higher.  
201 As affirmed in RS v (1) LCC (2) AB and (3) AL [2015] EWCOP 56. 
202 For further detail about the use of s 49 reports in the COP see Series et al. (2017b). 
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overall additional resource burden and may actually be cheaper given the respective 
costs of a psychiatrist and social worker’s salary.  However, rebalancing the evidence 
in mental capacity cases so that it is based on experiential, relational knowledge about 
P is essential for all of the reasons explored here and in Chapter Five – it is more likely 
to provide accurate information about P, it values the experience of P and those 
around her and provides a better understanding of P’s material, embodied position. In 
those cases where there is a concern about independence then alternative measures 




In this chapter I have outlined the different forms of evidence that emerged from my 
data, dividing them into expert and experiential knowledge claims. I argued that 
experiential knowledge provides a more informed understanding of P’s mental 
capacity. However, the COP received psy knowledge claims on mental capacity as 
objective and superior to other, experiential forms of evidence. This is despite psy 
professionals starting from an assumption of inherent vulnerability by focusing on the 
internal workings of the mind and/or brain. I have argued that, instead, the COP should 
place greater value on relational approaches to assessing capacity, valuing the 
experiential knowledge claims of those professionals who have an established 
relationship with her.  
In the following chapter I build on my analysis of knowledge claims by 
contrasting the legitimacy of social work and law. I argue that social workers are seen 
to have limited legitimacy to intervene in the lives of vulnerable adults. In the same way 
that social workers struggle to articulate their knowledge claim because they are 
perceived to be too subjective, social workers also struggle to establish their legitimacy 
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to intervene. However, I argue that seeking legal legitimation in challenging cases 




CHAPTER SEVEN: LEGITIMACY, SOCIAL WORK AND INTERVENTIONS 




Mental capacity assessments are regularly carried out in community, hospital and other 
settings.203 The vast majority of these assessments are not disputed and do not reach 
the COP for a determination. However, it is still important to identify why particular 
cases reach court and analyse the types of interventions that result. In this chapter I 
demonstrate that high-risk abuse cases dominate the COP in the sex/marriage/contact 
context. I further argue that the types of interventions that result are likely to be 
controlling rather than empowering of P. 
In the first half of this chapter I explore the meaning of legitimacy, contrasting 
the different ways that social work and law are seen to be legitimate. I argue that 
because social work interventions are perceived to have less legitimacy than legal 
interventions, social workers resort to law in the most challenging, high-risk cases. 
Whilst social workers may benefit from the use of law to legitimate their decisions, I 
raise concerns about the coercive power of law in this context. I argue that in referring 
mental capacity law cases to the COP, social workers reinforce the use of controlling 
interventions against P. This is because my data show that the types of interventions 
authorised by the COP are routinely controlling rather than empowering. 
In the second half of this chapter I argue that social workers need to be given 
greater legitimacy to intervene through support based and situational interventions. I 
further question whether the MCA should be used in cases of abuse and instead argue 
                                                      
203 It is difficult to obtain data on the prevalence of capacity assessments, partly because of the 
criticism that many capacity assessments are not properly documented, see Ramasubramanian, 
Ranasinghe and Ellison (2011). This difficulty was also noted by the Law Commission report on 




for the safeguarding adults legal framework to be strengthened. As explained in 
Chapter One, a duty to safeguard adults from abuse is contained within the Care Act 
2014. However, the safeguarding provisions do not compel local authorities to consider 
what might be done in cases where abuse is identified. This means that a local 
authority will have fulfilled its statutory duty merely by carrying out a safeguarding 
enquiry, even where that enquiry finds abuse. The intersection of the MCA and adult 
safeguarding is further complicated by the presence of other intersecting legal 
frameworks, including the FMCPA, which also applied to a number of the cases, as 
well as the potential for criminal justice interventions. Negotiating these different legal 
regimes was, perhaps understandably, not an easy task for social workers. Therefore, I 
argue that clarification and strengthening of the safeguarding adults legal framework is 
required to enable social workers to better support and empower rather than resort to 
legal coercion of the vulnerable adult.  
 
2. The Meaning of Legitimacy and the Resort to Law in High-Risk Cases 
 
In this section I explore the meaning of legitimacy and consider how law’s legitimacy 
can be contrasted with the legitimacy of social work. I argue that the limited legitimacy 
of social work results in the turn to the COP in high-risk welfare cases. This is primarily 
because social workers have concerns about their duty of care to service users who 
make unwise or risky decisions. I argue that social workers may benefit from this legal 
validation but doing so also undermines their legitimacy to intervene in less coercive 
ways. Furthermore, referring cases to the COP allows for an inherent vulnerability 
approach to be reinforced, which can lead to control and coercion of P, rather than 




2.1. The contrasting legitimacy of law and social work 
 
If an institution is seen as legitimate then it is more likely to have authority over others 
as people feel that they “ought to obey” (Tyler, 2006a, p. 377). Legitimacy is therefore 
a form of influence or power. In other words, it provides a “right to rule and the 
recognition by the ruled of that right” (Jackson et al., 2012, p. 1051). As Steffek 
explains “[l]egitimacy in the empirical sense is the phenomenon that a social order 
enjoys ‘the prestige of being considered binding’” (Steffek, 2009, p. 314). Legitimation 
is the process by which an individual, group or institution obtains such legitimacy for 
their actions. Law has long been theorised as a source of legitimate power (Foucault, 
1979; Smart, 1989; Hart, 1997), with the court being a key manifestation of that power. 
I suggest that in so far as law is commonly depicted,204 its legitimacy stems from two 
key features – its enforceability and objectivity. 
Enforceability of law is central to its authority. Law is enforced through the 
courts, being the organs of the state with the authority to punish backed up by force. 
Citizens might follow law in order to avoid the real consequences, such as the use of 
force, if they fail to do so. In this sense, many accept law as a necessary part of the 
functioning of a social order and fear the coercive consequences of contravening legal 
rules. Whilst enforceability is a key facet underpinning law’s legitimacy, as without 
enforceability law’s power would be diminished, more is required to fully understand 
the nature of law. People comply with law not only because they fear the 
consequences of failing to do so, but for normative reasons; that they perceive the law, 
and those who make and enforce it, to be legitimate (Tyler, 2006b). Hart similarly 
argues that the threat of sanctions is not sufficient as a complete understanding of law 
(Hart, 1997, p. 82). Focusing on the internal aspect of legal rules, he explains that law 
                                                      
204 In this sense I mean the way that law is ideologically or rhetorically constructed rather than 
arguing this is a normatively valid way of understanding law’s legitimacy.   
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gets its authority from people feeling that they ought to follow it (Hart, 1997). In this 
sense law’s legitimacy comes from: 
 
the belief that the law and agents of the law are rightful holders of 
authority; that they have the right to dictate appropriate behaviour and 
are entitled to be obeyed; and that laws should be obeyed simply 
because that is the right thing to do (Jackson et al., 2012, p. 1053). 
 
Law’s legitimacy therefore at least partly emanates from it being a standard that people 
generally believe ought to be complied with. Taking this further, I suggest that people 
believe law ought to be complied with if they perceive it to be objective, irrespective of 
whether they agree with the content of the law. Objective laws treat like cases alike. 
Relatedly, and as Tyler argues, the objectivity of law is reflected in its procedural 
fairness (Tyler, 2006b). Law is seen to be legitimate because people believe that they 
will get a fair hearing before an impartial and objective judge. Even in cases where 
individuals or institutions do not necessarily agree with the court decision, they more 
often than not comply with it, particularly where the individual respects the court’s 
authority (Tyler, 2006a, p. 379). Therefore ideologically at least, law’s legitimacy stems 
from both its enforceability and its objectivity.205  
If law is followed because it is believed to be fair and objectively applied, then 
courts, as enforcers of the law, are also likely to be seen as exercising power 
legitimately. Law’s legitimacy therefore allows its institutions “to be viewed as 
normatively or morally appropriate by the people within the system” (Tyler, 2006a, p. 
378). The submission of disputes to court exemplifies my understanding of legitimacy; 
                                                      
205 This is despite challenges from anti-positivists that it is law’s moral content that confers 
legitimacy. The debate as to whether or not the legitimacy of law is linked to its moral content is 
an area I do not have the space to explore within this thesis. The point here is to suggest how 
law is perceived, rather than being a normative claim that this is how law ought to be 
understood. For further on this point see Dworkin (1986). 
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courts are not proactive, they rely on cases being brought to them in order to develop 
the common law. Therefore if people did not believe they would get a fair hearing or 
their case would be treated objectively, then they would likely not expend their 
resources submitting their dispute to court in the first place. Similarly, there is little point 
in having a fair hearing without the possibility of enforcement. However, enforcement 
without fairness is perhaps equally less desirable, particularly in a context such as 
social work where overt perceptions of coercion could be problematic. Thus the 
interaction of enforceability and perceived objectivity underpin law’s legitimacy and, 
therefore, the legitimacy of court interventions.  
Social workers’ legitimacy fits less clearly into these parameters. They do not 
have the same historical and rhetorical claim to objectivity and enforcement that law 
displays. This historical legitimacy usually developed as a result of jurisdictional claims 
of authority and “scientific and ethical superiority” (Thomson, 2013, p. 194). As 
discussed in Chapter Six, other professions, such as medicine, have a strong claim to 
possessing authority and legitimacy, hence why law is relatively deferential to the psy 
professions. In contrast, social work, being a profession centred on the provision of 
social support, has been seen to have a less valid claim to objectivity and impartiality 
than law and medicine. In fact, social workers are often seen to be ‘biased’ in that they 
have a particular outcome in mind for the person which may reflect their own values 
and beliefs rather than those of the person. To achieve change social workers engage 
in an art of discursive persuasion and negotiation, as well as using material pressures 
to encourage the service user to act in a particular way. Furthermore, social workers’ 
interventions are not based on technical claims of expertise but instead on experiential 
knowledge and their ability to support a service user in multifaceted ways. These 
understandings of social work are very different from the perception of law as an 
authoritative and objectively applied body of rules. These fundamental differences in 




Social work interventions also lack the enforceability of law. This can be seen in 
the characterisation of the social work profession, which is defined as: 
 
…a practice-based profession and an academic discipline that promotes 
social change and development, social cohesion, and the empowerment 
and liberation of people… social work engages people and structures to 
address life challenges and enhance wellbeing. (International 
Federation of Social Workers, 2014). 
 
The core elements of social work are that it: is “person-centred”, is “personally and 
socially contexted”, is “relationship-oriented”, “follows an integrated process” and is 
“values based” (Whittington, 2016, p. 1953). Being person-centred and focusing on 
empowerment suggests social workers do not have the power of enforcement. They 
cannot compel service users to act in a particular way; in fact, attempts to do so would 
arguably contradict the appropriate role of adult social workers. Part of social workers’ 
legitimacy stems from the fact their decisions can be challenged. By this I mean that 
social workers’ legitimacy is based on their ability to develop a relationship of trust with 
their service user, to support them and to only intervene within clear statutory 
boundaries. Where a social worker is perceived to overstep that role, service users can 
challenge their decisions. As Braye and Preston-Shoot write: 
 
…the core tension is between social work and service users, and the 
dialogue is about professional power. Service users invite government 
to intervene when professionals are experienced as oppressive. Social 
work relies upon its statutory mandate to justify its actions, in return for 
continued endorsement of its existence. (Braye and Preston-Shoot, 
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1993, p. 119). 
 
Given the possible tension between social worker and service user, and the lack of 
enforceability of social work interventions, perhaps it is not surprising that social 
workers turn to law to legitimate their proposed interventions. Whilst this resort to law 
might be disempowering in certain ways, social workers do not always view it that way. 
In fact, resort to law can be seen as a useful tool for those who lack law’s perceived 
legitimacy but believe that law can help them to achieve a particular result. For 
example, David told me: 
 
There’s something to be said about decisions made in court, that people will, 
you know, respect and maintain it… 
 
Robert explained when asked about how he found the court process: 
 
I think good that the full majesty of the law would be exerted on behalf of 
vulnerable people… 
 
Similarly David said: 
 
…I think that any, any decision that is made in the community is, it’s legally 
binding we’re using a legal tool to do it even though we’re not legal 
professionals, rightly that has consequences for people so it’s gonna come 
under potentially come under scrutiny you know and the scrutiny of a judge is 
quite impressive, it’s quite withering at times you know and I would, I would 
 
 216 
be… wanting to be able to demonstrate that I’d done everything that I thought 
that I could in accordance with the law as it stands…  
 
Therefore even though social workers are seen to have less legitimacy to intervene 
than law, social workers do not necessarily resort to law reluctantly. The social workers 
I spoke to were aware of the usefulness of law to legitimate their decisions, for  
example with family members, deflecting difficult matters away from social work 
judgement into the jurisdiction of law. For example, talking about his views on the MCA 
Robert told me that: 
 
…from a personal view it was just terribly useful to have that framework so 
that if you did have a discussion… with a parent of a person with a learning 
disability… and they were saying are you telling me that I don’t get to make 
decisions for my son and it was very nice to have a freshly minted law to say 
no actually you don’t…  
 
Furthermore, in many cases the local authority, as well as individual social workers, 
benefit from referring a case to the COP. For example, if an individual was making a 
perceived ‘risky’ choice to stay within an abusive relationship, the local authority would 
be better served by having a court authorise their decision not to intervene because of 
the risk of harm that might result. This delineating of professional boundaries is not 
necessarily a problem for social workers as they too can resort to law to justify their 
decisions. However, one social worker I spoke to was also sensitive to the difficulties 
that can be caused by legal legitimation. For example, I asked Sarah whether she 




I think it would help us, in a way and feel more confident that we were backed 
up by something that was authoritative, and definite and coming from that 
place. In another way I would worry that we would then have to… we’re 
committed to it and we’ve got to go with it… there’s no way back once we’ve 
gone down that road, that’s my worry… 
 
The finality of a court decision reinforces its authority; a court decision must be 
enforced because it is seen to be based on an objective analysis of the facts. However, 
a court decision commits the social worker to a particular course of, often coercive, 
action. In contrast the interventions of a social worker might be more fluid and 
changeable. Therefore because social work interventions are more responsive to 
situational factors, that seemingly also makes them less authoritative and less 
objective, which in turn is perceived to undermine their legitimacy.  This highlights that 
framing law as the objective enforcer of legal rules also impacts on those professions, 
such as social work, which lack a similar rhetorical claim to legitimacy.  
 
2.2. Duty of care and vulnerability in high-risk cases of abuse 
 
Given the contrast between the legitimacy of the court and the legitimacy of social 
work, it was unsurprising that social workers sought legal legitimation of their decisions 
in challenging cases. The MCA Code of Practice states that an application to the COP 
may be necessary for: 
 
• particularly difficult decisions  
• disagreements that cannot be resolved in any other way 
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• situations where ongoing decisions may need to be made about 
the personal welfare of a person who lacks capacity to make 
decisions for themselves. (Office of the Public Guardian, 2016, p. 
139). 
 
My research found that it was in cases of abuse where legitimation through the COP 
was most valuable to social workers. This is because they were concerned that they 
had a ‘duty of care’ towards the service user and needed to manage the high risks.  
Yet they felt constrained by the notion of empowerment underpinning the MCA; that is, 
that the MCA was passed to provide protection for those (inherently) vulnerable adults 
who were unable to make decisions, rather than to allow interventions in relation to 
unwise decisions.206 This was felt most strongly where abuse was present because in 
abuse cases there is a conflict between protection and empowerment, as identified at 
p. 8 at the start of this thesis. The social workers I spoke to said they found this 
balance challenging and it has been identified elsewhere that this conflict is too often 
resolved through prioritising protection (Cave, 2015). 
The cases where controlling and coercive interventions were used in the 
welfare context207 were those that were viewed as ‘most risky’. For example, when I 
asked Sarah about her current role she explained that she was an investigating worker 
on a safeguarding team and they: 
 
complete a section 42 enquiry report… the idea being that we are hoping to 
identify what risks there are to the person and then hopefully come up with 
some kind of plan to reduce the risks to the people and then we keep them in 
                                                      
206 Albeit that some have rightly questioned where this ‘empowering ethos’ came from given 
what the MCA actually does is to allow courts to intervene and make decisions on a person’s 
behalf, even against their wishes, see Series (2015a). 




this process until we feel that the risks are kind of identified and being 
managed and then pass it back to the district or just kind of close it out if 
we’re happy that they’re now ok… 
 
Sarah went on to tell me about the case she was working on (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Four, p. 119) that was her first experience of taking a case to the COP. I 
asked her what it was about this case that made her consider taking it to court, she 
said: 
 
I think it was because we just felt that the risks were so high and we were just 
so worried about her… We just kinda kept coming back to thinking this is just 
so, risky, and that we just wouldn’t be happy just leaving it, we just couldn’t 
think of a plan that we would be happy with and thinking right we’ve put that 
place, ok, we can leave this now and just think, no. It just needed to go 
somewhere higher that was above us… 
 
Not only does she reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the COP but her comments 
highlight that concerns about risk were the reason for bringing the case to court, 
despite her earlier concerns about the finality of a legal decision. This discourse of risk 
reinforces my finding that welfare interventions in mental capacity law are more likely to 
be used in cases of abuse.208 This is because the highest risk cases are those where 
serious harm might result. This is most likely to occur when another individual causes 
                                                      
208 Risk of abuse was also a major factor in the forced marriage cases, which formed a sizeable 
part of the sample. Either there were concerns from the local authority that P was going to be 
taken abroad for marriage without consent or there were allegations of abuse within the family, 
often from parents.  
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harm to the person, albeit self-neglect might also be a source of risk.209 My interviews 
reinforced the pervasiveness of concerns about “duty of care” and “risk” that have been 
identified elsewhere (Jingree, 2015). For example, Julia and Andrea repeatedly 
explained that they had a duty of care towards their service users, Julia said: 
 
we have had situations where people will come in and get the service user to 
try and sign something but I think the nursing staff are now alerted to the fact 
they should never let anyone sign anything they that people coming in without 
having some- given some thought to whether that person’s got capacity, we 
have got a duty of care… 
 
Similarly, I asked Andrea for her views on supported decision-making rather than 
substituting their decision with the professional’s view through a court decision, she 
said: 
 
I feel really strongly about keeping, letting people have autonomy and things 
but I also deal with lots of risk, and I think a lot of people going to have 
support needs met and go into care for example, because it’s, because of all, 
perhaps they’re physically at risk and maybe they might want to just still take 
that risk. Maybe they’d rather die at home and fall down the stairs. It’s a real, 
it’s a real dilemma, it’s something that I struggle with in certain cases at 
certain times when people’s feelings are really strong, when they’re not so 
strong it tends not to worry you so much… But… people worry then about 
                                                      
209 It could also be argued that interventions are common in relation to self-neglect. This was 
not the focus of the research so could not be investigated further here.  
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being negligent don’t they, I think that’s what you’d worry about not fulfilling 
your duty of care and being negligent... 
 
I went on to ask her then if supported decision-making would be a big change in 
mindset and she said: 
 
Yeh it would, yeh, because I think you know we’ve got this duty of care always 
underlying everything so people don’t like to take risks… it’s really hard, you 
know, I try to take risks but there’s certain pressures that can be applied at 
times. You know, people just badger you and badger you and get everybody 
on to you. 
 
The discourse of risk that permeates mental capacity law in some ways reflects the 
situational vulnerability approach that I advocate in this thesis. As Andrea and Julia’s 
comments highlight, it is when others make decisions to abuse or where individuals 
want to live at home in a risky environment, that they, as social workers, are most 
concerned about their duty of care and the material risks to P. Therefore most 
concerns in the welfare context relate to the material situation that P finds herself in 
rather than being concerns about her inherent abilities. Sarah also highlighted this 
when, as discussed at p. 125, she told me that she wanted to show her service user 
that she could have a different life away from her abusive husband. Yet somewhat 
paradoxically, the resort to the jurisdiction of the COP in these high-risk cases can 
reinforce that the abuse is attributable to an inherent vulnerability of the individual. This 
can be seen in the following section where I identify the types of interventions ordered 
by the COP. 
Whilst high-risk abuse cases dominated my data, the cases were predominantly 
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those where the adults in question were ‘non-compliant’ with social worker advice, 
rather than all high-risk cases. This included cases both where P was non-compliant 
and where a family member was non-compliant because they disagreed with the 
decision. By non-compliant I mean cases where P or another disagreed with and was 
not willing to go along with the social worker’s opinion. For example, in seven of the 
COP case files reviewed P was non-compliant in that she either challenged the 
decision or made it clear that she did not agree with it,210 in five cases the male partner 
of P was non-compliant with the local authority decision,211 in at least two of the forced 
marriage cases the local authority decision to intervene was based on a concern that 
parents would take P abroad for marriage against social work advice,212 and in two 
other forced marriage cases the local authority clearly disagreed with P’s own non-
compliant behaviour in respect of marriage describing her actions as “risky”.213 These 
cases suggest it was typically where P or somebody close to her challenged social 
work advice that the case reached the COP. Therefore those cases where P did not 
have anyone to advocate on her behalf, or where P was compliant, were less likely to 
have court scrutiny. This is problematic because, in cases of abuse, the motives of 
those who challenge the local authority’s decision should be questioned as in many 
cases they were the alleged abusive party. Furthermore, COP interventions in abuse 
cases can be controlling rather than empowering of P. Therefore if challenge by the 
abuser is the primary reason that such cases are reaching court, this should be of 
concern because it means that P is in a no-win situation; she is faced with pathogenic 
control by the court or pathogenic control by the abuser. 
Social workers, particularly in high-risk cases, respond to their own lack of 
                                                      
210 W County Council v ZR, C Borough Council v (1) DY (2) B Council, T City Council v CY, N 
County Council v CA, YS v E District Council, OD v R City Council, PR CCG v QB. 
211 ML v (1) TL and (2) D County Council, Z County Council v FY, Y County Council v (1) LC (2) 
GK (3) SC, N County Council v (1) GI and (2) DQ, P County Council v SE. 
212 H County Council v XC, M County Council v EV. 
213 K County Council v SL, K County Council v MW. 
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legitimacy by resorting to the COP. In doing this they may ‘trade in’ some of their 
power, but in return they are shielded from having to make the final decision in what 
they perceive to be the most challenging cases. In seeking legal legitimation, social 
workers’ decisions were protected and reinforced whilst also enabling them to deflect 
any resulting coercion on to the legal process. However, in doing so, social workers 
also participate in the acceptance of coercive and controlling interventions against 
vulnerable adults. Yet the value of social work is precisely in its situational and holistic 
approach to supporting vulnerable adults. Therefore, by actively participating in this 
process the value of social work may be further undermined as they reinforce the 
legitimacy of the court enforced, ‘objective’ intervention over more ‘subjective’ support-
based approaches. Instead, if social workers can be given the legitimacy to intervene 
in more supportive ways, focusing on situational causes of vulnerability, this will help to 
both avoid the coercive nature of court interventions and to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the social work profession.  
 
3. The Use of Controlling Interventions in Mental Capacity Law 
 
Given the contested legitimacy of social work interventions, I now explore the types of 
interventions authorised in COP cases. I argue that my data show that the 
interventions in COP cases were typically controlling and coercive of P. I consider the 
possible reasons why such an approach has taken hold when, as discussed from p. 41 
in Chapter Two, these cases were primarily about surplus pathogenic vulnerability; that 
P was subject to a harmful form of situational vulnerability (abuse by a partner or family 
member) in excess of that needed to maximise her autonomy (and in many cases 
undermines her autonomy). I further challenge the use of controlling interventions in 
cases where P is at risk of, or experiencing, abuse, and instead argue for the use of 




3.1. The types of cases before the COP 
 
As set out at Table 7.1 below, my sample of 20 COP cases provides an indication of 
the types of cases that reach the COP within the sex/marriage/contact bracket. It 
highlights that high-risk welfare cases dominate this area of mental capacity law. These 
data are important because they provide an insight into this area of law, where cases 
are not always reported. Furthermore, those cases that are reported are predominantly 
from London courts. Series et al. also highlight the issue of regional differences in 
publication of judgments in their report on the COP’s welfare jurisdiction and similar 
findings were made in research into the family court jurisdiction (Doughty, Twaite and 
Magrath, 2017; Series et al., 2017b). This is exemplified in my own data. For example, 
one of my sample of 20 cases was heard at the Royal Courts of Justice (RCJ) and one 
was heard at the Central London COP, whereas all 18 others were heard in regional 
courts. In the one RCJ case in my sample, the final judgment was still made in a 
regional court by a Circuit judge. In contrast, a review of the 2016 COP cases reported 
on BAILII, taken on 13 September 2017, shows that 28 of the 63 reported cases were 
from the RCJ, whereas 35 were from a range of other regional courts (see Table A4, 
Appendix seven). However, 12 of those 35 were from cases at the London COP, which 
is more likely to be aware of the issues associated with transparency given their 
proximity to the judges and administration of the High Court. Given that the cases that 
have been reported on BAILII appear to be skewed by RCJ and London cases, my 













1.  K County 







Has capacity.  
Proceedings withdrawn. 
2.  ML v (1) TL 








ML died before final hearing.  
3.  Z County 






Final order. FY lacks capacity 
to: conduct proceedings, 
make decisions as to 
residence, care and contact.  
 
4.  Y County 
Council v (1) 











Final order. LC lacks capacity 
to: consent to sex, to marry 
and to litigate. Case ongoing 
in relation to contact and 
residence.  
5.  W County 
Council v ZR 
Domestic 
abuse 
Sex Proceedings stayed as ZR 
detained under s3 Mental 
Health Act 1983. 
6.  C Borough 
Council v (1) 










Final order. DY lacks 
capacity to: conduct 
proceedings, make decisions 
as to residence, care and 
contact. 
 
7.  A County 
Council v (1) 







Ongoing. Interim decision 
that MT lacks capacity to: 
conduct proceedings, decide 
on residence and care, 
consent to sexual relations 
and to marry.  
8.  H County 





Ongoing. Interim decision 
that XC lacks capacity in all 
domains. 
9.  M County 









Final order. EV lacks capacity 
in all domains. 
10.  T City 







Final order. CY lacks 
capacity to: conduct 
proceedings, decide on 
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residence and care. She 
does have capacity to decide 
on contact.  












Transferred to High Court 
judge for final hearing as 
case concerns consent to 
medical treatment. Awaiting 
expert evidence and final 
resolution at time of research 
end.  







Ongoing. Interim finding that 
MW had capacity in relation 
to sex but lacked capacity in 
relation to marriage.  
13.  N County 
Council v (1) 








Ongoing. Interim findings of 
incapacity in all domains. 
14.  N County 






Ongoing. Interim declaration 
that CA: 
lacks capacity to conduct 
proceedings; 
but has capacity to consent 
to sexual relations.  
Separate proceedings 
alongside considering CA’s 
partner (NF)’s capacity to 
make decisions about 
residence and care, capacity 
to marry in the future, 
capacity to consent to sexual 
relations, capacity to make 
decisions about 
contraception and capacity to 
decide what contact to have 
with other relevant 
individuals.  








Ongoing. Interim declaration 
that YS lacks capacity in all 
domains. 
 
At end of research transfer of 
placement was due to take 
place with further review 4 
months after date of order.  








Order that OD lacks capacity 





3.1.1. Cases involving interventions to protect the abused adult 
 
Turning first to the interventions to protect P, FY concerned a 66 year old married 
woman with a diagnosis of dementia. Z County Council determined that she lacked 
capacity to decide where to reside and that it was in her best interests to live in 
residential care. FY’s husband wanted her to return home. The local authority’s case 
17.  P County 
Council v (1) 









Final order. SE lacks capacity 
to: conduct proceedings, 
make decisions about care 
and residence and manage 
her property and affairs. 
Capacity evidence indicated 
she does not lack capacity to 
decide on contact and sexual 
relations. 
 
18.  V Borough 






Order that AY lacks capacity 
to: decide where to live and 
decide on matters of care 
and support. Order that it is in 
AY’s best interests to have 
contact with his mother and 
any other members of 
extended family in 
accordance with wishes and 
feelings. 





Order that QB lacks capacity 
in all domains. Order that it is 
in QB’s best interests to 
reside at placement and 
receive care package. Matter 
stayed until DOLS expires in 
2017. 
20.  O City 
Council v (1) 
AW (2) FW 









Final order. AW lacks 
capacity to: conduct 
proceedings and 
make decisions about 
contact. Order that it is in P’s 
best interests not to have any 
contact, either directly or 





was that it was in FY’s best interests to remain in residential care because she was at 
risk of abuse from her husband. It is not clear what FY’s wishes were. The court held 
that FY lacked the capacity to conduct proceedings and to make decisions as to her 
residence, care and contact. The hearing was then listed for a final hearing to: 
 
determine what contact between the First and Second Respondents is 
in the First Respondent’s best interest and whether any conditions 
should be attached to the standard authorisation, so as to ensure that 
the First Respondent’s deprivation of liberty within X Care Home 
represents the least restrictive care package…  
 
Similarly, V Borough Council v AY concerned a 35 year old male described as having a 
significant learning disability, autism and sensory processing disorder. The local 
authority applied for a declaration that AY lacked capacity to decide on residence and 
care as there were concerns that AY was being sexually and physically abused at 
home. Witness evidence from the local authority suggested that AY was afraid of 
returning home and the local authority said that he was “voting with his feet” by 
refusing to see his mother whilst in residential care. The court declared that AY lacked 
the capacity to decide where to live and to make decisions as to his care and support. 
The court held that it was “[i]n [AY]’s best interests to have contact with [mother] and 
any other members of his extended family, in accordance with his wishes and feelings,” 
albeit that those contact arrangements would be kept under review. 
These two cases, and the others summarised in Table 7.1 above, suggest that 
COP interventions are made in cases where the primary reason for the case being 
brought to court is abuse. Yet these cases are not viewed through a lens of surplus 
pathogenic vulnerability, with the abusive situation being the harmful cause of P’s 
vulnerability and contributing to the impaired decision-making. Instead, the MCA and 
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COP jurisdiction encourage an inherent vulnerability approach, leading to restrictions 
against the vulnerable adult. For example, T City Council v CY, discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Five, concerned a 49 year old woman described as having a mild to 
moderate learning disability complicated by harmful alcohol misuse and an emotionally 
unstable personality disorder. In that case it was held CY lacked the capacity to 
conduct proceedings, and to make decisions as to residence, care and how her care 
needs should be met during times which she has contact with others, particularly her 
partner, SB, about whom there were significant concerns. It was held to be in her best 
interests to: 
 
receive care in accordance with the contact plan dated X during times 
which she has contact with [SB], the plan shall be subject to review 
every twelve weeks in accordance with the recital above. 
 
The difficulty with CY’s case was that the judge expressly stated that capacity for care 
was being used to restrict contact. In discussing the evidence of CY’s father, my 
observational notes summarise the judge’s comments as follows: 
 
I’ve read [Mr Y’s] statement. Just going to look at it again. [Mr Y], I read 
this with some interest because it raised a point which hadn’t even 
occurred to me. You say that [SB] lacks the ability to competently care 
for your daughter when spend time away, talk about having been 
abandoned when drinking alcohol. You say you have no concern about 
time together at [care home] or under supervision. You put it that [SB] 
not the problem but unable to care for your daughter. That seemed to 
me a very interesting point. The local authority picked up on it, 
suggesting for two reasons, don’t think medical evidence to agree on 
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contact is sufficient. They say not only is that a legal problem but 
actually not much to do with [SB] himself, to do with fact she needs care 
providing to her. That circumvents the entire problem, has nothing to do 
with [SB] whether he has unsuitable characteristics, more to do with the 
global picture. 
 
The judge was saying here that there was insufficient medical evidence to conclude 
that CY lacked the capacity to decide on contact with others. However, she did lack the 
capacity to decide on her care needs. Therefore, her care needs would need to be met 
at all times, including when having contact with others, meaning that, indirectly, her 
contact with others would have to be supervised. As the judge said directly, “that 
circumvents the entire problem”. However, the problem with this is that it authorises a 
highly interventionist and controlling measure for an adult who was held to have 
capacity to decide with whom she has contact. Yet, in practice, she would not be able 
to decide with whom to have contact because this would always be subject to her care 
plan. Such an approach was, I suggest, only authorised because of concerns about her 
situational vulnerability in relation to SB. If her vulnerability had been characterised in 
situational terms, CY would have been free to decide when and with whom she had 
contact but might have been offered support to help her to leave SB and to get help 
with her alcohol problem. If there were specific concerns about SB’s behaviour then 
measures such as conditions during visits to CY’s accommodation or ultimately an 
injunction could have been taken against SB rather than requiring that CY, a 49 year 
old adult, be supervised.  
Similarly, N County Council v (1) GI and (2) DQ, also discussed in Chapter 
Four, p. 127, concerned a married 62 year old woman described as having Korsakoff’s 
syndrome due to alcohol consumption, personality disorder, depressive disorder and 
cerebral atrophy. The local authority brought an urgent application for declarations in 
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relation to capacity for care, contact, residence and litigation and a request for approval 
of a DOL. The application was described as urgent because of GI’s risk of domestic 
abuse by her husband. According to the local authority, since their marriage in 2012 
there had been “in excess of 50 domestic abuse allegations that [GI] has made against 
her husband”.214  The court ordered that GI lacked the capacity to litigate and to decide 
on residence, care and contact with people (including DQ). As discussed in Chapter 
Four, the injunctive intervention authorised by the COP in this case was the most 
nuanced and situational of all the cases I reviewed: 
 
[DQ] is forbidden whether by himself or jointly with any other person: 
 
a) To use or threaten violence against [GI] and must not instruct, 
encourage or in any way suggest that any other person should do so 
and 
b) To intimidate, pester or harass [GI] and must not instruct, encourage 
or in any way suggest that any other person should do so and 
c) Enter or attempt to enter the grounds of or premises known as D or 
any other property in which [GI] may from time to time reside, save for 
the purpose of supervised contact agreed in writing in advance by the 
social worker on behalf of [GI]. 
 
Therefore whilst I broadly agree with the use of an injunction, I have two concerns. 
Firstly, whether this outcome was best achieved through mental capacity law. Findings 
of mental incapacity in relation to very broad domains (litigation, residence, care and 
contact) can lead to the authorisation of controlling rather than empowering 
interventions. A similar outcome could have been achieved using the more nuanced 
                                                      
214 This report was made in 2016 therefore the figures relate to a 4 year period. 
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inherent jurisdiction as GI would appropriately be described as situationally and 
pathogenically vulnerable, as discussed at Chapter Two. Secondly, and more 
importantly, I question whether capacity determinations would have been made about 
GI were it not for the abuse. It would seem unlikely given that the entire proceedings 
were materially and discursively shaped by her abusive relationship and this was the 
reason given for the local authority’s application to the COP. It could be argued that GI 
de facto lacked capacity in relation to these matters but it simply would not have been 
identified were it not for the abuse. I do not comment on the likelihood of GI lacking 
capacity in relation to those specific domains, having not met or spoken to her. 
However, it cannot be a fair application of the MCA if those who are subjected to abuse 
are more likely to be found to lack capacity by a court not because they are more likely 
to lack capacity, but because those cases are more likely to reach a courtroom. 
This duplication of oppression means that not only was GI abused by DQ but 
that she had to deal with surveillance, restriction and coercion in the name of her own 
protection. I do not doubt that GI needed protection from DQ. However, the better 
approach would have been either to use criminal law measures against DQ or, with 
GI’s consent, apply for a non-molestation order against DQ. If GI’s consent was not 
obtainable then, as noted above, the local authority could have considered using the 
inherent jurisdiction to provide her with some relief, at least to enable her capacity to be 
assessed within a safer and more supportive environment away from DQ. Being a 
victim of abuse who also lacks capacity intensifies the scrutiny where it is arguable that 
all that GI required was to be supported to live a life away from DQ’s abusive and 
pathogenic vulnerability inducing influence. 
In the cases identified here, the situational element of the adult’s vulnerability 
was ignored and responses were focused on control and surveillance of her. In 
Chapter Two I explored the concerns of other scholars who contend that vulnerability 
discourse is unhelpful because of its stigmatising effects and its potential to authorise 
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wide-ranging interventions (Dunn, Clare and Holland, 2008; Hollomotz, 2009; Munro 
and Scoular, 2012). However, as outlined in Chapter Four, the concept is so 
discursively embedded in mental capacity and adult safeguarding practice that 
abandonment of the concept altogether seems unlikely. Furthermore, I have argued 
throughout that there are clear benefits from applying a vulnerability analysis. Feminist 
literature, as highlighted throughout this thesis, provides an alternative way of viewing 
vulnerability as universal, embodied and situational (Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010; 
Clough, 2014; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014b; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 
2014a).  In contrast, in mental capacity law, capacity and vulnerability are understood 
as inherent and unique to the individual. In refocusing on the situational causes of 
vulnerability, there is scope for minimising controlling interventions whilst still 
responding to abuse. 
Concerns about intervention also ignore the fact that the COP is already doing 
the thing that people are uneasy about; it routinely authorises wide-ranging 
interventions which use a person’s incapacity for decisions about care or residence to 
restrict their interaction with abusive others, even where they have capacity. Controlling 
interventions in the name of protection are, therefore, already happening. The question 
is how the use of coercive interventions can be reduced whilst not leaving that adult 
under-protected. Reformulating interventions so they consider capacity and 
vulnerability in more situational ways should result in less controlling interventions, 
particularly if social workers are also given the legitimacy to be responsive to such 




3.1.2. Cases involving interventions to control the abuser 
 
I now turn to the interventions which were aimed at preventing P from abusing others, 
this occurred most clearly in four cases, N County Council v CA, YS v E District 
Council, OD v R City Council and P CCG v QB (see Table 7.1 above and for more 
detail see Table A1, Appendix one). I focus here on YS and OD’s cases.  
YS v E District Council concerned a 52 year old male whose disability was 
described as “heavy alcohol consumption and brain injury as a result of road traffic 
accident”. The case was brought by YS under s 21A MCA to challenge his DOL and 
also considered his capacity to decide where to reside and his capacity to make 
decisions about care. The case file explained the background to the case: YS had 
been released from prison where he was on remand pending a decision not to charge 
him for alleged sexual offences committed at a previous residential placement. On his 
release he was moved to a care home and the proceedings arose from that move.  On 
the face of it, this was not an obvious mental capacity case; YS had a brain injury and 
heavy alcohol consumption but the extent of his injury and how it impacted on his 
decision-making was not clear. The case appeared to be motivated by YS’ wish not to 
have his liberty restricted and to make his own choice as to his preferred care home. 
Given his history of alleged sexual offences, the local authority were concerned about 
placing him in a care home with other vulnerable adults, again suggesting concerns 
about their duty of care but in this case to others rather than to YS. It also highlights the 
complexities of vulnerability, with YS being viewed as inherently vulnerable and 
therefore falling within the jurisdiction of the MCA, as well as being seen as the 
situational cause of vulnerability in others.  
 No final decision had been made by the time my research ended as the local 
authority was still seeking a suitable placement. However, in the interim the COP held 
that YS lacked the capacity to conduct proceedings and to decide on care and 
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residence. The COP order further authorised YS’ DOL. As a result, the local authority 
was permitted to find a residential placement it felt met YS’ needs, rather than allowing 
him to choose where to live and therefore enabling them to manage his risk to fellow 
residents. 
OD v R City Council concerned a 46 year old male, OD, described as having 
mild learning disability and schizophrenia (with no recent psychotic symptoms). His 
case concerned a challenge of his DOL in a care home where he had been living for 
two years, which was brought by his relevant person’s representative appointed under 
Part 10 Schedule A1 MCA. OD had been physically and sexually abused as a child 
and at 19 he was convicted for the rape of his younger brother. He had further 
convictions for gross indecency in a public place and indecent assault, as well as two 
convictions for indecent exposure against females. More recently it had been reported 
that OD had worked as a prostitute and had been financially exploited by pimps. OD’s 
wishes and feelings were that he wished to live independently. He accepted he would 
need carers but wanted a lower level of supervision. The case file noted that, as a 
result of his deprivation of liberty, he was also in effect being treated as if he lacked 
capacity to consent to sex and to decide on contact with others. I attended court for the 
final hearing which was vacated at the last minute as the parties had agreed a way 
forward based on the expert evidence. However, at court I discussed the case with the 
judge and reviewed the final order and case file, including the expert evidence on 
which the case concluded.  
The expert report of Dr L, Consultant Psychiatrist, concluded that OD lacked 
capacity to make decisions about residence, care, finances, contact and litigation, but 
had capacity to make decisions about sex. The expert evidence was based on one 
interview with OD, during which OD told Dr L that he didn’t like where he lived because 
of the “staff and residents, mainly the staff”. He told Dr L “they don’t treat me like a 
proper adult, they treat me like a kid”. Dr L asked for an example and OD said, “they 
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say to me like go and get a shower”, “they ask me to have a shower at 9am” whereas 
he would prefer to shower “in the middle of the day”. OD also told Dr L that his social 
worker “looks after my money she doesn’t care for me she treats me like a kid. I don’t 
like her she’s keeping my money”.  OD also told Dr L that he was gay and that “I used 
to sleep around and blokes in [R] would pay me lots of money for sex”. He would like to 
have a relationship with a man at the care home but said he couldn’t because he didn’t 
know who was gay there.  Dr L further noted: 
 
[OD] clearly lacks capacity regarding contact. He has no understanding 
of his disability and vulnerability and need for positive contact and care 
in either the short or longer term. His learning disability undermines his 
ability to understand the motivation of others who may not have his best 
interest at heart. 
… 
historical information contained in the court bundle suggests that in the 
past [OD] has worked as a male prostitute and has probably been 
sexually and financially exploited. [OD] is vulnerable to exploitation, this 
vulnerability is largely a result of his lack of capacity for sexual 
relationships and lacks capacity regarding contact then contact with 
others will require careful risk assessment and management. 
 
Despite this comment, Dr L found that OD had capacity to make decisions about 
sexual relations, but lacked capacity to decide on residence, care, finances, contact 
and litigation and this finding was upheld in the court order. 
This type of case suggests that social workers turned to mental capacity law 
where there were high risks of vulnerability created by perceived failures elsewhere in 
the system such that P (or others) needed protecting. This included cases where social 
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workers felt that the criminal law had failed to protect P from abuse, as in GI’s case 
discussed earlier. However, this was also clear in YS’ case where those involved were 
concerned that the criminal law had failed to deal with his threat of abuse to others. As 
such, social workers resorted to legal legitimation through the COP in cases where 
they perceived an intervention was needed 215  but not being provided by other 
protective mechanisms.  
Similarly, in OD’s case, the local authority’s position statement explained: 
 
It remains the position of the LA that [OD] continues to require constant 
supervision and control, such that it amounts to a deprivation of liberty, 
in order for his needs to be met and to protect him from significant harm. 
It is the position of the LA that such measures are necessary, 
proportionate and in [OD]’s best interests.  
 
This highlights that it is not only (if at all) that OD needed to be deprived of his liberty to 
meet his treatment or care needs,216 but also to protect him from harm. This is despite 
protection from harm not being a reason to deprive somebody of their liberty under the 
MCA. 217  OD was viewed as both victim and abuser given his complex history, 
highlighting his perceived inherent vulnerability as well as his situational and 
pathogenic threat to others. The local authority’s turn to mental capacity law was 
arguably only appropriate to the extent that they could argue that he lacked capacity in 
specific domains. Yet in both YS and OD’s cases, capacity decisions about care and 
residence were used as ways of controlling P in respect of much broader issues, such 
                                                      
215 Notwithstanding my critique of under-protection in certain types of cases in Chapter Four. 
216 Which is the lawful justification for a deprivation of liberty under schedule A1 para 1 MCA. 
217 Protection from harm is not a reason to deprive somebody of their liberty under the MCA. 
However, it does fall within the ‘general defence’ contained within s 5 MCA. This provision 
protects those who carry out an act based on a determination that P lacks capacity where that 
act is carried out in P’s best interests to prevent harm to P and is a proportionate response, see 
s 6 (2) – (3) MCA.  
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as contact with others. The underpinning justification where P was a threat to others 
does not fit the presumption of capacity required by the MCA and the need to respect 
unwise decisions.  Whilst I do not question the local authority’s motives in wanting to 
protect others within their care, it needs to be carried out within an appropriate 
jurisdiction. Arguably the criminal law, specifically sexual harm prevention orders 
(SHPO),218 might be more appropriate. Yet the weaknesses in other areas of law, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, may mean that local authorities view mental capacity law 
as their only option; the MCA provides a lower burden of proof than the criminal law, 
has flexibility in the types of interventions that can be ordered, and maintains the 
legitimacy of a court authorised intervention.  
The central concern arising from this comparison between abused and abuser 
cases is that there is a risk of cross-fertilisation of interventions. By this I mean that 
interventions under the MCA are controlling and coercive partly as a result of the 
presence of abusers within the mental capacity law jurisprudence. In turn, this 
reinforces a controlling approach for victims of abuse. Whilst controlling and coercive 
legal interventions need to be replaced with interventions which address the situational 
causes of abuse, more fundamentally I question whether mental capacity law is the 
appropriate jurisdiction where the primary reason for a case reaching court is to 
safeguard a vulnerable adult from abuse. This is partly because the MCA intrinsically 
focuses on inherent causes of vulnerability because of the language of s 2 MCA for 
example, rather than the situational reasons for vulnerability which may include a much 
wider range of factors. Of course capacity issues should not be ignored because a 
person is being abused, but it does not seem fair that mental capacity law is used 
                                                      
218 A SHPO can be ordered under s 103A Sexual Offences Act 2003 where a person has been 
convicted of a criminal offence listed in schedules 3 and 5 of the act (or has been found not 
guilty by reason of insanity or where the defendant is found to be under a disability and has 
done the act charged, s 103 (2) (a)). The purpose of a SHPO is to protect the public from sexual 
harm by the defendant or to protect vulnerable children or adults from sexual harm by the 
defendant outside of the UK, s 103 (2) (b).  
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because a person is being abused. Instead, a strengthened, non-discriminatory 
safeguarding adults framework is required. 
 
4. Interventions to Safeguard Vulnerable Adults From Abuse 
 
In this section I argue that a strengthened safeguarding adults legal framework would 
assist in limiting the coercive interventions authorised by mental capacity law. 
Furthermore, any changes to the safeguarding framework must empower social 
workers to intervene in supportive ways rather than mandating recourse to law. Some 
argue that there is danger in recourse to the courts (Merry, 1990, p. 3) and that 
interventions based in law can create harm (Smart, 1989). For example, as discussed 
at p. 55 of Chapter Two, law can create and exacerbate derivative vulnerability. This is 
not inevitable but depends on the type of intervention mandated by law. If the social 
work profession can be given greater legitimacy to intervene through supportive and 
situational measures, then this may limit recourse to formal law. This is important not 
only because of the potential for coercion in mental capacity law, but also because of 
the high material costs of bringing capacity cases to court (Series et al., 2017b).  
 
4.1. Strengthening social work legitimacy through a safeguarding adults framework 
 
By comparison with the FMCPA discussed in Chapter One, a clear and strengthened 
framework for intervention to safeguard vulnerable adults from abuse would increase 
social workers’ legitimacy to better protect and empower vulnerable adults. I make this 
comparison with the FMCPA because the forced marriage cases that were brought to 
the COP were generally narrower in scope than those brought solely under the MCA 
(see Table 7.1 above). For example, the only two cases where there was a reversal in 
capacity findings were brought under the FMCPA. Furthermore, the FMCPA cases had 
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fewer DOL applications attached to them (see Table A1, Appendix one). It is difficult to 
draw direct comparisons because, for example, in the majority of the forced marriage 
cases the adult still lived with their family therefore perhaps explaining why a DOL 
authorisation was less common. 219  However, if a case is brought under the 
safeguarding legislative framework, even where capacity issues are considered 
alongside it, then by comparison with the FMCPA cases it is more likely to narrow the 
scope of capacity decisions. 
A non-discriminatory and support based safeguarding framework would assist 
in deflecting attention away from mental capacity law because social workers could be 
legitimated to intervene without wide-ranging or coercive interventions. Whilst the Care 
Act 2014 put safeguarding on a statutory footing, the safeguarding provisions are 
limited and lack detail about how to respond to abuse. Furthermore, there is a lack of 
clarity as to how adult safeguarding interacts with the MCA, an area which requires 
further investigation than this thesis allows. Therefore strengthening the Care Act 2014 
safeguarding provisions would help to guide local authorities about when and how to 
intervene where abuse is suspected, empower social workers to take supportive, 
situationally focused action and legally enshrine the importance of working in 
partnership with the person to empower them to be free from abuse. I argue here that 
an amended safeguarding framework authorising interventions to protect vulnerable 
adults must, as a minimum, meet four criteria: it must be applicable to all citizens; it 
must take account of the individual’s wishes; it must not result in more harm than the 
adult was already living with, and; the agencies or individuals who intervene must be 
accountable for their interventions.220 
                                                      
219 This is something that the Law Commission have picked up on as they provisionally propose 
that deprivations of liberty at home would also require authorisation, see Law Commission 
(2017, p. 53).  
220 These criteria are different from but influenced by those set out by Mackenzie (2014b). The 
criteria also take into account the principles set out in similar Scottish legislation, see s 1 Adult 
Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 which states “The general principle on intervention 
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One of the central ways that an amended safeguarding framework would be 
fairer would be for it to apply to all ‘vulnerable adults’. The MCA’s diagnostic threshold 
has been widely criticised as including only those with mental impairments.221 As a 
result of treating P as inherently vulnerable, controlling responses are adopted against 
people with disabilities. However, as identified throughout this thesis, much of this turns 
on how vulnerability is viewed. Using the MCA to authorise interventions in cases of 
abuse against or by mentally disabled adults relates the abuse to their inherent 
vulnerability. Whereas using a non-discriminatory framework focused on safeguarding 
all adults vulnerable to abuse is likely to be more sensitive to the range of factors, both 
inherent and situational, that make a person vulnerable. As Clough explains, the MCA 
creates a “stark dividing line between those who have a cognitive impairment, who can 
thus be capable of being deemed to lack capacity, and those without a cognitive 
impairment, who cannot” (Clough, 2017, p. 476). As identified in Chapter Four, this 
sharp distinction can lead to over-protection of those who have particular disabilities 
and under-protection of those who are seen as choosing to put themselves at risk, 
such as women in abusive relationships. A non-discriminatory framework would 
provide the opportunity for a more nuanced response. 
To some extent this is already captured within the safeguarding provisions of 
the Care Act 2014, as discussed in more detail in Chapters One and Four. S 42 (1) (a) 
makes clear that the safeguarding provisions apply even to those adults who are not 
receiving local authority support. Unlike the MCA therefore, the safeguarding 
                                                                                                                                                            
in an adult's affairs is that a person may intervene, or authorise an intervention, only if satisfied 
that the intervention— (a) will provide benefit to the adult which could not reasonably be 
provided without intervening in the adult's affairs, and (b) is, of the range of options likely to fulfil 
the object of the intervention, the least restrictive to the adult's freedom.” However, the 
principles I set out here are narrower and focused on responding to abuse as a situational 
vulnerability rather than incorporating what is, essentially, a proportionality approach which risks 
overriding the wishes of P and coercing her in cases where the risks are sufficiently high.   
221 The reasons for this are explored by Clough who considers the perpetuation of the liberal 
idea of autonomy as reinforcing this vulnerable/invulnerable and protection/autonomy dichotomy, 
for further discussion see Clough (2017). 
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provisions do not state that an impairment or disability is required for the safeguarding 
duty to be triggered. Whilst whether an adult with care needs is able to protect 
themselves is an important way of encompassing those who might be vulnerable as a 
result of their disability, it does not restrict safeguarding to that group. The language 
within the Care Act has therefore changed, but this could be made more explicit so that 
local authorities are compelled to change their safeguarding approach rather than 
resorting back to historic practice where safeguarding only applied to particular 
(inherently) vulnerable adults. This issue is complicated by material constraints on 
resources available to local authorities, highlighting that even where legal discourse 
changes, material factors may still constrain practice. However, if COP interventions go 
down as a result of a strengthened safeguarding framework and increased social work 
legitimacy, then those resources could be diverted to frontline social work practice.222 
Secondly, any safeguarding process and resulting interventions must be carried 
out in partnership with the person, taking into account their own experience and 
desires. The importance of taking into account the embodied wishes and feelings of 
those affected by a decision have been emphasised throughout this thesis and more 
specifically in Chapter Two, section 5 of Chapter Five and section 4 of Chapter Six. 
Failing to hear and take into account the wishes and needs of the individual is less 
likely to result in a successful outcome, whatever the intervention. Similar to my 
arguments about judicial interaction with P at p. 159 of Chapter Five, if social workers 
fail to take into account P’s own experiences then their understanding of what 
constitutes ‘normal’ embodiment risks becoming the standard (Scully, 2012, p. 140). 
Furthermore, there is intrinsic value in involving P; she is valued as an individual and is 
encouraged to develop the capacity to make decisions about her future based on her 
own values. This is, to some extent, captured in the approach known as “making 
                                                      




safeguarding personal” (Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 2017). 223 
However, this rhetoric needs to be strengthened within the legal framework to ensure 
the individual is always consulted and involved at every stage about decisions which 
will affect her. Explicitly enshrining this principle in law strengthens the discursive 
pressure on local authorities to translate that into their practice and strengthens social 
work legitimacy if they are formulating interventions in cooperation with P. 
 Thirdly, any safeguarding intervention must not result in more harm in the 
adult’s life than they were living with before the intervention. This is important because 
many of the COP interventions discussed earlier in this chapter at p. 227 and p. 123 of 
Chapter Four would not fulfil this test. Protecting P by removing her from her home and 
restricting her liberty could be seen as putting her at greater risk of harm and does little 
to empower her as a decision-maker. As discussed in Chapter Two, state intervention 
can create further, pathogenic vulnerability, something we must seek to avoid. 
Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds explain that pathogenic vulnerability can arise “when a 
response intended to ameliorate vulnerability has the paradoxical effect of 
exacerbating existing vulnerabilities or generating new ones” (Mackenzie, Rogers and 
Dodds, 2014a, p. 9). Pathogenic vulnerability is so undermining of autonomy or 
exacerbates other vulnerabilities to such a great extent that it is always undesirable. 
For example, in my discussion at Chapter Two, section 3.2, I explained how in In Re A 
(Capacity: Refusal of Contraception)224 the court held that whilst it was in Mrs A’s best 
interests to receive contraception, it should not be forced on her without her consent. 
Not only would this undermine her autonomy but would likely have exacerbated her 
other vulnerabilities in that she may have avoided contact with professional agencies in 
the future thus making her more isolated and vulnerable to her husband’s influence. 
                                                      
223 Making safeguarding personal is a Local Government Association initiative which brings 
together various local authorities to agree on an approach which, in essence, ensures that 
safeguarding is done with the person rather than following a procedural approach. 
224 [2010] EWHC 1549. 
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Whilst we must therefore be alive to the possibility for pathogenic vulnerability to be 
created by the state, in the context of abuse we must not ignore the pathogenic 
vulnerability created by the abuser.  
A further principle that must guide any change is the need for accountability. 
Two major strengths of the legal process are the possibility of appeal and open justice. 
The latter has arguably been limited in this context up until COP cases were routinely 
held in public as part of the transparency pilot and maintaining this openness is 
important for accountability and procedural fairness. Furthermore, COP decisions can 
be appealed if there are grounds to do so, albeit in practice they rarely are. Conversely, 
the decision-making processes of local authorities, and more specifically social 
workers, are seen to be less accountable. The Health and Care Professions Council 
hold social workers to professional standards. However, if social workers are to be 
given greater legitimacy to intervene in safeguarding cases then additional review 
mechanisms may also be warranted to ensure both an image and reality of fairness 
and accountability (Platt, 2008, p. 304). 
Accountability can partly be promoted through rigorous professional ethics 
standards, which usually hold professions to a higher standard than the civil law. 
Placing ethics at the heart of social work may even be more effective in improving 
safeguarding practice than the traditional resort to law. Montgomery makes a similar 
argument in relation to the demoralisation of medicine (Montgomery, 2006). He 
emphasises the value of professional ethics to healthcare practice in contrast to what 
he described as the “amoral commitment to choice and consumerism” facilitated by 
legal activity (Montgomery, 2006, p. 186). Professional ethics therefore has an 
important role to play in maintaining standards in health and social care. Giving social 
workers greater legitimacy to intervene might be usefully balanced against the stronger 
promotion and protection of professional ethical values to ensure social workers are 
also held accountable. The case for this is even greater in a context of limited 
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resources where resort to the COP is rare. Regulation of the social work profession is 
currently undergoing a period of transition. The Children and Social Work Act 2017 
sets out the development of a new regulator for social workers and may therefore 
provide a useful opportunity to review professional standards to ensure they are 
sufficiently robust, particularly in relation to adult safeguarding. Promoting ethical 
practice in social work is especially important if social workers are to be given greater 
legitimacy to intervene. 
Another way of ensuring accountability that has been suggested in the COP 
context is the possibility of a clear review mechanism for cases where P disagrees with 
a decision, similar to that available under the DOL provisions (Series et al., 2017b). A 
similar review mechanism could be contained within the amended safeguarding 
provisions such that the person affected by the decision has a clear route to challenge. 
This level of review would require an independent body and it is not clear at present 
who would be best placed to carry out that function. However, one option would be to 
make it part of the role of Safeguarding Adults Boards (SABs), created under s 43 Care 
Act 2014. They may be well placed to make such decisions given their statutory 
function to protect adults in their area, albeit their lack of independence from local 
authorities may be a concern.225  
 
4.2. Specific legal reforms to safeguard situationally vulnerable adults 
 
Two situationally focused interventions I briefly explore here are a power of entry to 
access the person vulnerable to abuse and the right to apply for an injunction against 
the perpetrator of abuse. Both of these interventions would strengthen the legitimacy of 
local authorities (and specifically social workers) to intervene in cases of abuse but in 
ways that support and empower rather than coerce the situationally vulnerable adult.  
                                                      
225 Schedule 2 Care Act 2014. 
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The first situational intervention is the right for local authorities to apply for a 
civil injunction against a person suspected of abuse. The power would be related to the 
local authority’s Care Act duty to undertake a safeguarding enquiry and could provide a 
solution for social workers in cases of abuse where other injunctive remedies are not 
appropriate. For example, non-molestation orders under s 42 Family Law Act 1996 can 
only be initiated by the victim of abuse. The most recent family court statistics show 
that there were 6,692 domestic violence remedy order applications in July to 
September 2017, 81% of which were for non-molestation orders (Ministry of Justice, 
2017b). Similar orders are also available to the criminal courts, for example under s 5 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 a court can issue a restraining order against a 
defendant to protect victims of violence. Yet existing injunctive remedies lack the 
specificity of a safeguarding jurisdiction intervention, being viewed more as family or 
criminal law matters; those who do not see their case as falling within those categories 
may not be willing to use those remedies.  
Furthermore, civil non-molestation orders require the consent of the person 
being abused, which is not always easy to gain on a consistent basis to facilitate a 
court application. There are objections to intervening without the continued consent of 
the victim. Perhaps most persuasive being that it is harmful to a victim’s recovery to 
take the decision out of their hands. However, this ignores the reality of abusive 
relationships and the difficulty many will experience in resisting their abuser. This is 
particularly so for those adults whose abuser is also their care-giver, a problem for 
many adults with mental disabilities (Benedet and Grant, 2014, p. 143).  As Benedet 
and Grant also explain, “Feminist theory also offers an important understanding of the 
male power exercised by those who commit acts of sexual violence. Such acts are 
more than the individual decisions of abnormal men” (Benedet and Grant, 2014, p. 
136) and it is this power imbalance that needs to be addressed by the state. I argue 
elsewhere (Lindsey, 2016a) and in Chapter Two that the inherent jurisdiction and the 
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Care Act 2014 might be used together to provide such nuanced and situational 
responses. Yet the inherent jurisdiction can only achieve so much; it lacks the 
legitimacy and widespread knowledge of a statutory framework and is not widely used 
within adult social care.226 
Mental capacity law interventions do not require consent and are typically more 
interventionist than a limited power to grant an injunction to restrict the abuser, rather 
than the victim of abuse. Any new safeguarding injunction that could be applied for 
without initiation by the victim would need to be narrowly defined to avoid becoming 
coercive rather than empowering. Firstly, this would be achieved by limiting the scope 
of the injunction to prohibiting abusive behaviour by the perpetrator and restricting his 
access to the home of the vulnerable adult. The injunction should not be analogous to 
mental capacity law in that it should not limit or prohibit the victim’s right to contact the 
abuser; it should focus on prohibiting the abuser from carrying out further abusive 
behaviour. Secondly, an application for an injunction should require the participation of 
the victim, placing any objection they might have and likely compliance with the order 
as a factor to be taken into account, as is the case with FMPOs (Clark and Richards, 
2008, p. 514). However, requiring a vulnerable adult to initiate an application for an 
injunction is unrealistic and places the material burden on them rather than the 
professional. 
In relation to remedies for breach of a safeguarding injunction, a similar 
approach to that originally introduced by the FMCPA should be taken. Breach of a 
FMPO is contempt of court and a warrant for arrest can be issued227 with a penalty of 
up to two years imprisonment.228 Previously a power of arrest would also be attached 
                                                      
226 Of my interviewees five were aware of the inherent jurisdiction because they or a member of 
their team had been involved in an inherent jurisdiction case. The remaining three interviewees 
were not aware of it and had not been involved in such a case.  
227 s 63J (3) (b) Family Law Act 1996 (as amended). 
228 s 14 Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
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to a FMPO.229 However, s 121 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
introduced the criminal offence of forced marriage thereby making a power of arrest 
unnecessary. I advocate maintaining the civil law approach in the safeguarding context 
by making a breach of any safeguarding injunction a contempt of court and requiring a 
power of arrest to be attached to any orders. This would mean that the court could still 
take action against the abuser swiftly for any breach, thereby bypassing the need for 
the victim to provide evidence in a criminal trial with all of the difficulties that entails (as 
discussed at Chapter Four). Attaching a power of arrest to a safeguarding injunction is 
also important because a power of arrest cannot be ordered under the High Court’s 
inherent jurisdiction or attached to non-molestation orders under the Family Law Act 
1996.230 Whilst the Care Act 2014 statutory guidance importantly makes clear that 
safeguarding is not a substitute for “the core duties of the police to prevent and detect 
crime and protect life and property” (Department of Health, 2017), given the lack of 
protection currently provided by the criminal law, civil law solutions should be used to 
avoid injustice and to minimise further abuse.  
The second intervention, a power of entry to access the vulnerable adult, was 
considered but not adopted in the Care Act 2014 (Samuel, 2012; Norrie et al., 2016). A 
power of entry would have given local authorities a direct power to enter the property 
where they suspected a vulnerable adult was at risk of abuse or neglect to enable them 
to speak to the adult on their own. The power could have been linked to protection 
orders such as the possibility to apply for an injunction as above. A power of entry was 
ultimately rejected as it was felt that it was not necessary despite, according to the now 
defunct College of Social Workers, a survey of over 300 social workers showing that 
84% supported being given a power of entry (Samuel, 2012). Leaving aside neglect, 
                                                      
229 Under the now repealed s 63H Family Law Act 1996. 
230 In Re D (Vulnerable Adult) (Injunction: Power of Arrest) [2016] EWHC 2358. Albeit the 
criminal offence of breaching a non-molestation order was introduced by s 1 Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004.  
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which has not been explored in this thesis, I argue that a power to access the person at 
risk of abuse should be included in any new safeguarding framework. However, the 
power must only be exercised in situations where (1) access has been attempted 
through voluntary means but has been refused, (2) there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the abuser, rather than the vulnerable adult, is impeding access, and (3) 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that abuse has recently or is imminently going 
to take place. 
Giving social workers a power to enter an adult’s home might appear to be 
more coercive than even the MCA. Whilst such a power appears popular amongst 
professionals, it has more limited support from the public, seemingly because of 
concerns around privacy and interference with family life (Stevens et al., 2017). 
However, how a power of entry is viewed is dependent on how the power is framed 
and what can result from it. In my view, a power of entry should not allow social 
workers (or others) to remove the vulnerable adult from their home or otherwise coerce 
them into any course of action, and this should be made explicitly clear. This is 
therefore distinct from the approach taken in Scotland where removal orders, which 
allow the adult to be moved to a place of safety, are linked to the power of entry under 
the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 (Stevens et al., 2017). Instead, a 
narrow power, centred on accessing the vulnerable adult to assess her needs is a 
more situational response to dealing with suspected abuse. Failing to give social 
workers this power merely entrenches the power of the abuser to keep the vulnerable 
adult withdrawn from support services. Provided that such a power is framed narrowly 
and focuses on access and assessment, it can empower social workers to intervene in 
ways that view vulnerability as situational rather than inherent. A scheme piloting a 
power of entry should be funded, with a subsequent review of its effectiveness, taking 
into account the views of those who experienced its use. 
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Other amendments to the Care Act 2014 that should be considered are: a clear 
right of challenge or appeal to any intervention; the provision of greater clarity on the 
interaction between the MCA and adult safeguarding; and a clearer outline of how 
supported decision-making should be implemented in abuse cases. This latter issue 
will not easily be resolved given the MCA’s primary focus on capacity such that if an 
adult is deemed to lack capacity it will always be applicable. However, strengthening 
safeguarding powers may mean that social workers feel that they have more options 
open to them to help protect a non-compliant vulnerable adult at risk of abuse, without 
the need to resort to mental capacity law. 
Any changes to safeguarding adults law must strike an appropriate balance 
between protection and empowerment. As permeates this whole thesis, that balance is 
particularly difficult to achieve in the context of abuse. However, the four minimum 
criteria I have identified here (applicable to all; takes account of the individual’s wishes; 
not result in more harm; accountability) alongside the specific examples of types of 
intervention, will help to better achieve this balance. 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have highlighted that referring welfare cases to the COP can result in 
controlling interventions that coerce rather than empower P. This is, perhaps, 
understandable in high-risk cases of abuse where social workers feel caught between 
their duty of care to protect and wanting to empower the vulnerable adult. It is further 
likely exacerbated by social workers’ limited legitimacy to intervene in supportive ways 
which may lack the enforceability and apparent objectivity of law. However, where 
social workers resort to COP interventions in abuse cases, more often this results in 
over-protection rather than empowerment because P is controlled as a result of wide-
ranging capacity decisions. 
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In light of the use of controlling interventions, I have argued that social workers 
need the legitimacy to intervene in more supportive, situational ways. I have suggested 
this could be achieved through stronger safeguarding provisions, the aim of which 
would be to facilitate a move away from the MCA. The aim in my challenging the use of 
mental capacity law is not to leave adults unprotected. However, interventions need to 
be targeted and be attentive to situational vulnerability. Whilst the MCA undoubtedly 
provides local authorities with some flexibility and provides court authorisation to 
legitimate their decisions, because of its generalist application, diagnostic threshold 
and binary capacity decisions, it too often controls victims of abuse without considering 
more situational responses. In the concluding chapter to my thesis, I look forward to 










In this thesis I have explored mental capacity law in practice. I have done this through 
observing and reviewing COP cases and carrying out interviews with social workers. I 
have focused on the real stories of peoples’ lives, which has provided original material 
to enable me to answer my central research question about how mental capacity law 
empowers and protects vulnerable adults in practice. I have argued that the practice of 
mental capacity law needs to improve in various ways to better empower and protect 
vulnerable adults. Firstly, by understanding individuals as situationally rather than 
inherently vulnerable; secondly, by facilitating and prioritising the individual’s 
participation (and the participation of those who know her) in decisions about her life; 
and thirdly, where interventions are warranted in the name of protection, they should 
empower rather than control the vulnerable adult. 
This thesis has explored a difficult area as the subject matter of the cases 
explored so often concerned details of abuse. However, these are the cases at the 
margins of mental capacity law, where the imperative to protect is high but can often 
result in the control of adults vulnerable to abuse. I have analaysed this area of law and 
practice through vulnerability theory, which I have argued enables a better balance 
between protection and empowerment than an analysis predicated on the concept of 
autonomy. I have argued that vulnerability must be understood as situational, rather 
than solely inherent, and that interventions addressing the situational cause of the 
adult’s vulnerable position must be preferred over those that control and coerce. In this 
chapter I bring these different conclusions together to show how this thesis has made 
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an original contribution to these debates and to provide future suggestions for law 
reform and further research possibilities.  
 
2. Empowering and Protecting Vulnerable Adults 
 
In this section I set out how I have answered the four questions which have guided this 
thesis. These four questions are: 1) Who is understood to be vulnerable in mental 
capacity law and why? 2) To what extent do vulnerable adults participate in mental 
capacity law proceedings? 3) What forms of knowledge are valued in mental capacity 
law? 4) How do mental capacity law interventions balance protection and 
empowerment in relation to adults vulnerable to abuse? Centrally, I explain how my 
vulnerability analysis underpins this thesis and supports my claim that a better balance 
between protection and empowerment can be achieved in mental capacity law. 
 
 
2.1. The meaning of vulnerability  
 
The first substantive question that I answered, and that permeates the entire thesis, 
concerned the meaning of vulnerability. Drawing on case law, my observational 
research and interview data, I considered who is understood to be vulnerable in this 
context and why. This analysis is central to this thesis as I have argued that a 
situational understanding of vulnerability should be applied throughout mental capacity 
law. 
Firstly, using vulnerability theory in Chapter Two I argued that whilst 
vulnerability should be viewed as universal and part of the human condition, it also 
varies individually over time and within different contexts. In making this argument for a 
more nuanced conception of vulnerability, I drew on the work of Mackenzie, Rogers 
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and Dodds (Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014a; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 
2014b) who distinguish inherent from situational forms of vulnerability. Whilst mental 
capacity law disproportionately focuses on inherent vulnerability as it applies to adults 
with mental disabilities, I argued for a shift away from the focus on the inherent towards 
the situational causes of vulnerability to enable vulnerability to be a useful legal device. 
Secondly, I evidenced from my original data that law, social work and the psy 
professions focus on inherent vulnerability. In Chapter Four I provided examples to 
show that inherent approaches to vulnerability dominate the practice of mental capacity 
law. I used my data to demonstrate that a range of participants emphasised inherent 
vulnerability instead of material, situational causes of vulnerability. I argued that this 
framing of vulnerability underpinned both under-protection and over-protection of 
adults, particularly those at risk of abuse. My analysis of these data led to a conclusion, 
supported by much research from the domestic and sexual violence context, that the 
cause of vulnerability was attributed to the victim of abuse – in most cases mentally 
disabled women. Furthermore, I argued that mental capacity law was used in cases 
concerning abuse where the criminal law (and other mechanisms) failed to provide 
sufficient protection. Conversely, over-protection primarily occurred in cases that were 
referred to the COP. This was particularly prevalent in relation to specific findings of 
incapacity which led to P being deprived of her liberty or having her contact with others 
restricted. I argued that the clear focus on inherent vulnerability contributed to a 
paradox of under-protection and over-protection, which underpinned my findings in 
later chapters.  
In applying a vulnerability analysis throughout this thesis, I have highlighted the 
importance of understanding vulnerability as situational, relational and embodied. 
Some argue that a vulnerability approach could be disempowering and lead to 
widespread interventions in the lives of vulnerable adults (Dunn, Clare and Holland, 
2008). However, I highlighted specific examples of how taking an embodied, relational 
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and situational approach can better balance protection and empowerment of 
vulnerable adults. For example, in Chapter Five I explained how a shift in the 
presumption that P should give evidence in mental capacity would help to view P as 
situationally rather than inherently vulnerable, thereby valuing her as a knowledge 
giver. Similarly, I showed in Chapters Four and Seven that different types of 
interventions could be mandated under a situational vulnerability analysis. For 
example, I explained that injunctions could be ordered to protect and empower in 
cases of abuse, which focus on removing or restricting perpetrators rather than the 
vulnerable adult. Additionally, in Chapter Six I highlighted how the focus on inherent 
vulnerability can lead to the privileging of certain forms of evidence in mental capacity 
law, which, in turn, leads to the situational reasons for her vulnerable position being 
sidelined. Instead, having capacity assessments carried out by an individual who 
knows and understands P’s position is more likely to lead to situation sensitive 
responses, which I have advocated throughout.  
All of the above arguments stem from the underpinning finding that mental 
capacity law focuses on inherent causes of vulnerability, such as mental disability or 
gender, rather than the situational causes of vulnerability, such as a lack of support or 
the presence of an abuser. To facilitate any meaningful improvement in the balance 
between protection and empowerment, there must be a wider shift in focus from the 
inherent to the situational causes of vulnerability, which I have argued is possible even 
within the current legal framework.  
 
2.2. Participation of vulnerable adults 
 
The second question I answered in this thesis was to what extent do vulnerable adults  
participate in mental capacity law proceedings. My original empirical data confirmed 
the widely held belief that P rarely participates in mental capacity law proceedings 
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(Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016). As explained in Chapter Five, I presented P’s 
absence as a form of testimonial injustice and argued that P was not valued in her 
“capacity as a giver of knowledge” (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) for reasons related to her 
perceived inherent and situational vulnerability. Reinforcing my argument that mental 
capacity law views its subjects as vulnerable for inherent rather than situational 
reasons, P was assumed to be inherently vulnerable such that she was unable to 
participate or have her experiential knowledge heard. Viewing P as too inherently 
vulnerable to participate in proceedings meant that she was not empowered as a 
decision-maker in her own life. 
In addition to P being viewed as inherently vulnerable, a finding that pervades 
mental capacity law, P was also seen as especially situationally vulnerable as a 
knowledge giver in the courtroom, despite a lack of evidence in individual cases as to 
why P was any more situationally vulnerable than anyone else. These persistent 
assumptions that P was inherently vulnerable led to her voice being pre-emptively 
silenced and her experiential knowledge was excluded from mental capacity law. 
Therefore the meaning of vulnerability in mental capacity law fundamentally shapes the 
course of each case, showing why it is important to articulate a more nuanced, 
situational understanding of the concept. 
In Chapter Five I also explained why P’s participation is so important, focusing 
on valuing her as an experiential knowledge giver and understanding the embodied 
consequences of decisions. In arguing for a strengthening of P’s voice I provided 
specific recommendations for reform and discussed the use of special measures as a 
way of dealing with P’s situational vulnerability. However, I expressed caution about 
the turn to special measures because they risk reinforcing the persistent belief that P is 
especially vulnerable, and that, even with special measures, her evidence would not be 
accepted with the same credibility as others. Any solutions need to take into account 
the impact on how vulnerable adults are viewed more broadly in mental capacity law. 
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The resort to special measures as a way of dealing with P’s limited participation risks 
reinforcing the persistent assumption of inherent vulnerability rather than viewing 
vulnerability as situational. 
 
2.3. Hierarchies of evidence in mental capacity law 
 
In Chapter Six I discussed other evidential claims in mental capacity law, having 
considered the role of P’s evidence in Chapter Five. I argued that law categorises psy 
knowledge in relation to capacity as objective expert evidence, privileging it over the 
experiential evidence of others such as social workers. This reflects the wider findings 
in this thesis that mental capacity law focuses on inherent causes of vulnerability rather 
than considering the situational reasons for an individual’s vulnerability.  This is 
because psy professionals articulate a technical knowledge claim about capacity which 
focuses on the inherent features that impact on decision-making whereas social 
workers are more likely to view P’s situation holistically, taking into account a wider 
range of material-discursive, relational and embodied reasons for vulnerability.  
My data confirmed that mental capacity law treated psy expertise as superior, 
privileging it over evidence from professional and personal experience. I criticised this 
hierarchy and argued that experiential knowledge is more likely to be relevant to issues 
of capacity because of the importance of knowing how particular individuals make 
decisions and what they value. In concluding Chapter Six, I argued for an embodied 
relational approach to assessing capacity, which places greater value on experiential 
rather than expert knowledge. I did this by drawing on the work of feminist scholars 
(Nedelsky, 1990; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Nedelsky, 2011) and combining 
empirical data with the need for a relational analysis. A relational approach to capacity 
assessment would recognise the positive benefits of relationships to facilitating 
capacity and to gaining more reliable knowledge about P, particularly in light of her 
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routine, material absence from COP proceedings identified in Chapter Five. It would 
further facilitate the turn to situational interventions in the typology of cases throughout 
this thesis and help to break down the persistent assumption of inherent vulnerability 
within this area of law.  
 
2.4. Interventions to protect and empower vulnerable adults 
 
The final empirical chapter of this thesis considered the legitimacy of law contrasted 
with social work and how this related to the use of controlling interventions in mental 
capacity law. In Chapter Seven I argued that social works’ limited legitimacy compared 
to law led to them seeking legal legitimation of their decisions in high-risk abuse cases. 
This commonly resulted in interventions in COP proceedings which restricted and 
controlled victims of abuse because of their inherent vulnerability, in contrast to the use 
of interventions that addressed the situational vulnerability factors in P’s life. 
I showed throughout this thesis, but most specifically in Chapter Seven, that the 
COP case files I reviewed most commonly involved allegations of abuse. This finding 
was strengthened by the fact that I did not specifically seek out cases of abuse when 
asking the COP to select case files for the project. Given the problematic response of 
the criminal justice system to allegations of abuse identified in Chapter Four, perhaps it 
is unsurprising that the MCA has become a tool for dealing with abusive behaviours. 
However, I questioned whether the MCA is the appropriate jurisdiction for dealing with 
cases of abuse. I instead argued for a strengthening of the safeguarding adults legal 
framework, setting out the principles that should guide any new framework and 
focusing on balancing empowerment and protection. I also outlined specific examples 
of reforms that might assist in giving social workers the legitimacy to intervene in more 
empowering and situational ways to protect vulnerable adults from abuse. Chapter 
Seven reinforced the pervasive theme in this thesis that abuse needs to be reframed 
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as a situational vulnerability to minimise the use of controlling interventions against 
mentally disabled individuals in the name of their own protection.  
 
3. Future Possibilities for Reform 
 
In this section I set out the future possibilities for reform that arise from my thesis 
findings and arguments. 
 
3.1. Mental capacity law reforms 
 
Throughout this thesis I have identified a number of changes that need to be made to 
mental capacity law to address the challenges identified. In this section I provide 
suggestions for reform including the need for mental capacity law to be non-
discriminatory, for it to focus on the situational cause of the adult’s vulnerable position 
and for a relational understanding of capacity. Whilst some changes to mental capacity 
law have been made since the research was carried out, these have had a limited 
impact on my findings. For example, the new Court of Protection Rules 2017 have 
consolidated the existing provisions under the COPr that applied to this research. 
However, they make no substantive changes to the provisions relating to participation 
and evidence that I analysed in Chapters Five and Six.231 Therefore there remains 
scope for further reforms to improve the balance between protection and 
empowerment in mental capacity law. 
 
                                                      
231 For further analysis of these changes see Ruck Keene et al. (2017). 
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3.1.1. Diagnostic threshold  
 
This thesis has contributed to the argument that the diagnostic threshold contained 
within s 2 MCA is discriminatory and should be removed. This reform has been 
discussed in the literature for some time, particularly in light of the Article 5 UNCRPD 
requirement for non-discrimination on the grounds of disability (Bartlett, 2012; Essex 
Autonomy Project, 2014; Clough, 2014). I have further contributed to this debate by 
highlighting some of the problems associated with a discriminatory legal framework 
which allows intervention on the basis of mental disability. Whilst it is a limitation of this 
thesis that I have not been able to fully explore the impact and relevance of the 
UNCRPD, removing s 2 MCA would contribute to ensuring England’s UNCRPD 
compliance. 
In Chapter Four I explained how the MCA reinforces inherent vulnerability 
which, in turn, allows for under-protection of those vulnerable adults who do not fit that 
norm. Conversely, those adults who are seen as inherently vulnerable and therefore 
fall within the MCA can be subjected to over-protection. I built on this argument in 
Chapters Five and Six where I showed how this inherent vulnerability norm excludes 
P’s voice and privileges the evidence of the psy professions. If, in practice, some form 
of diagnosis of mental disorder or impairment is required because of the wording of s 2 
MCA this undermines the experiential evidence of P and social workers. In Chapter 
Seven I further showed how the COP authorises coercive and controlling interventions 
in cases where adults are found to lack the capacity to make decisions for themselves. 
At present therefore, the law reinforces an inherent vulnerability approach, which 
means that adults with mental disabilities can be over-protected on the basis of their 
inherent vulnerability – their mental disability. Such an approach does little to empower 
individuals as decision-makers in their own life. Therefore this thesis adds weight to the 
argument that the diagnostic threshold of the MCA should be abolished, which should 
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in turn encourage mental capacity law to place greater value on experiential evidence 
and provide vulnerable adults with a more appropriate balance between empowerment 
and protection. 
 
3.1.2. Situational responses 
 
Secondly, the mental capacity law framework should be amended to ensure that 
situational responses to vulnerability are routinely adopted. For example, in Chapters 
Four and Seven I highlighted how decisions about capacity were used to protect the 
vulnerable adult from abuse. However, interventions typically restricted P rather than 
empowered her to live a life free from abuse. Instead, mental capacity law interventions 
need to shift their focus from restricting the vulnerable adult towards addressing the 
situational cause of the adult’s vulnerable position. This did occur in some observed 
and reported cases (for example, N County Council v (1) GI and (2) DQ and In Re A 
(Capacity: Refusal of Contraception)). However, a broader shift in understanding 
vulnerability is required so that interventions can be more nuanced and empowering, 
whilst still providing protection.  
 Relatedly, understanding vulnerability more situationally will help to secure P’s 
participation in mental capacity law proceedings. For example, in Chapter Five I 
considered how P is viewed as situationally vulnerable within the courtroom, 
notwithstanding the universal vulnerability of the witness experience (Hunter, Jacobson 
and Kirby, 2013; Henderson, 2016). If we move away from understanding vulnerability 
exclusively in inherent terms, we can begin to address the specific situational 
vulnerability that is created by legal proceedings. For example, in Chapter Five I 
suggested the use of special measures in response to specific concerns about the 
experience of giving evidence. However, I also argued for a change in evidential 
practice in the COP to ensure that P gives evidence more often and that her evidence 
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is given sufficient weight. In particular I recommended that the Court of Protection 
Rules 2017 be amended to include a rebuttable presumption that P gives witness 
evidence in welfare cases. This is an important step in moving away from the 
assumption that P is inherently vulnerable which currently persists in mental capacity 
law.  
 
3.1.3. Relational reformulation of capacity 
 
The final reform I suggest draws on my arguments about the need for a relational 
reformulation of mental capacity law. Firstly, I argue that mental capacity law should 
take a person-specific rather than act-specific approach to capacity in welfare cases. 
This already occurs in respect of capacity to decide on contact, but, as outlined in 
Chapters One and Four, the tests for capacity to consent to sex and capacity to marry 
are act-specific. I argue that the MCA should be amended to make clear that decisions 
about welfare should take a person-specific approach to capacity. The reasons for this 
were set out in detail in Chapters One and Four. However, the additional findings in 
Chapter Seven - that controlling interventions have become legitimated in mental 
capacity law - reinforce the need for a change in this respect. If the law is unable to 
provide protection for P in relation to a specific partner on an act-specific approach, 
then it is highly likely that controlling interventions will continue to be used to protect P 
from abuse. By moving to a person-specific approach, P’s relational context can be 
taken into account, whilst still allowing for a low overall threshold for capacity. 
 Secondly, a relational approach to capacity involves treating the capacity 
assessment itself as a relational interaction, as argued for in Chapter Six. This is 
because the capacity assessment is the product of an encounter between two people 
(Donnelly, 2009b, p. 477). Where capacity assessments are carried out underpinned 
by a positive and well-developed relationship, they are more likely to facilitate P’s 
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autonomy and gain reliable information about her abilities, wishes, feelings and values 
(Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, 2016). I therefore argue that capacity assessments 
should only be carried out by a person who has a relationship with P, in contrast to the 
current situation where a person carries out a one-off assessment having never met P 
before. As argued in Chapter Six, the issue of independence may need to be 
addressed in individual cases, but any independent assessor would need to establish a 
working relationship with P before any capacity assessment. Understanding mental 
capacity law in these terms values the relational aspect of P’s life, improves knowledge 
and better responds to situational vulnerability. 
 
3.2.  A strengthened safeguarding framework 
 
In Chapter Seven I argued for a strengthened safeguarding adults legal framework. 
This is for two reasons. Firstly, and as explained throughout this thesis, mental 
capacity law is too often used in cases of abuse because of failures elsewhere in legal 
and societal responses to abuse. Therefore mental capacity law has, in the context of 
my research at least, become a forum for managing abusive behaviours in ways that 
coerce rather than empower the vulnerable adult. To facilitate a movement away from 
this approach, I argue for a strengthened safeguarding adults legal framework, which is 
likely best achieved through amending the Care Act 2014. 
Secondly, the legal frameworks currently operating in this area do little to 
empower social workers to intervene in the lives of vulnerable adults in supportive and 
situational ways. A strengthened safeguarding adults legal framework can reinforce the 
value of social work to support, empower and protect vulnerable adults, in ways that 
social workers are currently discouraged or fearful of doing in high-risk cases. If, as I 
have argued in Chapters Six and Seven, social workers are seen to lack the legitimacy 
or objectivity required to make decisions, the prevalence of coercive interventions is 
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unlikely to diminish. In Chapter Seven I therefore argued that there is a need to 
strengthen the safeguarding provisions in the Care Act 2014 but in ways that 
encourage situationally focused, supportive and empowering interventions. 
 
4. Future Research Possibilities 
 
My research has strongly suggested that legal reform is needed, particularly in relation 
to abuse cases which are not appropriate for the MCA legal framework. In addition to 
the proposed legal reforms identified above, I also suggest three areas where further 




Law has been criticised for relying too heavily on doctrinal analyses and analysis of 
reported judgments rather than the social impact of law on people’s lives (Smart, 1989, 
p. 24). This critique can similarly be applied to mental capacity law, which is an area 
that undoubtedly requires further empirical research. This is even more stark at mental 
capacity law’s intersection with adult safeguarding. Whilst there is empirical research 
on the health and welfare jurisdiction of mental capacity law (Emmett et al., 2013; 
Series et al., 2015b; Bartlett et al., 2016; Harding and Tascioglu, 2017; Series, Fennell 
and Doughty, 2017a), and also on its intersection with adult safeguarding law and 
practice (Hollomotz, 2011; Keeling, (2017)), further empirical data is needed to 
elucidate the reality of the law in this area rather than relying predominantly on 
doctrinal analyses, reported judgments and evidence from psy practice. I was informed 
that I was one of the first researchers to carry out research at the COP, the project by 
Series et al. being one of the only others (Series et al., 2015a; Series et al., 2015b; 
Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a). With the recent transparency changes to the 
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COP following the transparency pilot, it should now be an easier site for researchers to 
access and I hope that more data will soon be available. However, the COP is not the 
only site of mental capacity law and how it operates in the everyday lives of individuals 
similarly requires further empirical analysis, of which there is little.  
 As set out in my methodology chapter, there is also a need to approach 
research from a wider methodological perspective. I have valued a range of sources 
and evidentiary material to enable me to get as close to the material reality of the 
practice of mental capacity law as possible, including observations, interviews and 
traditional legal case analysis. These diverse socio-legal methods have helped to 
triangulate my findings and uncover partial truths about mental capacity law in practice. 
Furthermore, by using a material-discursive methodology I have focused on both the 
material conditions and discourse that shapes mental capacity law. I have also 
highlighted the way that law, and its institutions such as courts and lawyers, value 
particular forms of evidence and interventions over others. Therefore despite law’s 
claims to objectivity, the material-discursive intra-action between law and its subjects 
influences the cases that reach court and the outcomes that result. 
There have been a number of methodological limitations to this project, for 
example P’s absence, the limited range of social workers I spoke to and the incomplete 
nature of the information I was able to access at the COP. However, in carrying out a 
project which triangulated data from a range of sources and which valued both material 
and discursive factors, I hope to have made persuasive arguments that make an 
original contribution to this field. Further socio-legal research into the practice of mental 
capacity law, taking a broad and inclusive methodological approach, would strengthen 




4.2. Facilitating P’s participation 
 
Firstly, there needs to be further research into the most effective ways of facilitating P’s 
participation in mental capacity law. This is both in respect of participating in legal 
proceedings and participating in capacity assessments. Whilst there have been some 
analysis of these issues (Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017a), further interrogation is 
required so that P is valued as a decision-maker in her own life and capacity (and best 
interests) decisions are based on reliable information. Series et al. recommend the 
setting up of various working groups to explore some of these issues (Series, Fennell 
and Doughty, 2017a, p. 13). Going beyond that, further research is also required into 
the ways that participation can best be achieved. For example, there is research in the 
family and criminal contexts about the use of special measures (Burton, Evans and 
Sanders, 2007; Brammer and Cooper, 2011; Fairclough, 2017). However, there is 
limited research into how this might translate into mental capacity law and, whether or 
not, different considerations should be taken into account. This thesis contributes to 
this debate but it is also an area that requires further research. 
 Secondly, further research is needed in respect of participating in the capacity 
assessment process. This is not necessarily solely a legal issue but interdisciplinary 
empirical data is required to explore what methods: 1) best achieve P’s participation in 
capacity assessments; 2) best support and empower P; 3) value P’s relational 
connections; 4) gain the most reliable information about P’s decision-making abilities. 
There is research on capacity assessments and how they are carried out in practice 
(Harding and Tascioglu, 2017), but much of it takes a professional-centric view rather 
than focusing on how best to secure P’s participation and empowerment (Cairns et al., 
2005; Owen et al., 2009; Ramasubramanian, Ranasinghe and Ellison, 2011; Skinner et 
al., 2011). Until we know how best to achieve participation, both in court and in 
everyday settings, participation must be facilitated based on the ways that are 
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perceived to be most effective. However, more reliable information is needed to 
maximise the opportunities to empower P and ensure that capacity judgments are well 
informed.  
 
4.3. Remedies for dealing with abuse 
 
Finally, this area of law would benefit from further studies into the impact of injunctive 
remedies in abuse cases. There has been research into the use of civil law remedies 
such as injunctions to respond to domestic abuse and Burton, for example, found that 
the number of applications for non-molestation orders under the Family Law Act 1996 
fell following implementation (Kewley, 1996; Edwards, 2001; Burton, 2009; Wing-
Cheong, 2017). There may be a number of reasons for this ranging from the increased 
use of criminal justice measures, the availability of legal advice and confusion about 
implementation, albeit it “is unlikely that a reduction in domestic violence itself accounts 
for the fall, since the British Crime Survey data suggest that the prevalence of abuse 
has remained fairly stable” (Burton, 2009, p. 114). Therefore whilst there has been 
research into the use of civil law remedies for abuse, it principally focuses on the 
current remedies available, for example non-molestation orders under the Family Law 
Act 1996. In contrast, I have advocated, in this thesis and elsewhere, the use of 
injunctive remedies that could be used without the initiation of the victim of abuse 
(Lindsey, 2016a). Whilst I have argued for the use of such remedies even without the 
ongoing consent of the victim, their engagement is still a crucial factor. However, if 
such an approach is to be expanded, further empirical research is needed into the 
impact of and differences in cases where the victim of abuse is not the person to 
initiate the remedy. 
A critique of my approach might be that failing to obtain a woman’s consent for 
intervention undermines her autonomy. As I explained in Chapter Two, many women in 
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abusive relationships have developed ways of navigating and developing autonomy 
within their abuse situation and remaining within an abusive relationship is, in some 
cases, an autonomous choice based on a risk analysis (Humphreys and Thiara, 2003, 
p. 200). However, as also explained, Humphreys and Thiara also attribute some of this 
risk to the law’s failure to protect (Humphreys and Thiara, 2003). Therefore if, as I have 
argued, the law currently fails to protect women from abuse, then reform is needed to 
strengthen legal protection for abuse victims. In arguing for situational responses and 
civil law remedies, such as injunctions, I suggest the law can both empower and 
protect adults vulnerable to abuse. This is because they are not controlled or coerced 
in any way as happens under mental capacity law, but are still given a degree of legal 
protection to provide them with a safe space away from the abuser. Whilst this remains 
my view, further research is needed to gauge victims’ understanding and experiences 
of such interventions.  
 
5. Final Reflections 
 
In concluding, I am aware that I have not been able to make claims to have uncovered 
objective truths in this thesis, if such claims are possible. However, in using a material-
discursive epistemological approach I have argued for likelihoods of truth or partial 
truths (Harris, 1995; Barad, 2003; Barad, 2007) to make a persuasive case for my 
findings. In doing so I have accepted the role of material factors which shape the 
practice of mental capacity law, including resources and the difficulties in facilitating 
participation in court. I have further highlighted how the discourse of law and 
vulnerability can shape the legal interventions that result and ultimately have material, 
embodied consequences for individuals.  
Whilst this thesis focuses on mental capacity law, I hope that I have also 
provided useful insights into the problem of abuse and adult safeguarding. It is clear 
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that balancing protection and empowerment is a difficult challenge in any context, but 
this is exacerbated where abuse is present because of the understandable desire to 
protect. Yet too often in the cases I reviewed and stories I heard, victims of abuse were 
subject to restrictions, control and surveillance when the primary reason their case was 
before the court was abuse by another. What has become clear to me in carrying out 
this research is that it is only once society views and responds to abuse as something 
caused by the abuser, rather than being the fault of the abused individual, that we will 
begin to tackle the immeasurable problem of domestic abuse and sexual violence in 
our society. Furthermore, the structural failures to respond to abuse across the criminal 
justice system, the police, local authorities and society more broadly require urgent 
attention, and the failures are particularly acute in respect of women with mental 
disabilities. As Robert said to me: 
 
if you are vulnerable you know, if you are elderly if you have a learning 
disability or whatever and someone commits a crime against you that gets 
investigated by social workers who, you know, are not qualified to do so. And 
the rest of the population get the police. 
 
Learning from Robert and other participants about social work was one of the most 
rewarding aspects of the research. I was familiar with the COP having previously 
attended as part of my training as a solicitor, but had very little experience of working 
with social workers. Learning about their role and the difficult decisions they make 
proved insightful and humbling. Whilst I have been critical at points of decisions made 
or explanations given, I completed this research with enormous respect for the social 
work profession. All participants were clearly motivated by the desire to assist the 
adults with whom they worked but were sometimes constrained by the law, or their 
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perception of it, resources and their own pre-existing expectations of what would or 




This thesis has focused on how to balance empowerment and protection of vulnerable 
adults in mental capacity law. I have explored how social workers, psy professionals 
and the court process shape this balance and I have made a number of suggestions 
for reform. In doing so, I hope I have conveyed the stories that I observed and had 
relayed to me with accuracy and sensitivity. I further hope that some of the ‘legalism’ 
that is no doubt present in this thesis will be counterbalanced by reading other ‘non-
legal’ stories that permeate mental capacity law and adult safeguarding. However, the 
benefit of carrying out empirical research with real people is precisely that the stories 
that inform the analysis are much richer and deeper than would otherwise be possible. 
I am therefore grateful to all who shared their stories with me and allowed me an 
insight into their lives. Inevitably with law, things that seem central to a lay person can 
be ignored and therefore my retelling of events may be different from those who 
experienced it directly. However, I hope that future researchers will find my findings 
useful and that my contribution to these debates will have a lasting effect on the 
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Sex Age  Disability Keyword 
summary 
Summary of case  Public 
body  
Applicant DOL Outcome  
1.  K County 
Council v SL 






capacity to marry and 
consent to sexual 
relations. Subject to a 
forced marriage 
protection order and 
concerns about abuse 
and control by her 





No Has capacity.  
Proceedings 
withdrawn. 
2.  ML v (1) TL 




M 82 Dementia Domestic 
abuse 
Investigation of 
capacity for contact 
with wife. Local 
authority were refusing 
for the wife to have 
contact with him 
following concerns of 




Wife of P Unkn
own 
ML died before 
final hearing.  
3.  Z County 
Council v FY 
F  66 Dementia Domestic 
abuse 
Investigation of 
capacity to decide on 
residence, care and 
contact. P in residential 
care but husband 
wants her to return 
home. Local authority 















is at risk of abuse from 
husband and 
concerned about their 
relationship. 
 
4.  Y County 
Council v (1) 
LC (2) GK (3) 
SC 










capacity to consent to 
sex and marriage, 
forced marriage 
protection order in 
place and issue over 
capacity to decide on 
residence and contact 
as well (although lives 
with mother and no 
concerns raised in that 
respect). Case brought 
due to concerns about 
her relationship with a 
man, GK, who she 






No Final order. LC 
lacks capacity 
to: consent to 
sex, to marry 
and to litigate. 




5.  W County 
Council v ZR 





capacity to consent to 
sex. Local authority 
concerned about P re-
establishing a 
relationship with a man 
who had sexually and 






stayed as ZR 
detained under 
s3 Mental 
Health Act 1983. 
6.  C Borough 
Council v (1) 
DY (2) B 


















contact, consent to 
sexual relations and 
contraception. 
Concerns about safety, 
anti-social and 
disruptive behaviour 
and poor college 
attendance. Her 
association and co-
habitation with her 
partner also a 
prominent concern in 








7.  A County 
Council v (1) 
MT (2) KZ 







capacity to consent to 
sex and marriage, to 
conduct proceedings, 
decide on residence 
and care.  
 
No allegations of abuse 






No Ongoing. Interim 






care, to consent 
to sexual 
relations and to 
marry.  
8.  H County 
Council v XC 







capacity to consent to 
sex and marriage. 
Forced marriage 







No Ongoing. Interim 
decision that XC 




No allegations of abuse 
(by family or others), 
although XC had been 
abused in the past. 
 
9.  M County 
Council v EV 






capacity to litigate, 
decide on residence, 
care and contact. 
Capacity to consent to 
sexual relations and 
marriage. Capacity to 
manage his finances.  
 
Concern that his father 
was going to take him 
abroad for marriage 
against his will, forced 
marriage protection 





No Final order. EV 
lacks capacity in 
all domains. 
10.  T City 
Council v CY 












capacity to decide 
matters of contact, care 
and residence. 
Concerns about 
exploitation as alleged 
that she sells her 
belongings and sex for 
alcohol. However, 
sexual capacity not 
investigated on basis 
















care. She does 






11.  J Council v 
RK 
 












capacity to decide on 




came from fertility 
consultant that P may 
be being sexually 
abused by his wife on 
basis that he lacks 
capacity to consent to 





No Transferred to 
High Court 
judge for final 








at time of 
research end.  
12.  K County 
Council v 
MW 





capacity to conduct 
proceedings, consent 
to marriage and 
consent to sexual 
relations. Also subject 
to forced marriage 
protection order as 
concerns that she puts 
herself at risk with men 
and may travel abroad 





No Ongoing. Interim 
finding that MW 
had capacity in 





13.  N County 
Council v (1) 











capacity to decide on 
contact, care and 
residence. At risk of 
domestic violence from 





Yes Ongoing. Interim 
findings of 








were previous court 
proceedings that 
resulted in declarations 
that she has capacity. 
14.  N County 
Council v CA 






capacity to consent to 
sex and marriage. P in 
a relationship with a 
female resident at care 
home and he has a 
history of violence 
against women. 
Therefore local 
authority has concerns 





Yes Ongoing. Interim 
declaration that 
CA: 
lacks capacity to 
conduct 
proceedings; 
but has capacity 
to consent to 










care, capacity to 
marry in the 
future, capacity 














15.  YS v E 
District 
Council 








P challenged his 
deprivation of liberty 
under s21A MCA. 
Investigation of 
capacity for contact, 
care, residence and 
treatment. 
P was released to a 
care home following 
discharge from prison 
following allegations he 
had committed sexual 




P Yes Ongoing. Interim 
declaration that 
YS lacks 
capacity in all 
domains. 
 




due to take 
place with 
further review 4 
months after 
date of order.  
16.  OD v R City 
Council  









capacity to decide on 
care, residence and 
contact. Has history of 
sex offences against 
brother and women. 
Being treated as if 
lacks capacity for 
sexual relations.  
Local 
authority 
P Yes Order that OD 
lacks capacity in 
all domains. 
17.  P County 
Council v (1) 
SE (2) TM 
F 80 Dementia Domestic 
abuse 
Investigation of 
capacity for care, 






























18.  V Borough 
Council v AY 
 











capacity to decide on 
residence.  Allegations 
that P suffers serious 
abuse at home from 
family members and 
related allegations that 
P’s family members 
involved in other 
criminality including 





Yes Order that AY 
lacks capacity 
to: decide where 
to live and 
decide on 
matters of care 
and support. 
Order that it is in 
AY’s best 
interests to have 
contact with his 

















capacity to litigate, 
decide on residence 
and care. 
Alleged vulnerable to 
sexual assault and 
financial exploitation. 









Yes Order that QB 
lacks capacity in 
all domains. 








DOLS expires in 
2017. 
20.  O City 
Council v (1) 
AW (2) FW 


















Capacity for contact 
with family, in particular 
father and brothers. 
History of sexual abuse 
by father and inter-
sibling sexual 
relationships. Family 
potentially contact P 
and therefore case 















Order that it is in 
P’s best 



















Council v SL 





Council v (1) 
LC (2) GK (3) 
SC 
F 23 Autism and mild learning 
disability 





Council v (1) 
DY (2) B 
Council 
 




Council v XC 
M  24 Learning disability and 
deafness 
Marriage, Sex, Proceedings Yes (on second 
occasion) 
2 
T City Council 
v CY 
F 49 Mild to moderate learning 
disability, emotionally 
unstable personality disorder 
Contact, Care, Residence, Proceedings Yes 1 
K County 
Council v MW 
F 20 Learning disability Marriage, Sex, Proceedings No 1 
OD v R City 
Council  
M 46 Mild learning disability and 
schizophrenia 
Sex, Care, Residence, Contact, 
Finances 
No 1 – but hearing 
vacated 
P County 
Council v (1) 
SE (2) TM 
F 80 Dementia Sex, Residence, Care, Contact, 




Table A3: Summary of expert evidence from case files 
 
 











1.  K County 
Council v SL 




Psychiatry Written report Social work (by 






Has capacity.  
Proceedings 
withdrawn. 
2.  ML v (1) TL 




M 82 Dementia Domestic 
abuse 
Unknown Unknown Unknown ML died before 
final hearing.  
3.  Z County 
Council v FY 
F  66 Dementia Domestic 
abuse 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Final order. FY 




as to residence, 
care and contact.  
 
4.  Y County 
Council v (1) 
LC (2) GK (3) 
SC 


















Social work (by 
way of statement 
in COP 
application) 
Final order. LC 
lacks capacity to: 
consent to sex, 








5.  W County 
Council v ZR 




None N/A  Learning 
disabilities nurse 
(by way of 
statement in COP 
application) 
Proceedings 
stayed as ZR 
detained under 
s3 Mental Health 
Act 1983. 
6.  C Borough 
Council v (1) 
DY (2) B 
Council 
 









report of a 
doctor 
Unknown Unknown Final order. DY 




as to residence, 
care and contact. 
 
7.  A County 
Council v (1) 
MT (2) KZ 






Psychiatry  Written report  None Ongoing. Interim 
decision that MT 





care, to consent 
to sexual 
relations and to 
marry.  
8.  H County 
Council v XC 







Written report Social work (by 





decision that XC 









9.  M County 
Council v EV 








Unknown Unknown Final order. EV 
lacks capacity in 
all domains. 
10.  T City 
Council v CY 















Written report Unknown Final order. CY 





care. She does 
have capacity to 
decide on 
contact.  
11.  J Council v 
RK 
 














Unknown Unknown Transferred to 
High Court judge 
for final hearing 






final resolution at 
time of research 
end.  














finding that MW 
had capacity in 





13.  N County 
Council v (1) 
GI and (2) 
DQ 










Unknown Unknown Unknown Ongoing. Interim 
findings of 
incapacity in all 
domains. 
14.  N County 
Council v CA 




Unknown Unknown Unknown Ongoing. Interim 
declaration that 
CA: 
lacks capacity to 
conduct 
proceedings; 
but has capacity 
to consent to 











care, capacity to 
marry in the 
future, capacity 
to consent to 
sexual relations, 
capacity to make 
decisions about 
contraception 
and capacity to 
decide what 




15.  YS v E 
District 
Council 







Unknown Unknown Unknown Ongoing. Interim 
declaration that 
YS lacks 
capacity in all 
domains. 
 
At end of 
research transfer 
of placement was 
due to take place 
with further 
review 4 months 
after date of 
order.  
16.  OD v R City 
Council  




Psychiatry Written report Unknown Order that OD 
lacks capacity in 
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schizophrenia all domains. 
17.  P County 
Council v (1) 
SE (2) TM 




Written report Independent 





Final order. SE 

















18.  V Borough 
Council v AY 
 









None N/A Social work  (by 
way of statement 
in COP 
application) 
Order that AY 
lacks capacity to: 
decide where to 
live and decide 
on matters of 
care and support. 
Order that it is in 
AY’s best 
interests to have 
contact with his 














Psychiatry  Written report Unknown Order that QB 
lacks capacity in 
all domains. 








DOLS expires in 
2017. 
20.  O City 
Council v (1) 
AW (2) FW 
(3) YW (4) 
TW 














None N/A  Social work (by 
way of statement 
in COP 
application) 
Final order. AW 





Order that it is in 
P’s best interests 










SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Introductory and background questions 
 
1.  Please can you provide me with your full name, current position and brief 
employment background. 
2.  Can you describe your typical caseload including how many people you are 
responsible for at any one time? 
 
Questions around sexual activity and marriage cases 
 
3.  Have you got any cases at the moment or have you had previously any cases 
where you have had concerns around the adult engaging in sexual activity or 
marriage? If so, can you tell me a bit about those cases and what your concerns 
were? 
4.  What, if anything, did you do about your concerns? 
5.  Did you see the adult as vulnerable? If so, what do you mean by this? 
6.  What is your perspective on the position of men and women with learning or 
mental disabilities engaging in sexual activity?  
 
Questions around the Court of Protection 
 
7.  Are you familiar with the Court of Protection and the inherent jurisdiction of the 
High court? 
8. Have you ever had any cases which have gone to court? If yes, ask for details. 
9. What were your experiences of the court process and did you think it was positive 
 
 316 
for the subjects of the proceedings? For example, were they asked to give 
evidence and did you think they were sufficiently involved in the process?  
10. Would or have you ever considered referring a case to Court? If yes why, if no 
why not? 
11. What criteria do you think are relevant in identifying which cases can and should 
go to a court for a decision about a vulnerable adult? 
 
Questions around supported decision making 
 
12. Are you familiar with the concept of supported decision making? If so, please tell 
me your understanding of it. If not then I can provide you with my understanding. 
13. What do you think of the concept of support being used in all scenarios of adult 
protection instead of court authorised interventions?  
14. To what extent is supported decision making something you currently use in 
practice? 
15. Do you feel that support as an approach to adult protection can get the same 




16. Generally, do you have any comments or concerns about how the law relating to 
vulnerable adults operates? Whether the MCA, IJ or Care Act? 
17. Have you always worked with vulnerable adults or have you worked in any other 
areas of social care? 
18. Do you think there are many differences? 





SOCIAL WORK INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET AND 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Social worker interview participant information sheet 
A critical analysis of the test for mental capacity: autonomy, sexual activity and 
supported decision making 
 
Aims of the research 
This project, conducted by Jaime Lindsey (PhD candidate at the University of 
Birmingham), and supervised by Professor Rosie Harding (Professor of Law and 
Society at the University of Birmingham), explores the extent to which the current 
legal and social approach to mental capacity appropriately supports the autonomy of 
those who experience mental disabilities (this covers adults with learning disabilities, 
mental health issues and any other issue which may lead to an adult lacking mental 
capacity). 
 
The study is focusing on the current legal framework, both in terms of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court, which 
allows courts to intervene in the lives of vulnerable adults and adults who lack 
capacity in their “best interests”. The research is particularly considering the issue of 
capacity to consent to sexual activity as this draws out some of the most challenging 
legal and ethical issues, but social workers with wider experience of using the MCA 
in welfare decision making are still encouraged to participate.  
 
The study is also concerned with finding out how the concept of “vulnerability” is 
employed in this context and the researcher is interested to find out why social 
 
 318 
workers think particular cases reach the court room when many other, similar cases 
do not. 
 
The research will also be examining whether social work professionals have any 
particular perspectives or thoughts on the implementation of supported decision 
making as a way of enhancing the autonomy for those with reduced mental capacity. 
Data obtained in the interviews will also build upon observational research that the 
researcher is undertaking in the Court of Protection. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study on the basis that 
you are a social worker who works with individuals who may be subjected to legal 
interventions in their lives under the MCA or Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please do take 
the time to read this information sheet carefully.  Ask the researcher if there is 
anything that is unclear or if you would like more information. 
 
Engagement in this particular aspect of the study involves participating in an 
interview with the researcher.  The interview will last for approximately forty-five 
minutes, although it may take longer, depending on how much you would like to say. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
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You will be interviewed at your offices in relation to your experiences of dealing with 
individuals who potentially lack capacity to make health and welfare decisions. 
 
Prior to participation, you will be asked to sign a copy of the enclosed consent form. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
Participating in this research allows you to directly contribute to original research 
being conducted into a new and developing area of health and social care law, as 
well as enabling you to reflect upon your own practice. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
It is not envisaged that you will be exposed to any risk by partaking in this study.  
However, the University of Birmingham has in force a Public Liability policy, which 
provides cover for claims for ‘negligent harm’, and the activities here are included 
within that cover. 
 
Am I free to withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you are able to withdraw from the study without implication.  You may withdraw 
either verbally during the interview itself, or afterwards by contacting the researcher 
by e-mail within 6 months of the interview date. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should contact the 
researcher using the details set out below.  She will do her best to answer your 
questions. 
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/ or wish to raise a complaint about 
any aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of 
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the study please write to Professor Rosie Harding, also at Birmingham Law School.  
You may alternatively contact her by e-mail at  or by phone 
on  
 
How will information about me be used? 
The interviews will be audio-recorded.  Upon their completion, the researcher will 
personally transcribe them.  All potentially identifying data will be removed during the 
transcription process. 
 
The researcher will prepare a summary of findings that will be presented at 
conferences relating to gender and health and social care law, as well as published 
in journal articles or books.  The findings will also be used in order to produce the 
researcher’s PhD thesis.  Quotes from the hearings may be used in conjunction with 
pseudonyms, if you consent to this. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Everything said within the interview will be kept confidential.  Your confidentiality will 
be protected at all times, both during and after this study.  Only the researcher will 
hear the entirety of the audio recording of your interview, although she may play 
excerpts from it to her supervisor.  If you consent, audio recordings and transcripts 
will be retained for a period of 10 years as per the University of Birmingham code of 
practice on research. If you do not consent to this storage, audio recordings and 
transcripts will be destroyed at the end of this research project, when the researcher 
no longer needs access to the data. 
 
The researcher will ensure that no identifiable data relating to you, your service users 




Who is funding the research? 
The researcher’s PhD is being funded by way of a scholarship at Birmingham Law 
School. 
 
Will I receive any feedback after the interview? 
The researcher will seek to obtain your e-mail address, which she will subsequently 
keep separately from your interview data.  Once the project is finished, the 
researcher will e-mail you with a summary of the findings. 
 
Contact for further information 
If you have any questions, please contact Jaime Lindsey by e-mail at 
. You can also write to her at Birmingham Law School, 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT. You can also contact 





Consent form – social work interview 
 
 
Title of project: A critical analysis of the test for mental capacity: autonomy, sexual 
activity and supported decision-making 
Name of researcher: Jaime Lindsey (supervised by Professor Rosie Harding) 
 
Please initial each box to confirm whether or not you agree: 
 
  Yes No 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study entitled ‘Social work interview participant information 
sheet’ and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time within 6 months of the date of this consent form. 
  
3 I agree to take part in this study.    
4 I agree to my interview with the researcher being digitally recorded.   
5 I understand that the data collected about me during this study will be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
  
6 I agree that anonymised quotes can be used.   
7 I agree that audio recordings may be confidentially stored for 10 years   
8 I agree that an anonymised transcript of the interview may be 
confidentially stored for 10 years 
  
9 I agree to my identifiable data being transferred to, stored and 
analysed by the University of Birmingham 
  
 
__________________ ___________________ ____________________ 
Name of participant  Date    Signature 
__________________  ___________________ ____________________ 






CASE FILE REVIEW TEMPLATE 
 
 
Research Project: A critical analysis of the test for mental capacity: autonomy, sexual 












Details about P 
 




































[INSERT CASE NUMBER AND ANONYMISED CASE NAME] 
 
I write to seek your consent to participate in a research project which I am carrying 
out with the approval of HMCTS, the Ministry of Justice and the Court of Protection. 
Please read the detailed information about the research which is contained within the 
enclosed participant information sheets. In summary, I am seeking your consent to 
attend and observe the hearing in this case scheduled for [INSERT DATE]. 
 
If you are a professional representative of one of the parties in this case, I should be 
grateful if you would also seek the consent of your client to this research. If you (and, 
if applicable, your client) decide to take part, please return the signed consent form in 
advance of the hearing preferably by email:  or by post: Jaime 
Lindsey, University of Birmingham, School of Law, Edgbaston, B15 2TT. If you do not 
Our Ref:  [INSERT CASE NUMBER]  
Your Ref: [INSERT] 
 
[Date]    
 
 
[INSERT PARTY CONTACT DETAILS] 
 






wish to take part then please let me know in advance as if I do not hear from you 
before the hearing, I may also seek your consent on the day. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me directly if you have any questions or concerns 






Enc.  Participant Information sheets (simplified and non-simplified) 






OBSERVATIONAL PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEETS (NON-SIMPLIFIED 
AND SIMPLIFIED) AND CONSENT FORMS (NON-SIMPLIFIED AND SIMPLIFIED) 
 
Observational research participant information sheet 
A critical analysis of the test for mental capacity: autonomy, sexual 
activity and supported decision making 
 
Aims of the research 
This project, conducted by Jaime Lindsey (PhD candidate at the University of 
Birmingham and practising solicitor), and supervised by Professor Rosie Harding 
(Professor of Law and Society at the University of Birmingham), explores the extent 
to which the current legal approach to mental capacity appropriately supports the 
autonomy of those who experience mental disabilities. 
 
The study is focusing on the current legal framework, both in terms of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court, which 
allows courts to intervene in the lives of vulnerable adults and adults who lack 
capacity in their “best interests”. The research is primarily focussed on cases in the 
context of capacity to consent to sexual activity, capacity to marry and capacity to 
decide on matters of contact as these cases draw out some of the most challenging 
legal and ethical issues relating to autonomy and supported decision making.  
 
The observational research will also involve considering the extent to which the 
subject of the proceedings is involved in the court process and the language used in 
the court room which may point to underlying presumptions surrounding autonomy 
and the mentally disabled. Data obtained in the observational research will contribute 




You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study on the basis that 





Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please do take 
the time to read this information sheet carefully.  Ask the researcher if there is 
anything that is unclear or if you would like more information. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are free to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
Prior to participation, you will be asked to sign a copy of the enclosed consent form. 
You will also be expected to liaise with your client (if a solicitor) to obtain their 
consent for the researcher to observe. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
Participating in this research allows you to directly contribute to original research 
being conducted into a new and developing area of health and social care law, as 
well as enabling you to reflect upon your own practice. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
It is not envisaged that you will be exposed to any risk by partaking in this study.   
 
Am I free to withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you are able to withdraw from the study without implication.  You may withdraw 
either verbally during the observation itself, or afterwards by contacting the 
researcher by e-mail within 6 months of the date of the consent form. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should contact the 
researcher using the details set out below.  She will do her best to answer your 
questions. 
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/ or wish to raise a complaint about 
any aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of 
the study please write to Professor Rosie Harding, also at Birmingham Law School.  





How will information about me be used? 
The researcher will make notes during her observation of the Court proceedings.  
Upon completion, the researcher will personally review these notes and all potentially 
identifying data will be removed. 
 
The researcher will prepare a summary of findings that will be presented at 
conferences relating to gender and health and social care law, as well as published 
in a journal article.  The findings will ultimately be used in order to produce the 
researcher’s PhD thesis.  Quotes from the hearings may be used in conjunction with 
pseudonyms, if you consent to this. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Everything said within the observation will be kept confidential.  Your confidentiality 
will be protected at all times, both during and after this study. If you consent, 
transcripts will be retained for a period of 10 years as per the University of 
Birmingham code of practice on research. If you do not consent to this storage, 
transcripts will be destroyed at the end of this research project, when the researcher 
no longer needs access to the data. 
 
The researcher will ensure that no identifiable data relating to you, your service users 
or any other party is published or otherwise shared. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The researcher’s PhD is being funded by way of a scholarship at Birmingham Law 
School. 
 
Will I receive any feedback? 
The researcher will seek to obtain your e-mail address and once the project is 
finished, the researcher will e-mail you with a summary of the findings. 
 
Contact for further information 
If you have any questions, please contact Jaime Lindsey by e-mail at 
You can also write to her at Birmingham Law School, 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT. You can also contact 




Participant information sheet 
Research title: Does English Law support people with mental disabilities? 
 
We are asking if you would join in a research project. Research is a way of 
answering a question or problem. 
 
In this research we are looking into the law’s approach to mental capacity and 
whether it supports people with mental or learning disabilities to live an independent 
life. The research is mainly looking at cases relating to sex, marriage and contact 
with friends and family.  
 
What you are being asked? 
Before any research is allowed to happen, it has to be checked by a group of people 
called a Research Ethics Committee. They make sure that the research is fair. Your 
project has been checked by the University of Birmingham Research Ethics 
Committee.  
 
You are invited to take part on the basis that the Court is considering making 
decisions about your life and we want to know how and why the Court does this. The 
researcher would like to know how much you are involved in the Court process and 
how the Court takes into account your feelings and wishes about sex, marriage, 
contact with friends or family.  
 
Before you decide if you want to join in, it‘s important to understand why the research 
is being done and what it will involve for you. So please consider this leaflet carefully. 
Talk to your family, friends or social worker if you want to.  
 
The researcher will not contact or speak to you directly. She will be sitting in the 
Court room and writing notes about what she sees.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You can decide whether or not to take part. If you do wish to take part you will be 
asked to sign a copy of the enclosed consent form.  
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
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Taking part in this research allows you to contribute to original research in a new and 
developing area of health and social care law. The researcher’s aim is to improve the 
law in this area for people living with mental disabilities. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
We do not believe that you will be exposed to any risk in taking part in this research.   
 
Am I free to withdraw from the research? 
Yes, you are able to withdraw either by saying this to the researcher or your 
friends/family/social worker in the Court room or afterwards by contacting the 
researcher by e-mail within 6 months of the date of the consent form. 
 
Who is conducting the project? 
This project, conducted by Jaime Lindsey (PhD candidate at the University of 
Birmingham and practising solicitor), and supervised by Professor Rosie Harding 
(Professor of Law and Society at the University of Birmingham),  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any problems with the research you should contact the researcher using 
the details set out below or speak to somebody that you trust.  
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint please 
write to Professor Rosie Harding, also at Birmingham Law School.  You may 
alternatively contact her by e-mail at  or by phone on  
 
 
How will information about me be used? 
The researcher will make notes on her computer while sitting in the Court room. The 
researcher will not use your name or any other information that another person could 
use to identify you. 
 
The researcher will prepare a summary of findings that she will use in her work. 
Quotes of what you or others have said may also be used in conjunction with fake 
names, if you agree to this. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
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Everything said within the observation will be kept confidential. This means that only 
the researcher will know that the information is about you.  Your confidentiality will be 
protected at all times, both during and after this study. If you consent, the typed up 
notes will be kept for 10 years. If you do not consent to this storage, the notes will be 
destroyed at the end of this research project, when the researcher no longer needs 
access to the data.  
 
Who is funding the research? 
The researcher’s PhD is being funded by way of a scholarship at Birmingham Law 
School. 
 
Will I receive any feedback? 
If you would like to you can provide the researcher with your contact details and once 
the project is finished the researcher can contact you with a summary of the findings. 
 
Contact for further information 
If you have any questions, please contact Jaime Lindsey by e-mail at 
. You can also write to her at Birmingham Law School, 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT. You can also contact 





Consent form – observational research 
 
Title of project:  A critical analysis of the test for mental capacity: autonomy, sexual 
activity and supported decision making 
 
Name of researcher: Jaime Lindsey (supervised by Professor Rosie Harding) 
 
Please tick box: 
  Yes No 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study entitled ‘Observational research participant information 
sheet’ and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time within 6 months of the date of this consent form. 
  
3 I agree to take part in this study.    
4 I understand that the data collected about me during this study will be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
  
5 I agree that anonymised quotes can be used.   
6 I agree that any anonymised notes of the proceedings may be 



























Title of project:  Does English Law support people with mental disabilities? 
 




Do you understand what this project is about?    Yes / No 
Have you asked all the questions you want?     Yes / No 
Have you had your questions answered in a way you understand?  Yes / No 
Do you understand it’s OK to stop taking part at any time?    Yes / No 
Are you happy for the researcher to use the information for her project? Yes / No 
Are you happy to take part?        Yes / No 
 
If any answers are “no‟ or you don’t want to take part, don’t sign your name! If you do 
want to take part, you can write your name below:      
  
_______________________ 

















Please tick the box if you are happy for the researcher to keep  





APPENDIX SEVEN  




Table A4: Review of 2016 reported cases on BAILII at 13 September 2017 
 
 
 Case name Court Judge Level of Judge Date Summary 




Circuit Judge 12 January 
2016 
Contested application for 
property and affairs deputy 
2.  Birmingham City Council v D (by 
his litigation friend, the official 
solicitor) and W 








Deprivation of liberty for 
16 year old 








Termination of pregnancy 




Circuit Judge 14 January 
2016 
Property and affairs 
deputyship 
5.  North Yorkshire County Council, 
A Clinical Commissioning Group 
v MAG & Anor  









Deprivation of liberty 
6.  PJV v (1) The Assistant Director 
adult social care Newcastle city 
council (2) The criminal injuries 
compensation authority  











Deputyship over criminal 
injuries compensation 
award 




Circuit Judge 5 January 
2016 
Deputyship for property 
and affairs 




Circuit Judge 8 January 
2016 
Revocation of Lasting 
Powers of Attorney for 
property and affairs and 
health and welfare 









Capacity for residence, 
care, contact and litigation 
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Circuit Judge 2 February 
2016 
Revocation of Lasting 
Power of Attorney for 
property and affairs 








Property and affairs 
deputyship 




District Judge 26 February 
2016 
Best interests as to 
residence 
13.  Re W (Medical treatment: 
anorexia) 






Medical treatment and 
care in respect of anorexia 




Circuit Judge 1 March 
2016 
Deputy for property and 
affairs  









Deprivation of liberty and 
Re X procedural issues 
16.  NHS Trusts v C (Medical 
Treatment and Reporting 
Restrictions Order) 








Medical treatment in 
respect of pregnancy 








Advance decision and 
capacity in respect of 
medical treatment 
18.  The London Borough of 
Southwark v KA (Capacity to 
Marry) 








Capacity to decide on 
care, consent to sex, 
marriage and litigation 

















Circuit Judge 24 March 
2016 
Revocation of lasting 
power of attorney for 
property and affairs 








Withdrawal of medical 
treatment 
22.  V v Associated Newspapers 
Limited & Ors 


















District Judge 14 April 
2016 
Deprivation of liberty 
24.  A County Council v AB & Ors Not listed His Honour 
Judge 
Rogers 
Circuit Judge 31 May 
2016 
P’s participation in 
proceedings 
25.  Cambridge University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust v BF  








Consent to medical 
treatment 




Circuit Judge 12 May 
2016 
Revocation of Lasting 
Power of Attorney for 
property and affairs and 
health and welfare 








Withdrawal of medical 
treatment 
28.  Staffordshire County Council v 
SRK & Anor 











Deprivation of liberty 
29.  University College London 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
v G  



















31.  Devon County Council v Martins 
& Anor 








Capacity and best 
interests in relation to 
residence 














Circuit Judge 23 June 
2016 
Deprivation of liberty 
34.  V & Associated Newspapers Ltd 
& Ors 












35.  Re AG Not listed District Judge 
Bellamy 
District Judge 6 July 2016 Capacity for care and 
residence and deprivation 
of liberty 




Circuit Judge 1 July 2016 Executor for statutory will 
37.  The Friendly Trust’s Bulk 
Application 




District Judge 29 July 
2016 
Deputies for property and 
affairs 
38.  Mrs P v Rochdale Borough 





District Judge 18 July 
2016 
Deprivation of liberty, care, 
residence and deputyship 
for property and affairs 
39.  Re A (A patient) (No 2) Royal Courts of 
Justice 
Sir Munby P High Court 
Judge 
(President of 




Procedure, publication of 




40.  Re A (A patient) Royal Courts of 
Justice 
Sir Munby P High Court 
Judge 
(President of 




Property and affairs and 
associated applications 





Circuit Judge 30 August 
2016 
Care and deprivation of 
liberty 








Contempt of court 
application 
43.  RD & Ors (Duties and Powers of 
Relevant Person’s 
Representatives and Section 
39D IMCAS) 








Deprivation of liberty and 
relevant person’s 
representatives 










Consent to medical 
treatment 








Capacity to decide on care 
and residence 









Jurisdiction of Court of 
Protection 












Withdrawal of medical 
treatment, preliminary 
issue 




Circuit Judge 18 
November 
2016 
Authority for deputy to 
execute a statutory will 
and transfer land 
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Circuit Judge 17 
November 
2016 
Capacity to decide on 
care, residence and 
litigation 
50.  N (Deprivation of liberty 
challenge) 







Deprivation of liberty 
51.  Newcastle City Council v TP & 
Anor (Capacity) 





Circuit Judge 25 
November 
2016 
Capacity for care, contact, 
residence and litigation, 
deprivation of liberty 
52.  Newcastle City Council v TP & 
Anor (Judgment findings) 





Circuit Judge 22 
November 
2016 
Capacity for care, contact, 
residence and litigation, 
deprivation of liberty – 
factual findings 
53.  Newcastle-Upon-Tyne City 
Council v TP & Anor (Best 
Interets of TP No. 1) 





Circuit Judge 22 
November 
2016 
Capacity for care, contact, 
residence and litigation, 
deprivation of liberty – 
best interests 
54.  Newcastle-Upon-Tyne City 
Council v TP & Anor (Capacity 
of TP No. 2) 





Circuit Judge 25 
November 
2016 
Capacity for care, contact, 
residence and litigation, 
deprivation of liberty  
55.  Newcastle-Upon-Tyne City 
Council v TP & Anor (Final No. 
3) 





Circuit Judge 21 
December 
2016 
Best interests as to 
residence 











Property and affairs 
deputy 
57.  X (No: 2. Declaration that X has 
capacity) 

























Withdrawal of medical 
treatment 
59.  Cheshire & Wirral Partnership 
NHS Foundation Trust v Z 









Capacity to decide on care 
and treatment in relation to 
anorexia 









Costs of proceedings 
relating to withdrawal of 
medical treatment 
61.  Newcastle-Upon-Tyne City 





Circuit Judge 21 
December 
2016 
Best interests in relation to 
care, residence and 
contact 
62.  Re CA (Natural Delivery or 
Caesarean Section) 








Capacity to decide on 
medical treatment 
(caesarean section) 
63.  Re R (Serious Medical 
Treatment) 









Withdrawal of medical 
treatment 
 
